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This study provides an analysis of the United States’ foreign policy toward the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 1990-2014. This period has witnessed four different 
American Presidents: the Republicans, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, and the 
Democrats, Bill Clinton and Barack H. Obama. Republicans and Democrats have both 
maintained relatively close relations with Jordan. This study concluded that the most 
important factors that shaped the United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan are the 
geopolitical location, ideology, moderate regime, regional security dimension, and Arab-
Israeli peace process. This study explores the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
of October 26, 1994, which markedly enhanced US-Jordan bilateral relations to 
unprecedented levels. The United States’ foreign aid, Qualifying Industrial Zones, and 
the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement have dramatically boosted the Jordanian economy 
and modernized its military weapon systems. This study found that the primary concern 
of the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East is securing strategic access to oil 
ii 
in the Gulf region, supporting and protecting Israel’s sovereignty, maintaining the United 
States’ military bases, particularly in the Gulf states, defending client-states and friendly 
regimes, and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups.     
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Statement of the Problem 
The League of Nations granted Britain mandates over Iraq, Palestine, and 
Transjordan while France was given the mandate over Lebanon and Syria as a result of 
the San Remo Conference of April 1920. The Emirate of Transjordan was created by 
Britain and established its own government on April 11, 1921. Transjordan’s defense, 
finances, and foreign affairs were regulated by the British.1 Two years later, 
Transjordan’s independence was recognized, albeit with certain restrictions imposed by 
the British,2 and established Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein as its emir, in May of 1923.3 
Abdullah’s negotiations with the British concluded with the new Anglo-Transjordanian 
Treaty on March 22, 1946. Under this treaty, Transjordan was officially acknowledged as 
a sovereign state and continued a friendly and peaceful relationship with Britain. 
Additionally, the treaty gave Britain access to Transjordan’s military facilities in 
exchange for British subsidies and support of the Arab Legion.4
                                                          
1 Karen Wills, Jordan, Modern Nations of the World (San Diego, CA: Lucent Books, Inc., 2001), 
30.  
 
2 Robin Surratt, ed., The Middle East, 9th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 
2000), 288. 
 
3 Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), 108-10.  
 
4 Ibid., 152-53. 
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On May 22, 1946, the British mandate over Transjordan ended. Three days later, 
the country gained full independence as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan and 
Prince Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein was proclaimed its king. Transjordan continued to have 
a special defense treaty relationship with Britain until 1957. On May 14, 1948, the British 
mandate over Palestine ended and the Jewish leaders declared the independence of 
“Israel.” Transjordan aligned with its Arab neighbors to assist Arab Palestinian 
nationalists opposed to this new development. The first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 
continued until the armistice agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed on April 3, 
1949, which effectively transferred control of the Palestinian West Bank and the Old City 
of Jerusalem (East Jerusalem) to Jordan.5  
In April 1949, the regime in Amman renamed Transjordan the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ; referred to as Jordan for simplicity going forward), following 
King Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein’s annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem.6 Just a 
year later, the Jordanian parliament approved the annexation. Despite this formality, only 
Britain and Pakistan acknowledged the annexation.7 Jordan continued administrating the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem until Israel gained control of it during the Six-Day War of 
1967. From 1970-1971, Jordan was ruined by fighting between the government and 
guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a struggle that finally ended 
with the PLO’s ejection from Jordan. On July 31, 1988, King Hussein renounced all 
Jordanian claims to the Palestinian West Bank in favor of the PLO and signed a peace 
                                                          




7 Wills, Jordan, Modern Nations of the World, 34. 
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treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994. Upon the death of King Hussein in February 
1999, his eldest son, Prince Abdullah (later renamed King Abdullah II) assumed the 
throne of Jordan. 
Jordan is a small state with few valuable natural resources in the heart of the 
Middle East. Since its creation in the aftermath of World War I, Jordan has been 
challenged by powerful neighbors Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and shares the longest 
border with Israel of any Arab state. Despite its lack of natural resources, Jordan has been 
the beneficiary of foreign aid from the world’s great powers (Britain and later the United 
States). Given its crucial role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jordan also benefited from the 
response of other Arab states, especially during the height of the Arab oil industry.8 
The long relationship between the United States and Jordan dates back decades. 
Diplomatic relations between Amman and Washington, DC were initiated on January 31, 
1949. Since then, the United States has continued its interest in strengthening and 
consolidating its relations with Jordan. In fact, the two nations celebrated the sixtieth 
anniversary of continuous diplomatic relations in 2009. 
 The focus of this study is to examine the United States’ foreign policy toward 
Jordan from 1990-2014. The year 1990 was pivotal as it represents a dramatic change in 
the world system, changing from bipolar to unipolar. The United States became the sole 
world power in the aftermath of the Cold War. The year 2014 represents the end of this 
study as it is the most recent historical year. In addition, this study explores what shapes 
and sustains the American-Jordanian relationship, in spite of a succession of American 
                                                          
8 Surratt, The Middle East, 285. 
4 
   
administrations and the political transformations that have taken place in the Middle East 
and around the world. 
Research Questions 
The researcher poses a primary question and numerous secondary questions for 
review. Primarily, this study strives to answer: 
What factors contributed to the shaping of the United States’ foreign policy 
toward Jordan during the period of this study, 1990-2014? 
Additionally, the researcher will answer the following secondary questions: 
i. What is the significance of Jordan’s geopolitical location in the Middle East to the 
United States’ foreign policy?  
ii. What is the significance of Jordan’s ideology in the context of the Middle East to 
the United States’ foreign policy? 
iii. What is the significance of Jordan’s regime in the Middle East to the United 
States’ foreign policy? 
iv. What is the significance of Jordan’s security in the Middle East to the United 
States’ foreign policy?  
v. What is the significance of Jordan’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 
Middle East to the United States’ foreign policy?  
vi. What is the importance of Jordan’s role in fighting terrorism in the Middle East to 
the United States’ foreign policy?  
vii. Do the Congressmen of the United States influence the special relationship 
between the United States and Jordan? 
5 
   
viii. What are the primary objectives of the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle 
East?  
Hypotheses 
The foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan is primarily shaped by a 
widespread belief among successive American administrations that maintaining Jordan’s 
security and stability is significant to the United States’ national security interests in the 
Middle East region and instability of Jordan would lead to the spread of radical Islamic 
movements that might threaten the United States’ national security interests in the region. 
The contemporary belief among American decision-makers is that Islamist movements 
aim to liberate Palestinian territories that now comprise Israel through military force, 
violence, and terrorist means. Thus, Jordan’s instability might pose a substantial threat to 
the United States and its allies in the Middle East. 
Based on the above statement, the researcher proposes the following three 
exploratory hypothesis statements:  
Hypothesis One: Jordan’s stability is crucial for the United States to maintain its 
national security interests in the Middle East.  
Hypothesis Two: Jordan’s instability might lead to the spread of radical Islamic 
movements, which might pose a substantial threat to the United States’ national security 
interests in the Middle East. 
Hypothesis Three: Foreign aid and economic agreements have been utilized as 
principal instruments of the United States’ foreign policy to exercise influence over 
Jordan to achieve certain political objectives. 
6 
   
The diverse research data collected for the purpose of this study will test each 
hypothesis. The supported hypotheses will be accepted and confirmed, while those not 
supported will be rejected.  
Limits of the Study 
The year of 1990 represents the beginning period of this study due to the dramatic 
changes that took place in the world and the Middle East. At that time, as previously 
mentioned, the international system changed from bipolar to unipolar, resulting in the 
United States becoming the sole world superpower after the end of the Cold War. This 
change has had a profound impact on the international system and the way it is governed, 
particularly in the Middle East. Further, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 had a substantial 
impact on Jordan, as did the announcement of the “New World Order,” and the final 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The year of 2014 will represent the end of the 
period of this study as the most recent in history. On occasion, the researcher will discuss 
events before the period of this study as well as afterward to enrich essential elements of 
this study. The spatial domain will include the general region of the Middle East, Jordan, 
and the United States.  
Major Concepts 
The fundamental concepts pertinent to this study are foreign policy, the foreign 
policy of the United States, national interest, Jordan, and the Middle East. The concepts 
presented below will be defined either by a relevant source or by the author of this study 
and will be followed by a brief discussion.  
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Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy includes a range of political actions such as conducting 
negotiations, writing position papers, establishing bilateral-multilateral security 
agreements, initiating trade boycotts, and waging war that are taken by governments to 
achieve goals and shape relationships with other nations. Foreign policy may require 
political, economic, cultural, or military resources.9    
The Foreign Policy of the United States 
The foreign policy of the United States is a plan that outlines the interactions 
between the country and other nations. The ideas within those plans shift from time to 
time depending on what is happening in the globe. The President, advisors, and cabinet 
members establish and implement the country’s foreign policy.10   
In current times, the foreign policy of the United States has had the following 
objectives:11  
i. To protect the United States’ geographic borders 
ii. To protect the United States’ global interests  
iii. To protect the geographic borders of the major worldwide allies  
iv. To increase the United States’ sphere of influence around the globe  
The United States has used multiple approaches to achieve these foreign policy 
goals. Specifically, it has worked diligently to oppose communism, promote peace, 
                                                          
9 Susan Welch et al., American Government, 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 
1996), 623.  
 
10 Jack R. Fraenkel, Frank T. Kane, and Alvin Wolf, Civics Government and Citizenship 
(Needham, MA: Prentice Hall Inc., 1990), 455.  
 
11 Welch et al., American Government, 623. 
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democracy, and capitalism, as well as increasing the standard of living globally and 
increasing empathy between the United States and other countries.12 Techniques to 
increase understanding include promoting knowledge and education through a 
maintenance of public libraries around the world and funding international cultural and 
academic communication.13    
National Interest 
The HarperCollins Dictionary of American Government and Politics defines 
national interest as “i. Those policy aims identified as the special concerns of a given 
nation. Violation of them either in the setting of domestic policy or in international 
negotiations would be perceived as damaging to the nation’s future, both in domestic 
development and in international competition.… ii. In the context of foreign policy, 
[national interest is] the security of the state.”14  
From the realist perspective, “the national interest is the important guide to wise 
statesmanship. The concept of national interest contains two elements: “minimum 
requirements,” involving the nation’s physical, political, and cultural identity and 
integrity; “variables,” depending on the political circumstances and traditions, the “total 
cultural context” within which a nation formulates its foreign policy.”15  
                                                          
12 Fraenkel, Kane, and Wolf, Civics Government and Citizenship, 455. 
 
13 Welch et al., American Government, 624. 
 
14 Jay M. Shafritz, The HarperCollins Dictionary of American Government and Politics, 1st ed. 
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1992), 382. 
 
15 Joseph Dunner, ed., Dictionary of Political Science (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 
1964), 367.  
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The concept of the national interest is very significant to international relations as 
national interest is one of the essential pillars of the realist school. The United States’ 
national interest represents its goals and ambitions whether political, economic, military, 
or cultural. These interests change, however, depending on what is happening around the 
world. 
Jordan  
The 1952 Constitution made Jordan a sovereign independent Arab state. The 
constitution highlights that the citizens of Jordan are an integral part of the Arab Nation. 
Jordan was set up as a monarchy with a parliamentary system of government. Under the 
constitution, the city of Amman was established as the capital of the country. The religion 
of the state is Islam. Arabic is its official language;16 however, for business, education, 
and tourism, English is the most often spoken language.  
Jordan is a relatively small and resource-poor state in the heart of the Middle East 
surrounded by powerful neighbors: Syria to the north; Iraq to the east; Saudi Arabia to 
the south and southeast; and Israel and the occupied Palestinian West Bank to the west. 
Jordan is about the size of the state of Indiana covering approximately 34,495 square 
miles (89,342 square km).  
Jordan was named after the river that delineates its western borders. It has access 
to the Red Sea through the port city of Aqaba at the northern end of the Gulf (see Figure 
1).  
  
                                                          
16 The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 1952 (Amman: Publications of the 
Jordanian House of Representatives, 2011), 5.   
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Figure 1. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Source: Map adopted from Jordanian Alternative 
Solutions, accessed July 2, 2014, http://jordansolarpower.net/main/images/jordan-map.png. 
Note: As a result of the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, 
the Palestinian West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem (East Jerusalem), and Syria’s Golan Heights. On 
November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242 in an attempt to end the ongoing 
conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.   
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The Middle East 
The term “Middle East” is relatively new. In 1902, the name appeared in a series 
of articles in a British daily newspaper, The Times. After World War II, the term “Middle 
East” became widely accepted, especially in academic institutions and government 
agencies.17  
The geographical boundaries of Middle East vary and it is also called the Near 
East or Southwest Asia. Among institutions of higher education, Middle East refers to the 
Arab states of Asia; the Arab states of North Africa; Israel; and the non-Arab states of 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.18 
Research Methods 
This study is dependent on the historical and descriptive analysis methods. The 
historical approach is applicable in this study in order to link past events with the present 
and understand the roots of the liaison between the United States and Jordan by 
explaining its policies and positions. To that end, the researcher will use the historical 
approach to describe and analyze the major events that have impacted the relationship 
between the two countries including the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and 
others. Additionally, the researcher uses other independent approaches to present a 
complete picture of the foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan. For example, 
the national interest approach helps in reviewing and examining the national interests of 
                                                          
17 Don Peretz, The Middle East Selected Readings (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1968), 1-14. 
 
18 Surratt, The Middle East, 4.  
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the United States in the Middle East region in general and Jordan in particular. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning that the realist school assumes that “the key factor 
prevalent in all international relationships is power. The wise and efficient use of power 
by a state in pursuit of its national interest is, therefore, the main ingredient of a 
successful foreign policy.”19 The decision-making approach is also applicable and allows 
a better understanding of the most important decisions that took place during the period 
of this study, most notably, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States’ foreign aid to 
Jordan, and the US-led global war on terrorism. Finally, the researcher will use a 
systemic approach to examine the impact of the internal political environment of the 
United States on Jordan to understand the effects of the internal political environment 
interaction of the United States on its foreign policy toward Jordan.  
This study will use both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include 
the United States and Jordan’s government documents:  
i. The United States’ official government publications  
ii. The United States’ Department of State bulletins and supplements 
iii. The United States’ Department of Defense bulletins and supplements 
iv. Weekly compilation of Presidential documents  
v. Public papers of Presidents of the United States  
vi. The United States Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee bulletins 
vii. The United States House of Representatives’ Foreign Relations 
Committee bulletins  
                                                          
19 Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 4th ed. (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-Clio Inc., 1988), 7. 
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viii. The United States’ foreign treaties and agreements with the government of 
Jordan  
ix. Jordan’s official documents and publications  
x. Jordan’s Prime Ministry official documents and publications  
xi. Jordan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates official documents 
and publications 
xii. Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation official 
documents and publications  
xiii. Jordan’s Ministry of Finance official documents and publications 
xiv. Jordan’s foreign treaties and agreements with the government of the 
United States  
xv. The United Nations’ official documents and publications related to the 
subject matter 
xvi. The World Bank’s official documents and publications related to the 
subject matter 
Secondary sources will include the following:  
xvii. Published works dealing with the subject matter, such as books, studies, 
documents, and data 
xviii. Scholarly and journalistic articles  
xix. Newspapers reports 
xx. Autobiographies of the important people related to the subject matter 
14 
   
In this study, the researcher will also gather information relevant to the foreign 
policy of the United States toward Jordan through personal research obtained via 
broadcast and print media, audio-visual, formal, informal, and social networking sites.  
The combination of the primary and secondary source materials mentioned above 
would help to provide information to examine the questions of the study. 
Many important materials were available at the Robert W. Woodruff Library of 
the Atlanta University Center, Emory University, the University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte, and the University of Jordan. Other materials and data were compiled from the 
Presidential libraries of the United States such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and 
George W. Bush. Finally, other information related to the subject matter was acquired 
from professional research institutes in Washington, DC, such as The Foreign Policy 
Institute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, United States Institute of Peace, 
and The Brookings Institution. 
Review of the Literature 
A tremendous amount of literature has been written on the United States’ foreign 
policy toward the Middle East from both American and Arabic perspectives, as well as 
from third and independent parties. The enormous task of sifting through this daunting 
amount of literature for relevant data is further complicated by different views presented 
in the biases of the authors. It is not the intent of the researcher in this study to chronicle 
every aspect of the foreign policy of the United States toward the Middle East. The 
primary purpose of this work is to examine and assess what shapes the United States’ 
foreign policy toward Jordan during the period of 1990-2014. In addition, since the 
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subject of this study is specific, the primary focus is on the literature employing the micro 
view approach to the area of study rather than the macro view approach, which examines 
the whole foreign policy of the United States from a historical perspective. 
To that end, the researcher will discuss some works that examine the United 
States’ foreign policy toward the Middle East and Jordan. Then, the researcher will 
examine the impact of the considerable economic difficulties that the Jordanian state 
faced before and during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and how these difficulties 
consequently negatively impacted the foreign policy of Jordan and the United States. 
The United States’ foreign policy toward the Middle East has grown steadily after 
World War II. The United States recognized that its traditional allies (Britain and France) 
were unable to play their previous roles in the Middle East. Therefore, the foreign policy 
of the United States during this period centered on three key interests: controlling energy 
supplies (oil) of the Gulf states, protecting Israel’s borders, and containing the Soviet 
Union’s possible expansion in the Middle East region.  
Supporting the above statement, Richard Cottam, in his article, “U.S. Policy in the 
Middle East,” (1993), explains the feeling of the time: 
American policy makers concerned with the Middle East came to understand 
early three interests must be taken into account in the formulation of an integrated 
American policy toward the area. These interests were central to the American 
foreign policy process, and American policy as it took form would have to 
reconcile the three. The first of these interests was that emanating from a broad 
public consensus that emerged in the United States shortly after world war II: that 
the Soviet Union was an expansionary power and, if not contained, would expand 
deeply into the Middle East and such expansion would be highly deleterious to 
American security interest … The second interest related closely to the first. The 
dependence of Western industry on Middle Eastern oil was a matter of early 
concern … The third interest reflected the terrible history of the Jewish people in 
World War II and indeed throughout their diaspora in Europe … the American 
government and people were sympathetic with this feeling, and American policy 
16 
   
makers responded positively to requests that the American government make a 
concerted effort to gain approval in the United Nations and in the community of 
nations generally for independence of Israel.20  
 
Louis J. Cantori, in his article, “The Middle East in the New World Order,” 
(1994), describes the following about the impact of the end of the Cold War and the new 
unipolar international system that resulted:   
The end of the cold war in 1989 prepared the way for a U.S.-dominant unipolar 
international system in the 1990s. The political dissolution of the USSR 
reinforced that outcome. Concomitant with this, U.S. foreign policy needed to 
readjust from one attuned to the global activities and ambitions of the Soviet 
Union to one with new definitions of security and political interests.21 
 
Melani McAlister, in her book, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. 
Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000 (2001), explains the United States’ goals of 
protecting the flow of oil and the benefit of a stable Saudi Arabia: 
In the early fall of 1990, the United States –led coalition against Iraq began what 
would become one of the largest military operations of the post–world War II 
period. The multinational coalition of troops was initially mobilized in response to 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; the official goal was to defend the border of Saudi 
Arabia and also to protect U.S. and Western “interests” in the Gulf. Operation 
Desert Storm involved almost seven hundred thousand troops, including more 
than five hundred thousand Americans, in the task of avenging what President 
George Bush described as the “rape” of Kuwait. Ensuring the continued “flow of 
oil” was the most common argument for massive military response; protecting the 
“friendly” and “stable” monarchy in Saudi Arabia was another.22  
 
                                                          
20 Richard Cottam, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” in The United States and the Middle East: A 
Search for New Perspectives, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1993), 36-37. 
 
21 Louis J. Cantori, “The Middle East in the New World Order,” in The Gulf War and the New 
World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 451. 
 
22 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 
1945-2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 235. 
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Kamel S. Abu Jaber, in his article, “Jordan and the Gulf War,” (1994), explains 
that Jordan’s location left it isolated and a secondary target of the economic blockade in 
1990: 
Caught between powerful conflicting poles-its traditional pro-Western policies, its 
friendship and strong ties with the Gulf regimes and Saudi Arabia, and its equally 
strong relations with Iraq-Jordan decided to stand in the middle. Doing so, it 
hoped to influence the course of events in such a way as to avoid military conflict. 
Underestimating and perhaps unaware of the undercurrents of Western 
(principally Britain-U.S. and Israeli) long-term strategy, Jordan found itself in the 
unusual situation of being isolated with Iraq. In effect, the economic blockade 
applied to Jordan as well, making it a secondary target; its very survival hung in 
the balance for the entire duration of the crisis, from 2 August 1990 to March 
1991.23    
 
In his book, Global Security Watch-Jordan (2010), W. Andrew Terrill, reports 
that Jordan tried to avoid war and maintain relations with Iraq:  
Jordan condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but it also opted to remain outside 
of the U.S.-led multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein, instead urging a 
peaceful solution to the crisis. Jordan also tried without success to find a formula 
to avoid war and continue acceptable relations with Iraq and at least some of the 
major states opposing Iraq. The mutually exclusive demands of Baghdad and the 
U.S.-led coalition nevertheless made such compromise impossible. After war 
broke out on January 16, 1991,… king [Hussein] continued efforts to work with 
all parties to end the conflict, and on February 6 he made a particularly tough 
speech denouncing U.S. policy toward Iraq. This speech followed the U.S. 
destruction of several large Jordanian fuel trucks mistaken for military targets 
entering Iraq along the Amman-Baghdad highway. In his remarks, King Hussein 
condemned the war and called for a renewed effort to seek a diplomatic solution. 
The King’s harsh tone was widely viewed as excessively pro-Saddam, although it 
was extremely well-received by the Jordanian public. After the war, Jordan paid a 
high price for this approach and had to cope with extremely strained relations 
with the United States and the Gulf Arab states that had opposed Saddam in the 
war. Aid to Jordan was strongly disrupted and trading relationships severely 
damaged.24  
                                                          
23 Kamel S. Abu Jaber, “Jordan and the Gulf War,” in The Gulf War and the New World Order: 
International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994), 368. 
 
24 W. Andrew Terrill, Global Security Watch – Jordan (Santa Barbara, CA: An Imprint of ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 19. 
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In the economic arena, Jamil E. Jreisat and Hanna Y. Freij, the authors of “Jordan, 
the United States, and the Gulf crisis,” (1991), review the economic impact of the Gulf 
crisis: 
In 1985, Kuwait indicated that it was unwilling to renew the contracts of 15,000 
Jordanian workers who, with their families, totaled 50,000. But after Jordan 
exerted pressure on the Kuwaiti government, 90% of the contracts were 
temporarily renewed. Despite this, some Jordanian economists were predicting 
that by 1990 unemployment could reach 200,000. The Gulf crisis has realized 
such predictions. Furthermore, excessive consumer consumption of imports and a 
lack of domestic productivity has fueled a destructive inflationary spiral that has 
penalized low income citizens. In the midst of this, public debt increased from 
$119 million in 1970 to $5.5 billion in 1988 94% of the GNP.25 
 
Supporting the Jreisat and Freij analysis, Warwick Knowles, in his book, Jordan 
since 1989: A Study in Political Economy (2005), expands on the economic woes of this 
period: 
In late 1988, the economy finally collapsed under the weight of inappropriate 
government policy responses to three events: the oil-revenue slump, the Iran- Iraq 
War and the renunciation of the claim of sovereignty over the West Bank.… The 
effects of the drop in oil earnings of the OPEC countries impacted negatively 
upon the Jordanian economy. Firstly, the return of migrant labour from the Gulf 
[states] increased unemployment rates, increased the need for extra welfare 
spending by the state and reduced the income of the families of the returnees. 
Secondly, higher prices in the oil-producing countries resulted in the migrants 
having fewer funds to repatriate adding to the recession. In addition, the oil-
producing countries were no longer able to provide high levels of economic 
assistance. Finally, exports to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait fell from JD50.3m in 
1984 (19.3% of exports) to JD40.7m in 1988 (12.5% of exports).26 
 
                                                          
25 Jamil E. Jreisat and Hanna Y. Freij, “Jordan, the United States, and the Gulf Crisis,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly 13, no. 1/2 (Spring 1991): 106. 
 
26 Warwick Knowles, Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy (New York: I.B. Tauris & 
Co Ltd, 2005), 77-78. 
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Further, it is important to emphasize that the interaction between Iraq’s financial 
debt to Jordan and Jordan’s economic dependence on Iraq stressed Jordan’s finances in 
the late 1980s.27 
Adam Garfinkle’s article, “Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace 
Conference,” (1993), explains the region’s economic strife at that time: 
As the Bush administration began, Jordan was in the midst of a serious structural 
crisis that affected most aspects of national life. The economy was sputtering, 
Islam was increasingly militant and joining with romantic Palestinian nationalist 
extremism, and the East Bank constituency, which has ever been the backbone of 
the regime, was showing signs of changing direction on the future of the 
Hashemite rule. Moreover,… king [Hussein] seemed tired and sick, the Israeli 
political scene was increasingly unfriendly to pragmatic moderation, and world 
attention was focused not on Jordan but on dramatic events in Europe and the 
Soviet Union.28  
  
In addition, Garfinkle hypothesized that there were numerous regional and 
domestic political changes, economic problems, and fall out from politics centered on 
Palestinian political problems.29   
In the political arena, several factors impacted Jordan’s position in the late 1980’s 
and early 1990’s: the 1987 eruption of the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in the West 
Bank, the decline of foreign aid from the Gulf states and the United States, the continuing 
expense of assisting the West Bank, King Hussein’s relinquishment of the claim of 
sovereignty over the West Bank in July 1988, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, and, finally, 
the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991.    
                                                          
27 Knowles, Jordan since 1989, 78.   
 
28 Adam Garfinkle, “Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to the Madrid Peace Conference,” in The 
Middle East after Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Gainesville: University Press of 




   
Daniel C. Diller, the editor of The Middle East: Revised to Include a Persian Gulf 
Crisis Supplement (1991), explains King Hussein’s motivation: 
The Intifada also affected the Arab-Israeli peace process by inducing Jordan’s 
King Hussein to renounce his government’s claims to the West Bank. He 
announced on July 31, 1988, that the PLO was “the sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestine people.” He severed Jordan’s administrative and legal links to the 
West Bank and declared later that Jordan would no longer pay the salaries of 
about twenty-one thousand West Bank civil servants. Hussein’s renunciation 
appeared to be motivated primary by his desire to insulate Jordan’s Palestinian 
population from the destabilizing effects of the intifada and his recognition that 
Palestinians in the West Bank did not favor a federation with Jordan.30 
 
Garfinkle noted that Arab aid to Jordan waned. During the 1978 Baghdad 
Summit, promises of continued support were made, but not fulfilled. In each subsequent 
year, Jordan received less money than the previous. In fact, by the end of 1986, it was 
evident that the “Arab oil boom” had ended, as well as the influx of Arab oil funds to 
Jordan. Finally, between 1988 and 1989, foreign aid fell by a third (a total of $178 
million); in 1988 Jordan had received $536 million, falling to $377 million in 1989. 
Funds from Jordanian expatriates also dwindled due to the changes in the oil market. This 
source once comprised nearly one-third of Jordan’s income.31  
On the other hand, Thomas L. Friedman, in his article, “War in the Gulf: 
Washington; U.S. Says it is Reviewing Aid to Jordan,” (1991), points out that Jordan 
received millions of dollars in aid from the United States: 
The Bush Administration announced … that it was reviewing all of its economic 
aid to Jordan after a speech by King Hussein in which he seemed to abandon his 
professed neutrality in the Persian Gulf War and threw his support behind Iraq. In 
fiscal 1990, Jordan received $102 million in economic and military aid from the 
                                                          
30 Daniel C. Diller, ed., The Middle East: Revised to Include a Persian Gulf Crisis Supplement, 7th 
ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1991), 2.   
 
31 Garfinkle, “Jordanian Policy,” 298.  
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United States. In fiscal 1991, which began last October, it received $57.2 million -
- $20 million in military assistance, $35 million in economic assistance and $2.2 
million in training programs.32 
  
In the security arena, it should be noted that the Jordanian regime, since its 
inception, maintained close relations with the Western nations (especially Britain and 
later the United States) to defend the national integrity and interests of the Jordanian 
state. Since the eruption of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the Jordanian government has 
taken several steps to enhance its national security interests. Prominent among those were 
the deployment of thousands of troops on its vast borders with Iraq and Syria to prevent 
Iraqi smugglers and others from entering the country illegally. In addition, Jordan signed 
a peace treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994, supported the US-led international 
campaign against the “War on Terror” in 2001, sustained the US-led constructions efforts 
to rebuild Iraq in 2003, and joined the US-led international coalition against the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014. Furthermore, as part of its commitment to fight 
terrorism, maintain security, and stabilize the region, Jordan provided training to 
Afghani, Yamani, and Iraqi security troops to boost their capability to fight terrorist 
groups. Finally, Jordan provided training to prescreened moderate Syrian rebels in May 
2015.  
In their article, “Foreign Policy as a Strategic National Asset: The Case of 
Jordan,” (2008), Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Karen Abdul Kheir state the nature of the 
Jordanian foreign policy: 
Jordan’s foreign policy role, as defined by [King] Hussein, was linked to the 
“Hashemite vision”-a vision of a new Arab renaissance, an Arab world 
                                                          
32 Thomas L. Friedman, “War in the Gulf: Washington; U.S. Says it is Reviewing Aid to Jordan,” 
New York Times, February 8, 1991. 
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characterized by democracy, cooperation, and “above all, open to the outside 
world.” Close relations with the West played a central role in the pursuit of this 
vision. First Britain, then the US, provided the economic and military 
requirements necessary to establish Hashemite rule, and to maintain the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Jordanian state.33 
 
Supporting the preceding perspective, Curtis R. Ryan, in his article, “Jordanian 
Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,” (2014), summarizes Jordan foreign policy goals, 
noting that:  
[To Jordan,] [m]aintaining and deepening its relationship with the United States 
remains a top foreign policy goal. Today, Jordan remains dependent on foreign 
aid, both economic and military. For King Abdullah II, who has pursued a series 
of neoliberal economic policies that have endeared the regime still further to 
Washington, the U.S. relationship provides the economic underpinnings of both 
the state and the regime. These include not only extensive foreign aid, but also 
U.S. investment in the development of the kingdom, as well as trade relations 
(which have increased, particularly since the establishment of the U.S.-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement in 2002).… Jordan’s close relations with the U.S. 
government also link the Hashemite kingdom to the many very unpopular 
American policies toward the Middle East and are something of a liability, in 
terms of domestic and regional legitimacy. But for the regime itself, the benefits 
far outweigh any cost and are, in fact, essential to the economic development as 
well as the national security of the state.34 
 
Scott Lasensky, in his report, “Iraq and its Neighbors: Jordan and Iraq between 
Cooperation and Crisis,” (2006), explains the impact anti-American sentiment among 
Palestinians: 
Jordan’s interest in a stable Iraq relates not only to traditional national security 
concerns but also to internal dynamics. Jordan, perennially anxious about 
instability and turbulence on its borders, also needs to avoid a situation where 
events in Iraq might upset the delicate balance of political, social, and economic 
forces at home. Because of its high Palestinian population (50–70 percent by 
various independent estimates), and with anti-American sentiment particularly 
                                                          
33 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Karen Abdul Kheir, “Foreign Policy as a Strategic National Asset: 
The Case of Jordan,” in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, eds. Bahgat 
Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 263. 
 
34 Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 1 
(Spring 2014): 146-47. 
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high among Palestinians, Jordan has had to contend with a large, restive internal 
constituency that opposed the removal of Saddam [Hussein of Iraq] … In many 
respects, the Palestinian factor—both the situation west of the Jordan River and 
the role of Palestinians within Jordan—looms larger than Iraq. The same can be 
said for Islamism in Jordan. The Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections 
resonates far more strongly in Jordanian politics than does Iraqi Islamist politics. 
To be sure, from a security perspective the Jordanian regime worries about 
Zarqawi-style Salafist radicalism emanating from Iraq, but politically Hamas 
poses a much greater challenge—to Jordan’s peace with Israel and to the balance 
between secular and religious forces at home.35 
 
Robert J. Bookmiller, in his article, “Abdullah’s Jordan: America’s Anxious 
Ally,” (2003), notes Washington enthusiastically supported King Abdullah II: 
… King Abdullah II has sought to reposition Jordan closer to the United States, 
while at the same time expand Amman’s contacts and participation in multilateral 
international forums.… his active backing of Washington’s war against terrorism 
and tacit support for the US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq has placed 
Jordan at odds with many other Arab states.… Behind the scenes, Jordan shared 
valuable intelligence information with the US and publicly, Abdullah backed the 
Bush Administration’s “war on terrorism”.… The Bush Administration rewarded 
this high-level cooperation in a number of ways. Chief among the rewards was a 
final White House push to secure Senate ratification of the US-Jordanian Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA).36 
 
W. Andrew Terrill, in his book, Jordanian National Security and the Future of 
Middle East Stability (2008), elaborates on Jordan’s role: 
In the years prior to the 2003 Iraq War, Jordanian Special Forces troops played a 
leading role in securing the Iraqi border where almost nightly clashes took place 
between Jordanian forces and Iraqi smugglers. Training Special Forces was also 
an important way for Jordan to contribute to fighting terrorism in the region in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In April 2002, Jordan sent a special forces training 
unit to Yemen to assist U.S. military instructors training the Yemeni military to 
fight terrorist groups in that country. Additionally, the Jordanians have trained 
                                                          
35 Scott Lasensky, Iraq and its Neighbors: Jordan and Iraq between Cooperation and Crisis, 
Special Report 178 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 4. 
 
36 Robert J. Bookmiller, “Abdullah’s Jordan: America’s Anxious Ally,” Alternatives: Turkish 
Journal of International Relations 2, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 174-75. 
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around 100 officers and soldiers from the post-Taliban government of 
Afghanistan in special operations and counterterrorist procedures.37 
 
A review of the above body of literature shows that the United States’ interests in 
the Middle East date back to World War II when the United States emerged as a world 
super power and recognized the economic importance of the Middle East to Western 
society. During the Cold War era, the United States’ foreign policy toward the Middle 
East focused on containing the Soviet Union, controlling oil in the Gulf states, and 
protecting Israel’s borders. 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, several dramatic changes took place in 
the Middle East. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied its oil-rich 
neighbor Kuwait. This action completely changed the vision of the United States’ foreign 
policy toward the Middle East. Moreover, this action paved the way for proposing a new 
era in the international system, the era of the “New World Order,” which almost 
coincided with the complete collapse of the Soviet Union, the major supporter of the 
Arab concerns during the Cold War. 
The literature review also reveals that Jordan faced substantial economic and 
political crises in the late 1980s. According to several authors, these crises arose from 
domestic and regional political changes. In the economic arena, assistances from 
neighboring Arab states given to Jordan declined, particularly from Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. In the political arena, Jordan was affected by the Palestinian Intifada of 1987-
1993, renouncing legal and administrative claim of the West Bank in 1988, and the Gulf 
crisis of the 1990-1991. 
                                                          
37 W. Andrew Terrill, Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 56.  
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As a result of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, Jordan’s relations significantly cooled 
with the Gulf states and the United States, although Jordan condemned Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait from the beginning and sought to resolve the crisis within the Arab League. King 
Hussein’s attempts to resolve the crisis diplomatically failed and he was perceived as pro-
Saddam Hussein. Also, the Bush administration was disappointed by the King’s position 
during the Gulf crisis. This resulted in the suspension of United States foreign aid to 
Jordan and increasing tensions between the two countries. 
The literature review reveals that the relationships between the United States and 
Jordan aligned after the Gulf War of 1991ended. Subsequently, the Bush administration 
recognized the crucial role of King Hussein and allowed him to be involved in the 
Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East as well as the peace process between the 
PLO and Israel. After King Abdullah II assumed power, the United States and Jordan’s 
relations remained strong. Immediately after the September 11, 2001 events, King 
Abdullah II pledged support for the George W. Bush policy against terrorism. Since 
2001, Jordan has strategically partnered with the United States in its war on terrorism in 
the Middle East. Additionally, the review of literature shows that maintaining close 
relations with the United States would ensure the influx of economic and military foreign 
aid, allowing for Jordan’s security and stability in the turbulent Middle East region.  
Finally, the literature review shows that the United States’ foreign policy toward 
Jordan, specifically, was not discussed. However, the literature review showed that 
several authors examined the United States’ foreign policy toward the Middle East. Some 
authors focused on the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 and its impact on the Jordanian 
economy; others discussed the Arab and American foreign assistance to Jordan. Other 
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authors examined Jordan’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and some discussed 
Jordan’s support of the United States’ policies on fighting terrorism in the Middle East 
region.   
The researcher did not find any comprehensive study in the current time that 
discusses all aspects of the foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan in the 
aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Thus, this study will present a contemporary, 
holistic, and systematic analysis of factors that shaped the United States’ foreign policy 
toward Jordan from 1990-2014. Furthermore, this study aims to update the existing 
literature related to the subject matter by including an analysis of current President, 















   
Significance of the Study 
This study seeks to understand the United States’ foreign policy toward the 
Middle East, in general, and Jordan, in particular. Specifically, this study explores factors 
that shaped the United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan during 1990-2014. The 
period of this study is significant given the magnitude of historical events: the Gulf crisis 
of 1990-1991; the announcement of the “New World Order” of 1991; the international 
system change from bipolar to unipolar, the United States becoming a sole world 
superpower, the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, the American war 
in Afghanistan in 2001, the Iraq War in 2003, the Arab Spring of 2010-2011, the Syrian 
Civil War of 2011, and , finally, the US-led international airstrike campaign against ISIS.  
Additionally, this study is an attempt to understand how these substantial changes 
affected the United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan. The analysis and data of this 
study are expected to enrich the existing literature and should be useful to students, 
scholars, and policy-makers who are involved in international affairs and foreign policy 
issues, especially in the Middle East. 
The researcher further believes that this study will enhance the reader’s 
knowledge by adding information about the United States’ foreign policy determinants 
toward Jordan and the Middle East. Moreover, this study provides students and 
researchers insight into the history of American-Jordanian relations and may suggest a 




   
Organization of the Study 
This study will be divided into seven chapters:  
Chapter I — Introduction  
In this chapter, the author discusses the statement of the problem, research 
questions, hypotheses, limits of the study, major concepts used in this study, what 
research methods will be adopted to fit the study, and what  kind of data this study will 
need. A comprehensive literature review will answer the research questions. In addition, 
this chapter will discuss the significance of the study, why this study is important and 
how it differs than the previous studies. 
Chapter II — Theoretical Framework of the United States’ Foreign Policy  
Chapter II will provide a discussion about the concept of foreign policy, its 
meaning, origin, and developments. The chapter will also discuss the concept of the 
United States’ foreign Policy and its foundation and purposes. The United States’ foreign 
policy before World War II, after World War II, and in the post-Cold War Era will be 
explained in order to form a clear picture about its natures, objectives, and motivations, 
and how it developed during these periods. Finally, the chapter will discuss the United 
States’ foreign policy instruments - notably public diplomacy, foreign aid both economic 
and military, and military power. 
Chapter III — The Importance of the Middle East in the United States’ Foreign Policy  
This chapter will shed light on the United States’ economic and political presence 
in the Middle East region before and after World War I and after World War II to 
understand how United States’ presence has developed in the region and what motives 
were behind its presence. Chapter III also explores and discusses the United States 
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primary interests in the Middle East including securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf 
region, supporting and protecting Israel’s sovereignty, maintaining the United States’ 
military bases, defending client-states and friendly regimes, and resisting Islamic 
movements and terrorist groups. 
Chapter IV — The Importance of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the United States’ 
Foreign Policy  
Chapter IV will provide a synopsis of the United States and Jordan relations. 
Moreover, this chapter will deliberate the roots of the relationship and when the 
alignment between the two countries emerged. The author discusses why Jordan was an 
important state to the United States since the early years of the Cold War until today. 
Also, the most crucial factors that shaped the United States foreign policy toward Jordan 
between 1990 and 2014 are reviewed, including the geopolitical location, ideology, 
regime, security, and the peace process. These factors contributed to enhanced and the 
mutual relationship between the two nations ever since.  
Chapter V — The United States’ Foreign Policy toward the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan 
This chapter will discuss the United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan from 
1990-2014. Specifically, the United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan during the 
presidencies of both the Republican and the Democratic administrations is explored: the 
United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan during the George H. W. Bush Presidency 
(1989-1993); the Bill Clinton Presidency (1993-2001); the George W. Bush Presidency 
(2001-2009); and the Barack H. Obama Presidency (2009-2014) will be discussed in 
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depth. Finally, in this chapter, the author reviewed the events, dimensions, and aspects 
that have shaped the relationship between the two nations.  
Chapter VI — The United States’ Foreign Aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
Chapter VI will discuss the United States foreign aid toward Jordan from 1990-
2014; the United States’ foreign economic aid to Jordan and foreign military assistance 
will be tracked, discussed, and examined. In this chapter, the author explains the role and 
impact of the United States’ foreign aid on the Jordanian economy. Also, the US-Jordan 
trade agreements will be reviewed. How foreign aid and the mutual economic agreements 
have developed and enhanced the trade relations between the United States and Jordan 
will also be explained. Finally, in this chapter, the US-Jordan military cooperation will be 
examined, besides the US-Jordan role in fighting terrorism in the Middle East.    
Chapter VII —Conclusion and Theories 
Chapter VII presents an analysis of the findings in the study and shows support 
for the hypotheses around which this study built. In addition, this chapter will present 
some theories about the future of the relationship between the United States and Jordan.  





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY 
The Concept of Foreign Policy 
There is no specific definition of “foreign policy” in political science literature. 
Like many concepts in social sciences, there is still much debate due to the absence of a 
consistent theory in the humanities. However, this does not prevent a fresh discussion of 
the definitions and endeavor to reach an understanding of foreign policy. 
A good definition of foreign policy is provided by the former United States 
Ambassador Hugh Gibson in his book, The Road to Foreign Policy (1944). He defines 
foreign policy as “a well-rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and 
experience, for conducting the business of the government with the rest of the world.”  
The goal of the foreign policy is to protect and promote national interests. It 
requires a thorough understanding of those interests as well as identification and creation 
of the resources that can be used to achieve these goals. He goes on to note, “Anything 
less than this falls short of being a national foreign policy.”1 
Felix Morley, in his book, The Foreign Policy of the United States (1951), defines 
foreign policy as “the governmental conduct of the relations of one political sovereignty 
with others.” Morley views foreign policy as more of an art than as a science and is easily 
affected by emotional factors that may not necessarily be strictly logical. Morley views 
                                                          
1 Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., 
1944), 9.  
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foreign policy as more of an art than as a science that is easily affected by emotional 
factors that may not necessarily be strictly logical. He states that foreign policy is also a 
science, in that and the policy should reliably cause an outcome that can be predicted by 
the government. The people in the nation may not be aware of or even support the 
outcome.2   
According to Michael Sheehan, foreign policy “occurs at the meeting point of the 
state and its international environment.” The international environment and domestic 
arenas can influence each other; this definition is what some refer to as “international 
relations” or political relations between nations.3  
The Dictionary of Political Science has defined the concept of foreign policy as 
“courses of action in pursuit of national objectives beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of 
the state. It includes objectives in the sense of specific goals, principles or guides to 
action and conduct, commitments or specific undertakings, and the strategy and tactics 
suitable to the attainment of the ends sought.”4  
The Dictionary of Government and Politics defines the foreign policy as a “policy 
followed by a country when dealing with other countries.”5   
In light of the foregoing discussion, it can be argued that foreign policy is a plan 
set by a state to organize its foreign relations with other states and international 
                                                          
2 Felix Morley, The Foreign Policy of the United States, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 
1951), 7. 
 
3 Michael Sheehan, “International Relations: Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Elements in Political 
Science, Frank Bealey, Richard A. Chapman, and Michael Sheehan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1999), 328. 
 
4 Dunner, Dictionary of Political Science, 189.  
 
5 P.H. Collin, ed., Dictionary of Government and Politics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn 
Publishers, 1998), 121. 
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organizations. The foreign policy of a state depends very much upon its traditions, 
principles, prestige, and culture on how to conduct its foreign policy with other nations. 
In addition, it is important to understand that the foreign policy is an extension of 
domestic policy, meaning that domestic policies, to some extent, shape a foreign policy 
of a state. Nowadays, many governments consider foreign policy as a segment of their 
public policy. Thus, it is clear that a successful foreign policy of a state cannot ignore its 
domestic policies. 
The Concept of the United States’ Foreign Policy 
The basic United States’ foreign policies were gradually developed from a series 
of decisions often expressed in public statements by foreign affairs officials that date 
back to the formative years of the country. These decisions were often in response to 
events of international significance, external threat, warfare, commerce agreement, peace 
treaties, or were attempts to protect the national interests of the United States at the time. 
Consequently, many of these decisions shaped the development of foreign policy.6  
Werner J. Feld, in his book, American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality 
(1984), indicated that Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank offer the following definition of the 
United States’ foreign policy: 
The foreign policy of the United States refers to the courses of action which 
official U.S. policymakers determine to take, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States, in order to secure and advance the national interests of the 
American people, and to enhance the power and prestige of the United States in 
world affairs.7   
 
                                                          
6 Feliks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1954), 46. 
 
7 Werner J. Feld, American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1984), 2. 
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The purpose of the foreign policy of the United States is to protect, advance, and 
strengthen its national security interests around the world. To that end, the United States 
government has sought to build distinguished diplomatic relations, missions, and contacts 
with almost all nations in the world. In addition, the United States also established many 
relations with international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Common Market, and the 
Organization of American States, and other international organizations such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the International Red Cross.8 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the foreign policy of the United 
States is a complex process that is influenced by both constitutional law and pressure 
from private parties and the public at large. Traditionally, foreign policy is developed and 
implemented by both the President and Congress working in concert, but in practice can 
be initiated by either Congress or the President.9 
The United States’ Foreign Policy before World War II  
In his famous, “Farewell Address” on September 17, 1796, President George 
Washington advised the following about how to conduct foreign affairs: 
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of 
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise 
in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
                                                          
8 Feld, American Foreign Policy, 3-4.  
 
9 Ernest Simone, ed., Foreign Policy of the United States, vol. I. (Huntington, NY: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2000), vii. 
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politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or 
enmities.10   
 
Americans accepted Washington’s isolationist advice for over one hundred years 
and opposed undue involvement in European, Asian, and African politics. The fact that 
the United States is also geographically removed from these regions made isolationism an 
even more attractive approach to foreign policy, especially during the first four decades 
of the Twentieth Century. In addition, at that time, the United States’ military was still 
developing and thus opted to focus on developing its domestic affairs.11 
However, in contrast to its isolationist approach toward countries outside of the 
Western Hemisphere, during the early 1800s, the United States instituted a different 
foreign policy with regard to South America. On December 2, 1823, President James 
Monroe, in his Seventh Annual Message introducing his Monroe Doctrine to Congress 
stated:   
… the American continents … are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for 
future colonization by any European powers…. we should consider any attempt 
on [the European’s] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety.12 
 
The Monroe Doctrine instructed the European powers to stay out of the Western 
Hemisphere. In return, the United States would not meddle in European affairs. During 
                                                          
10 George Washington, “Farewell Address, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 17, 1796,” in 
Speeches of the American Presidents, 2nd ed. eds. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (Bronx, NY: The H.W. 
Wilson Company, 2001), 24.  
 
11 Walter E. Volkomer, American Government, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979), 
370.   
 
12 James Monroe, James Monroe, 1758-1831: Chronology, Documents, Bibliographical Aids, ed. 
Ian Elliot (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1969), 60-69. 
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this period, the United States’ foreign policy focused on protecting its national security 
interests by limiting European influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
Succeeding the Spanish-American War of 1898, “the United States emerged as 
one of the imperial powers of the world, its territorial dominion and spheres of influence 
extending into the Pacific and Caribbean regions.”13 As a direct result of the war, the 
United States gained Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands (which later achieved 
independence in 1946). In the years following the Spanish-American War, the United 
States returned to the isolationist policy which lasted until World War I.14 Thereafter, the 
United States temporarily left its traditional isolationist policy when it declared war 
against Germany on April 6, 1917. Although many Americans opposed the war and 
wanted to remain neutral, the United States joined its allies (Britain, France, and Russia) 
to fight in World War I. After the Great War, the United States returned to the isolationist 
tendencies until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  
The United States’ Foreign Policy after World War II 
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the American naval fleet at Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii. This attack not only led the United States to be involved in the World 
War II, but also marked the end of American isolationism in foreign policy. As a result of 
their involvement in the war, the United States won the Second World War and emerged 
as a major world power. 
                                                          
13 Marian Doris Irish and Elke Frank, U.S. foreign policy: Context, Conduct, Content (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 409. 
 
14 Steffen W. Schmidt, Mack C. Shelley, II., and Barbara A. Bardes, American Government and 
Politics Today (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1985), 581. 
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At the end of World War II, delegates from fifty countries met in San Francisco, 
California at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draft the 
United Nations Charter, signed on June 26, 1945. The United Nations then was officially 
formed on October 24, 1945. The United Nations Charter was ratified by China, France, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and by a mass of other 
signatories.15 The purpose of the United Nations was to create an international 
organization in which countries cooperated and problem-solved together to maintain 
international peace and security and to improve relationships between nations.16  
 During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies; 
however, this alliance and the cooperation during wartime ended with the death of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. 
Truman, became the next President of the United States. By the end of April, the new 
administration quarreled with the Soviet Union about their sway over the United Nations 
and in Eastern Europe. Further, the spread of the Soviet armies into Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and others created a military threat to the other countries in Western Europe. 
Truman’s administration viewed this as a threat to the United States and its allies by 
extension. This period of unease between the two great powers in the post-World War II 
era is referred to as the Cold War.17 
                                                          
15 “History of the United Nations,” United Nations, accessed September 5, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml. 
 
16 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(Mount Vernon, NY: The Peter Pauper Press, 1977), 7.   
 
17 Volkomer, American Government, 371-72. 
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In response to these developments, Truman’s administration adopted the policy of 
containment, which was articulated by American diplomat George F. Kennan, in 
Moscow, in February 1946. The primary goal of the containment policy was “to prevent 
any further expansion of the Soviet Union beyond the postwar boundaries of that nation 
and its satellites in Eastern Europe and Asia.”18 
Walter E. Volkomer, in his book, American Government (1979), states that 
“Kennan contended that communism expands by both military action and through the use 
of elections, propaganda, subversion, and other nonmilitary means where nations are 
politically, socially, and economically weak.” Accordingly, the United States needed to 
address overt and subversive expansion methods. The United States’ military was capable 
on the fighting front, but not so well prepared to fight propaganda and other non-military 
approaches used in politically and economically unstable countries.19    
In this context, it essential to point out that the policy of containment was the first 
major policy adopted by Truman’s administration during the Cold War era to prevent the 
expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of international communism abroad. This 
policy continued to characterize the American foreign policy until the end of the Cold 
War in the early 1990s.  
In his speech before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, President 
Harry S. Truman states: 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own 
                                                          
18 Volkomer, American Government, 396. 
 
19 Ibid., 372.   
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destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through 
economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly 
political processes…. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful 
hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.20  
 
In this speech, which became known as Truman Doctrine, he asked Congress to 
support Greece’s government in its civil war against the Greek Communist Party. At the 
same time, Truman asked Congress to provide economic assistance for Turkey as well.  
Subsequent to the Truman Doctrine, in a famous speech at Harvard University on 
June 5, 1947, George C. Marshall, the Secretary of State in the Truman administration, 
proposed a plan in which the United States would provide immediate economic 
assistance to help restore the devastated economies of Western Europe following the 
close of World War II. Thereafter, in March 1948, the United States Congress passed the 
Economic Cooperation Act (known as the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery 
Program), providing $15 billion to rebuild Western European economies between 1948 
and 1952. The Marshall Plan successfully enabled several Western European countries to 
reach their pre-war economic levels.21 It is important to note that the Marshall Plan was 
also designed to limit the expansion of communism in Western and Central Europe by 
shoring up weaker nations. 
Following the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the 
United States and its European allies founded NATO to counter the increasing threat of 
the Soviet Union’s military in Europe. NATO created an alliance for collective defense as 
                                                          
20 Harry S. Truman, “The Truman Doctrine, Washington DC, March 12, 1947,” in Speeches of the 
American Presidents, 2nd ed. eds. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (Bronx, NY: The H.W. Wilson 
Company, 2001), 614.   
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defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, NATO was based on 
collective defense principle stated in Article 5: “The parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all.”22 The NATO treaty was signed in Washington, DC on April 4, 1949, 
by the twelve founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. After the treaty was signed, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Albania, and Croatia became members.23   
The United States continued to use its containment policy to prevent the 
expansion of Soviet communism in Asia. Specifically, in the 1950’s the United States 
supported South Korea in its war against North Korea. After the Korean War ended, the 
United States turned its attention and efforts toward Vietnam to prevent it from falling 
under communist influence as well. 
On January 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed a joint session of 
Congress regarding his foreign policy toward the Middle East. As a result, Congress 
adopted a resolution that came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under this 
doctrine, the President was authorized to provide economic and military assistance to any 
Middle Eastern country threatened by “international communism.” 
                                                          
22 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and Figures, 2nd ed. (Brussels: NATO 
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Additionally, in his “Special Message to Congress on the Situation in the Middle 
East,” President Eisenhower built on the notion of international communism: 
… It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist 
any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the 
development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national 
independence. It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake 
in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any 
nation or group of nations which desires such aid. It would, in the third place, 
authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed 
forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and 
political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed 
aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.24  
 
By April 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was utilized when the United States 
believed that the life of King Hussein was being threatened by both international 
communism and nationalist opposition. In a swift response, President Eisenhower 
dispatched the United States’ Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and announced a 
$10 million emergency financial aid grant to Jordan.25 This financial assistance paved the 
way for long-term relationship between the two nations.  
In the following decade, mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union 
increased significantly within the context of the Cold War. While there were no major 
incidents in the Middle East at that time, other events associated with the nuclear arms 
race, including the Soviet building of the Berlin wall, the United States’ unsuccessful 
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invasion of Cuba in 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, dominated John F. 
Kennedy’s presidency.26    
In the early 1970s, the United Sates adopted a new pattern of foreign policy to 
cope with the Soviet Union, which shifted from a focus on containment to that of détente. 
Détente is a French word that means “relaxation of tension between two or more 
countries.”27 The policy of détente was formalized by Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, to describe the improved relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. During the Moscow Summit of 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 
signed several agreements to limit the development and deployment of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missiles (ABMs). As a result of these negotiations, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
(SALT I), was signed on May 26, 1972. Kissinger believed that if the United States and 
the Soviet Union became equal in acquiring nuclear weapons, then the chance of war 
between the two nations would be reduced. He also believed that establishing political, 
economic, social, and scientific relationships would help to further reduce tensions.28 
Following the policy of détente and avoiding a substantial nuclear conflict with 
the Soviet Union, the United States adopted the policy of deterrence. Deterrence “is 
based on the idea that a government, in calculating whether or not to undertake a certain 
foreign policy or a certain action, will not act if the probable outcome involves costs that 
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will be too high compared to the anticipated gains.”29 It can be argued that the policy of 
deterrence was successful in holding back the Soviet Union until its final collapse in the 
early 1990s. Today, deterrence marks the foreign policy of the United States.  
In the context of the current policy of deterrence, Walter E. Volkomer, in his 
book, American Government (1979), explains that a war was not completely out of the 
question:  
Most policy makers believe the threat of deterrence has made a planned war 
highly unlikely between the superpowers. But there remains the possibility that an 
attack might occur as a result of human error or accident.30 
 
During the era of President Jimmy Carter, negotiations over the limitations of 
offensive missiles continued. On June 17, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) in Vienna. SALT II limited both nations’ nuclear 
forces and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, 
including Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs). However, this 
treaty was not approved by the United States Senate given the invasion of Afghanistan by 
the Soviet Union in late 1979. Shortly thereafter, Carter’s doctrine was announced in his 
State of the Union address on January 23, 1980. In this doctrine, Carter states:  
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force.31   
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President Carter warned that the United States would use military forces if 
necessary to protect its national interests in the Gulf region. It was also clear that Carter’s 
policy was a direct response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 
and attempt to control the Soviet Union’s possible expansion in the last decade of the 
Cold War. From the Soviet perspective, the invasion of Afghanistan significantly affected 
its vital interests in the Middle East region, especially within the Muslim nations.  
To this point, Robin Surratt, the editor of The Middle East (2005), expounded 
upon the Soviet relations with the Arab states: 
Islamic nations, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, regarded the invasion as proof 
of Soviet aggressiveness and lack of respect for Islam. The Soviet Union retained 
influence with some Arab states through its arms sales and its ability to act as a 
counterweight to the United States, but Soviet creditability was severely damaged. 
Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf states, in particular, moved toward a closer 
relationship with the United States in response to the Soviet invasion.32 
 
In January 1981, President Ronald Reagan entered office deeply suspicious of the 
Soviet Union. Two years later, in his famous “The Evil Empire” speech on March 8, 
1983, President Reagan took a hardline stance against the Soviet Union.33 On February 6, 
1985, in his State of the Union address he said “… we must not break faith with those 
who are risking their lives---on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy 
Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth…. 
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Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and totally consistent with the OAS and U.N. 
Charters.”34  
President Reagan’s famous speech came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, in 
which he supported the “Freedom Fighters.” It resulted in limiting Soviet-backed 
communist governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa through overt and covert 
assistance. In Asia, Reagan’s administration provided Afghani rebels with American 
support to challenge Soviet occupation, to refute the Brezhnev Doctrine, and to reaffirm 
the military power of the United States.35  
In this regard, Reagan’s administration recognized Soviet Surrogates as ‘terrorist 
states’ as part of his vision for the Cold War security.36 The administration then viewed 
North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and Libya as nations breaking the international law and 
posing a substantial threat not only to world security but the United States’ national 
security interests as well.  
The United States’ Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 
The post-Cold War era began when the Soviet Union completely collapsed on 
December 31, 1991. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union 
ended, the communist empire collapsed, and the Berlin Wall fell. While in office, 
                                                          
34 Morgan James Publishing, 2004, The State of the Union: A Tribute to Ronald Reagan, n.p.: 
Morgan James Publishing, 112.  
 
35 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 14. 
 
36 Alex Miles, US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine (New York: Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2013), 19. 
46 
   
American Presidents’ George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton witnessed these post-Cold 
War era changes. 
At the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration decided to keep America 
fully engaged in international affairs. The threat of so-called “Outlaw States” had been 
used as a justification for continued United States entanglement and leadership in the 
world arena. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 supported Bush’s vision of a “New 
World Order” that required the United States to take a primary leadership role in world 
affairs in order to stand against countries that invade or violate other countries. The 
United States stepped up to provide global security, stability, and peace for the rest of the 
international community.37     
Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, in their book, U.S. Foreign Policy after 
the Cold War (1997), state the following about Presidents Bush and Clinton: 
… each president has had to downsize the military and focus more attention on 
trade and commercial issues…. The major cuts in both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations were in strategic weapons systems and warheads and in theater 
weapons systems. Reductions in force, especially in Europe, have also followed. 
To a considerable extent, under both presidents attention has been given to high-
technology conventional weapons systems and mobile forces. On the whole, the 
new posture is a sort of defense lite–mobile, conventionally armed, but high-tech 
forces.38 
 
Rather than an emphasis on foreign affairs, President Bill Clinton’s priorities were 
on domestic issues including deficit reduction, health care, and welfare reform.39 
However, Clinton did have some success in foreign affairs. These successes included 
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trade agreements with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and 
a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994. In the Middle East, Clinton 
was also able to promote compromise between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, albeit with 
marginal success, and the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic Republics of 
Estonia and Latvia in 1994.40  
Magid Shihade, in his article, “War on Terror, or Interests and Ideology? 
Reframing U.S. Foreign Policy before and after 9/11,” (2009), states: 
Since September 11, the U.S. has been involved in a global “war on terror” 
mainly in Arab and Muslim countries. Not much has been altered in U.S. foreign 
policy despite the rhetoric of and hopes put on the new U.S. administration. Both 
U.S. administrations, the Republican and Democrat alike, have been using the 
carrot and the stick policy (or what is called in the academy, soft and hard power) 
to make sure that everyone falls in line with U.S. foreign policy agenda.41 
 
After September 11, 2001, the nature of the United States’ foreign policy 
changed. The United States formally declared a “War on Terrorism.” President George 
W. Bush argued, in many speeches, that America has a right to defend itself from 
countries that host or support terrorism. After that, the United States invaded Afghanistan 
in 2001 and Iraq in 2003--all in an attempt to get rid of terrorist organization and their 
leaders and to bring about stability to a region that is significant to continued, secure 
national interests. 
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Henry R. Nau, in his article, “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” (2010), states the 
following about President Barack H. Obama’s foreign policy in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan:  
Obama put it bluntly in March 2009 when he announced his first new strategy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan: America has “a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, 
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their 
return to either country in the future.” He narrowed this goal even further when he 
announced his second new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in December 
2009: “We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s 
momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.” The goal is no 
longer defeating al Qaeda but denying it a safe haven and denying the Taliban the 
ability to overthrow the Afghan government.42  
 
Martin S. Indyk and others, in their article, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A 
Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” (2012), indicate that Obama’s foreign 
policy focused on the following:  
He would refurbish the United States’ image abroad, especially in the Muslim 
world; end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; offer an outstretched hand to Iran; 
“reset” relations with Russia as a step toward ridding the world of nuclear 
weapons; elicit Chinese cooperation on regional and global issues; and make 
peace in the Middle East. By his own account, Obama sought nothing less than to 
bend history’s arc in the direction of justice and a more peaceful, stable world.43 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the United States’ policy against terrorism has 
continued during the Obama presidency. The Obama administration has achieved some 
accomplishments in foreign affairs notably: killing the Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin 
Laden (May 1, 2011), ousting the Qaddafi regime in Libya (October 20, 2011), 
withdrawing the United States’ military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, enabling the 
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Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to take control of the Egyptian government, and 
increasing the United States’ military assistance to Israel.44 
The United States’ Foreign Policy Instruments 
 In order to achieve its national interests, the United States has used a number of 
foreign policy instruments to influence and control the behavior of other nation-states. 
The most notable foreign policy instruments: public diplomacy, foreign aid (economic 
and military), and military power.  
Public Diplomacy 
The International Relations Dictionary defines diplomacy as “the practice of 
conducting relations between states through official representatives. Diplomacy may 
involve the entire foreign relations process, policy formulation as well as execution. In 
this broad sense a nation’s diplomacy and foreign policy are the same.”45   
Harold Nicolson, an English diplomat, defined diplomacy as “the ordered conduct 
of relations between one group of human beings and another group alien to 
themselves.”46 
Werner J. Feld, in his book, American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality 
(1984), states:  
Embassies as we know them now date from the middle of the fifteenth century 
and had their origin in northern Italy where, in 1455, the Duke of Milan 
announced his intension to establish the first permanent embassy abroad. The 
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legal bases for modern diplomatic practice, including the rules for the 
classification of ranks, came into being with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and 
were finalized in their present form by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations in 1961.47 
 
As an aside, it should be noted that although diplomacy dates back millennia, the 
term “public diplomacy” is a comparatively new term that came into use during the 
1960s. In the United States, public diplomacy is understood as “the means by which 
governments seek to advance their nations’ interests through understanding, informing 
and influencing broader publics in foreign countries.”48 
Michael Sheehan, in Elements in Political Science (1999), notes that public 
diplomacy is comprised of four key functions:49 
i. To enable communications between political leaders and other entities 
engaged in international relations 
ii. To allow for the negotiation of agreements when the divergent interests of 
states seem to intersect, however slightly 
iii. To make it easier to gather intelligence or information about other 
countries 
iv. To temper differences between national interests in international relations  
The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy defines public 
diplomacy as it “seeks to inculcate others with American values, promotes mutual 
understanding between the United States and other societies … reduces the potential for 
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conflict-military, political, and economic and dispels negative notions about the United 
States.”50  
On August 1, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower fashioned the independent 
United States Information Agency (USIA) tasked with streamlining the government’s 
foreign information programs.51 From 1953 to 1999, the USIA was in charge of the 
United States’ public diplomacy efforts to obtain a better understanding of, and support 
for, American society and global foreign policy. The USIA made information accessible 
to the full range of citizens via a worldwide network of radio, television, films, libraries, 
and exhibitions. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ended the 
USIA and its activities were distributed to Department of State and a newly created 
independent International Broadcasting Board of Governors. The White House, Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) are also considered as members of the 
United States’ public diplomacy community.52  
Secretary of State, Colin Powell viewed public diplomacy as a good way to 
promote the United States’ values and interests after the Cold War, especially considering 
technological advances in communication and information. The importance of public 
diplomacy increased exponentially following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
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President Bush’s administration and State Department officials felt they had “no choice 
but to be involved in the battle to win the hearts and minds of the world’s people, 
particularly those living in places like the Middle East.”53  
Foreign Aid  
Foreign aid can be defined as assistance given to other countries to secure world 
peace, security, and humanitarian relief to further develop and advance both the receiving 
and giving countries. Foreign aid is viewed as vital to national security service as a 
strategic, economic, and moral necessity.54 It promotes stability and at the same time 
serves as a means for influencing the development of other countries. Assistance includes 
technical support in addition to financial grants and loans. Financial aid then serves to 
create or expand global markets for the United States, as the grants are often used to buy 
American products or to repay American loans.55 Thus, foreign aid is an important 
foreign policy instrument. 
 Many countries obtained their independence during the 1950s, but were unable to 
overcome existing economic deficiencies. Therefore, foreign aid was commonly used to 
gain an advantage in the Cold War by enticing economically fragile countries to support 
either the Western or the Communist World. Similarly, newly independent countries also 
expertly pitted the United States against the Soviet Union and China to maximize the 
amount of aid they could procure. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the competition for 
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foreign aid waned and became available from all economically advanced countries. Some 
politically motivated foreign aid continues to be doled out to maintain relationships that 
could influence voting support within the United Nations or other international 
situations.56 
Economic Aid 
Foreign aid can include economic aid and military assistance. The first United 
States’ economic aid program took shape after World War II, when George C. Marshall 
provided significant aid to Europe after the war to rebuild the economic, social, and 
political infrastructures.57 The motive was to restore a market for American products and 
enhance Europe’s ability to resist communist subversion. During the Korean War, the 
emphasis shifted from recovery to containment and from Europe to Asia.58 
This led to the creation of other foreign assistance programs that spun off the 
achievements of the Marshall Plan. The next landmark for United States’ foreign 
economic aid was in 1961, when President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign 
Assistance Act into law. This act allowed for the creation of the USAID, marking a 
significant increase in United States’ foreign economic aid and enabled a focus on long-
term global economic and social development.59 
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Joan M. Nelson, in her book, Aid Influence and Foreign Policy (1968), perceived 
foreign aid as a major instrument: 
Foreign aid has become a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy throughout the 
underdeveloped world. In many countries, it is the primary instrument relied upon 
to protect and promote central U.S. interests. As a result, the economic assistance 
program has come to serve and to reflect the full range of U.S. interests in the 
developing countries. These interests are as humanitarian as relieving poverty and 
disease; as manipulative as attempting to influence the outcome of an election; as 
ephemeral as concern over the tenor of remarks of tomorrow’s U.N. General 
Assembly session; as long-run as investment in a country’s capacity to maintain 
growth without external aid…. This multipurpose nature of [foreign] aid is a 
major cause of uncertainty about its goals and its effectiveness.60 
 
In the post-Cold War era, the Soviet Union threat declined and subsequently so 
did the level of foreign aid. The consensus about efficacy and necessity of foreign aid 
waned, and, therefore, doubts about the continued utility of foreign economic aid as a 
tool grew. Even without the Cold War as a reason to provide aid, remaining security 
concerns are a primary motivator for continued use of foreign aid.61  
Early in President Bush’s administration, the United States’ approach began to 
change. However, the Bush administration did not use foreign aid to firm up its tactical 
plan against terrorism until after the events of 9/11. Israel and Egypt have been the most 
consistent beneficiaries, but other countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, and Sudan benefitted from the United States’ 
foreign aid in 2004. Foreign aid to these additional countries has continued to increase 
since 1995 to the point that it has exceeded Japan regarding providing aid around the 
                                                          
60 Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1968), 1.  
 
61 Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley, Jr., American Foreign Policy, 119.   
55 
   
world.62 This shift in provision of aid over the course of nearly two decades highlights the 
increased awareness of the utility of aid as a tool for fighting terrorism.   
Foreign aid has clearly rebounded from its low levels in the mid-1990’s, but how 
foreign aid will be doled out in the future will primarily depend on the United States’ 
focus on the war on terrorism and how important it is to American interests and security 
as well as Middle Eastern stability. Without clear unrest, a threat to the United States or 
one of its allies, foreign aid may well drop off again in the future. It remains to be seen.63  
Eugene R. Wittkopf and others, in their book, American Foreign Policy: Pattern 
and Process (2008), linked foreign aid to antiterrorism efforts after the events of 9/11: 
More recently, [US foreign] aid policy has been linked with antiterrorism policies 
around the world, as donors try to address the roots of terrorist causes by 
promoting development and increasing political stability.64   
 
Post-September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration increased the 
foreign aid budget and started a wide bureaucratic reform that included assuring 
Department of State and USAID’s control over all foreign aid programs and the creation 
of other foreign aid projects, innovating operational models. In order to provide foreign 
economic aid, a number of different agencies since World War II have been engaged. 
Most prominently, the USAID administers American economic aid programs. By 2005, 
the USAID was separated into nine programs: Child Survival and Health Programs 
(CSH); Development Assistance (DA); Economic Support Fund (ESF); Transition 
Initiatives (TI); FREEDOM Support Act (FSA); Support for East European Democracy 
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(SEED); Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI); Millennium Challenge Account (MCA); 
and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR).65 
In 2010, President Obama signed the Presidential Policy Directive on Global 
Development, which sought an integrated national security approach of promoting 
development, diplomacy, and defense. The directive governed United States’ efforts to 
support development worldwide and directed all United States government agencies 
responsible for managing and implementing foreign assistance.66 Through this directive, 
over 100 countries received foreign aid from such government agencies.  These 
investments promoted the American interests of free market expansion, combating 
extremism, stabilizing democratic governments, and eliminating poverty.  This was all 
done while fostering an ideal of good will throughout the world.67 
Additionally, it is important to point out that the United States’ foreign aid has 
been directed to the following region of the world: Africa north of Sahara, Europe, Far 
East Asia, Middle East, North and Central America, Oceania, South America, South 
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Table 1. Depicts Where the United States’ Foreign Aid Was Spent 1965-1995 
Source: Data adapted from Randel, German, and Ewing, Reality of Aid 2000, 80. 
 
Finally, the United States’ foreign aid was spent on the following pivotal sectors: 
agriculture, basic education, education, health, population, emergency aid, government 
and civil society, other, program assistance, transport and industry, and water supply and 
sanitation.69(see Table 2).  
Table 2. Depicts the Sectors on Which the United States Spent Foreign Aid 1965-1995 
Source: Data adapted from Randel, German, and Ewing, Reality of Aid 2000, 80. 
                                                          



































   
Military Assistance 
Military assistance includes grants, credits, or loans offered by the United States 
to other friendly countries to purchase arms, defense equipment, services, and training. In 
this context, it is important to note that since the early days of the Cold War, the United 
States’ military assistance programs to less-developed countries have become a major 
instrument for America to enhance national security interests abroad.  
Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank, in their book, U.S. Foreign Policy: Context, 
Conduct, Content (1975), stated:  
The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, terminated the traditional policy of U.S. 
neutrality with regard to foreign wars. It embraced the new principle, that 
American security could and should be promoted by supplying military assistance 
to nations at war with potential enemies of the United States.70  
 
Chester J. Pach, Jr., in his book, Arming the Free World: The Origins of the 
United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950 (1991), indicated: 
… after the end of the Second World War, American officials had made 
ambitious plans to provide military assistance to several foreign nations. In the 
spring of 1946 President Harry S. Truman asked Congress to approve long-term 
arms aid to the Philippines, China, and Latin America. He also requested 
authority to send military advisers to any foreign country whenever he thought 
that such help would advance the national interest.71 
 
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was established a legal foundation for economic 
and military assistance. In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act authorized military 
assistance and since that time, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) has served as the 
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main way that countries receive military assistance. Also, this military assistance was 
provided for through grants that did not require repayment by recipients.72  
The United States’ military assistance program contained three distinctive 
variations: (i) Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) that provided loans and grants to 
foreign countries in order to buy military arms and training from the United States; (ii) 
Military Assistance Program (MAP) that provided funds in the form of grants for the 
purpose of buying American-made arms; and (iii) International Military Education and 
Training Program (IMET) that provided military training for foreign countries’ armed 
forces. It should be noted that many underdeveloped countries have received multiple 
kind of military assistance.73  
Today, the FMS program represents one of the most important components of the 
United States’ military assistance program to other nations as evidenced by reports from 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  In FY 2014, out of a total of $34.2 
billion in sales, government-to-government sales were more than ten times greater than 
non-FMS cases, with government-to-government sales totaling $31.2 billion compared to 
only $3 billion for sales managed under other security cooperation authorities.74 Thus, 
this is a highly utilized tool for building relationships with other foreign nations, 
achieving national security interests and foreign policy goals, facilitating sales of United 
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States arms, defense equipment and services, and finally providing military training to 
foreign nations. 
The United States has extended its military assistance to its allies in order to build 
a greater military coalition of allies and thereby minimize threats to its national security 
interests abroad. Moreover, this also can help promote and enhance the United States’ 
economic interests through defense industry sales. The World Policy Institute concluded 
that more money is spent providing loans and grants for arms purchased from American 
sellers: “One-half billion dollars of U.S. tax dollars are spent each year to promote arms 
sales, while $3.2 billion in grants, $800 million in loans, and additional millions in 
foreign aid are used to fund arms purchases from U.S. sellers.”75  
In the Middle East, Israel remains the largest recipient country of the United 
States’ military assistance since the end of World War II. “To date, the United States has 
provided Israel $124.3 billion … in bilateral assistance. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to 
Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also received 
significant economic assistance.”76 The 1979 Camp David peace agreements between 
Israel and Egypt provided security and economic support to each country. In the Middle 
East, past recipients include Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. In fact, since the Camp David 
agreement, the Middle East has received approximately half of the United States’ 
financial assistance, security, and economic benefits.77 
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It is essential to note that the United States’ foreign aid began in World War I 
with a United States contribution of 6% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) toward the 
war in Europe. The foreign aid program continued with the “Lead-Lease” in World War 
II, providing as much as 5% of the nation’s GDP in 1945. The rescue of Europe via the 
Marshall Plan and the Korean War kept foreign aid at or above 2% of United States’ 
national GDP. Later, aid to those nations fighting the Soviets kept foreign aid at above 
1.4% of the GDP during the 1950s. It was not until 1962 that the federal budget data 
began presenting economic and military aid separately, and the data shows a sharp 
decline in the GDP from 1% to 0.4% in 1970. In the 1970s and 1980s, foreign aid 
hovered around 0.4%. After 1985, foreign aid to other countries further fell to 0.2% of 
the GDP. Finally, in 2010, foreign aid ticked up a bit to 0.3% of the GDP.78 
Military Power 
Michael Sheehan, in Elements in Political Science (1999), states that military 
power is a strong foreign policy tool: 
Military power is an important foreign policy instrument. It can be used to back 
up threats, to demonstrate strength (‘showing the flag’), to intervene in, if not to 
actually instigate, international or civil war, to support allied or client states and to 
subjugate foreign populations. It is a contributor to national [security] prestige and 
a shield behind which other [foreign] policy instruments can come into play.79 
 
In April 7, 1950, the National Security Council (NSC) issued its famous, top-
secret memorandum (NSC-68). “This document set in motion the militarization of 
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American foreign policy and the containment strategy that would persist for decades.”80 
The (NSC-68) was written by the United States’ Department of State’s Policy Planning 
Staff at the beginning of the Cold War. The authors of (NSC-68) indicated in their report 
on the substantial threat of the Soviet Union to the United States’ national security and 
interests around the world. They also informed the United States’ policymakers that the 
Soviet Union was building up its military arsenal capacity, including nuclear weapons, 
and would soon be a great power house. Furthermore, they contended that “the best 
course of action was to respond in kind with a massive build-up of the U.S. military and 
its weaponry.”81 Finally, they suggested that the United States should build a superior 
military strength, but not actually use it. Rather, a nonmilitary countermeasure against the 
Soviet Union was recommended.  
During the Cold War, military power emerged as an important instrument of 
American foreign policy. Since that time, the United States has been heavily dependent 
on military power to defend its national security interests from the threat of Soviet 
communism. To that end, the United States has deployed its military forces in many 
regions including Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, the Middle East, 
and elsewhere. Also, the United States sought to ensure the security of its allies around 
the globe. 
In this regard, it is important to point out that there were 226 mobilizations of 
American troops between 1946 and 1976, most of which were in the Near and the Far 
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East and Western Hemisphere to achieve its political objectives.82 Further, in the first 
decades of the Cold War, the United States heavily relied on nuclear deterrence “to 
achieve the ultimate goal of avoiding defeat or destruction by a foreign power.”83 The 
best example of this is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Thereafter, during the Carter 
and Reagan eras, spending on nuclear weapons increased, generating a nuclear race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States’ defense spending declined 
during the 1990s, but increased in the 2000s during the “War on Terrorism” during the 
George W. Bush administration. 
At the height of the Arms Race during the Regan administration, 6.8% of the 
GDP was allocated to defense spending. This began to trend down prior to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and, following its collapse, spending subsequently dropped further at 
6% of the GDP in 1990; just under 4% in 1996; and bottoming out at 3.5% in 2001. This 
was nearly half the level of that in1985. This trend would once again reverse itself with 
the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, when there was an increase to 4.6% of the GDP in 2005 up to 5% during the 
intensification of operations during the “surge” of 2008 in the Iraq War. Unsurprisingly, 
this increased further with the renewed efforts in Afghanistan throughout 2011, topping 
out at 5.7%. Considering the expected reduction in forces and the downsizing of the 
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United States’ military, spending is expected to decline to 4.5% of the GDP by the close 
of 2015 and continued gradual reduction of spending to 3.8% of the GDP by 2020.84 
  
                                                          
84 “US Defense Spending History: Recent Defense Spending,” usgovernmentspending.com, 
accessed December 31, 2014, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defense_spending.  
 
65 
CHAPTER III  
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN 
POLICY 
The Middle East has continued to be a primary attention of the United States’ 
foreign policy since World War II. Culturally, the region has numerous similarities with 
the West, dating back to the time of the Crusades in the Middle Ages and continuing 
through modern history with the efforts of the Western missionaries and their educational 
activities. The Middle East consists of portions of three continents: Europe, Asia, and 
Africa. The land possesses vital resources including oil and waterways.1   
In this chapter, the researcher will divide the United States’ presence in the 
Middle East into three distinct periods: the first ends in 1914; the second begins after 
1919, and the third begins after 1945.  
The United States’ Foreign Policy toward the Middle East 
 before World War I 
American trade with the Middle East dates back more than two hundred years. In 
fact, commercial contacts between Smyrna (an ancient city in Turkey) and Boston began 
as early as 1767, when Smyrna products (most notably figs) appeared in America.
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Thereafter, an American trading house was established in Smyrna in 1811, laying the 
groundwork for the first American Ottoman treaty that was signed on May 7, 1831.2 
Supporting the above-mentioned argument, Julius W. Pratt, in his book, A History 
of United States Foreign Policy (1972), stated the following about the United States’ 
interests in the Middle East region before World War I: 
Prior to World War I American interest in the Middle East–the land of the Bible 
and of the origins of the Christian religion–had been chiefly religious and 
archeological. American traders, too, had early found their way to the eastern 
Mediterranean and the ports of the Persian Gulf, but such trade had never been 
large.3  
 
American religious groups, especially Presbyterians, conducted multiple missions 
in the Middle East that were not only religious, but charitable and medical as well. The 
American missionaries in the Middle East appeared as early as 1820, when the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions established the first American religious 
mission in the region. The American missionaries and philanthropic organizations began 
going to the Middle East to carry out their ministries to the population.  
These missionaries, however, were unable to convert many Muslims or Jews to 
Christianity, but instead influenced and modernized education in the region; establishing 
outstanding institutions such as Robert College in Turkey founded in1863, Syrian 
Protestant College, later renamed American University of Beirut (AUB) founded in1866, 
Istanbul Women’s College founded in1871, and The American University of Cairo 
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founded in1919.4 The AUB “became (at least in some fields) the most outstanding 
institution of higher learning in the Middle East. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
AUB was a highly influential center for the emergence and promotion of Arab 
nationalism.”5 Contributions to higher education made America popular in the eyes of the 
local populace, and the lack of the American political motivation strengthened the 
general goodwill toward American democracy.6 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that before World War I the United 
States’ contact with the Middle East region was limited to commercial, missionary, and 
educational activities. The demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I 
placed the entire region of the Middle East under European influence. Egypt, Iraq, 
Palestine, Sudan, and Transjordan were under the British mandate, while the North 
African states, Lebanon, and Syria were under the French mandate. The Gulf region was 
under the British influence as well. In this context, it is important to point out that, during 
the period between the two world wars, some states in the region achieved a nominal 
independence with the Europeans maintaining only some influences until the end of 
World War II. The European colonialism significantly delayed the Arab dreams to 
establish their own independence under one unified nation-state. In contrast, the United 
States showed little interest in international affairs in general during and after World War 
I. This was especially the case in the Middle East region, as ‘isolationism’ was the 
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predominant feature of the United States’ foreign policy until Japan bombed Pearl Harbor 
on December 7, 1941. 
The United States’ Foreign Policy toward the Middle East  
after World War I 
During and after World War I, the American political thoughts, ideas, and 
principles were appealing to the Middle East. In addition, President Woodrow Wilson’s 
concept of “self-determination” of nations was essential and supportive to the rights of 
peoples to decide to have their own political destiny. These concepts were very attractive 
to the Arabs nationalists’ dreams to attain independence. Moreover, the Wilsonian ideas 
“… provided a stimulus to Arab nationalism in the years ahead. Until the creation of the 
State of Israel (in 1948), the United States enjoyed widespread prestige and admiration in 
the Arab world.”7 
In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson’s administration endorsed a letter that was 
sent from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, to Lord Lionel Rothschild, a 
British Zionist leader, to establish a “national home” for Jewish people in Palestine. 
Then, in 1922, a joint resolution of Congress voted unopposed for this “Mandate for 
Palestine.” This mandate validated Jewish claims to settle Palestine anywhere from the 
Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Nearly two months later, on September 21, 1922, 
President Warren G. Harding signed the joint resolution to confirm the establishment of a 
Jewish national homeland in Palestine.8  
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In the aftermath of World War I, even though the Middle East region was under 
heavy European influence, American contacts, especially petroleum companies, with the 
region increased steadily. While American companies gained only a partial interest in 
companies in Iran and Kuwait, they attained full control in Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain 
Island.9 
Gaddis Smith, in his book, American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 
1941-1945 (1966), notes that the United States’ interest in the Middle East between the 
two world wars was not political: 
Between the [two world] wars American economic and humanitarian interests in 
the [Middle East] region grew, but politically the United States remained only 
slightly involved. Meanwhile, the Arabs countries, recent appendages of the 
Ottoman Empire, acquired varying degrees of nominal independence while 
chafing under British or France Control.10  
 
George Lenczowski, in his book, The Middle East in World Affairs (1980), 
describes the important role the United States’ involvement played in the Middle East 
during the period of 1941-1945:  
During the … period (1941-1945) the United States suddenly developed multiple 
contacts with the Middle East as a result of the war emergency…. American 
troops appeared in Iran to handle the supplies to Russia; they also came to Egypt 
and Palestine, mainly to accomplish various technical tasks connected with the 
American armor with which the British army was being equipped. The American 
navy and merchant marine played a vital role in conveying supplies to the Middle 
East theater…. This military tie with the area was strengthened by several 
economic measures: the United States extended lend lease to most of the Middle 
Eastern countries, gave active support and guidance to the Middle East Supply 
Center, and took an active interest in the interim arrangements concerning oil 
production.… The government also grew more alert to the political problems of 
the Middle East…. The United States had shown friendly helpfulness to Saudi 
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Arabia at the time of her economic crisis, and to Syria and Lebanon in their 
struggle for emancipation.11 
 
Based on this source, the period between the two world wars shows that the 
United States remained only slightly involved in the Middle Eastern affairs from a 
political standpoint; on the other hand, the United States had established multiple 
economic contacts within the Middle East region. The American petroleum companies 
negotiated a number of concessions in Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. During 
World War II, the United States’ presence in the Middle East increased. In addition, the 
United States government paid closer attention to the region’s significant oil reserve and 
began to reevaluate its importance to American and Allied security interests but, “It was 
not until the end of the [Second World] war that the area came to assume any real 
significance in U.S. foreign policy.”12 
The United States’ Foreign Policy toward the Middle East  
after World War II 
The United States’ political presence in the Middle East did not intensify until the 
end of World War II. Prior to that, three indirect occurrences may be cited in this regard: 
“(i) Iran was used as a transit route for the sending of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet 
Union from 1941-1945; (ii) Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Company, was 
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established in Saudi Arabia in 1938; (iii) America influenced the Arab nationalist 
movement in the early 1920s through its domestic ideals.”13 
Tareq Y. Ismael, in his book, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle 
East: A Study in World Politics (1986), states that: 
The United States began to develop a political presence in the Middle East during 
World War II. Even before the American entry into the war, President Roosevelt 
expressed his concern over the protection of Turkish territorial integrity from 
possible German encroachment. Later, U.S. troops took part in the occupation of 
Iran and in the North Africa campaign.14  
 
At the end of World War II, a new balance of power prevailed in the international 
arena. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only two superpowers in 
the international system. The main European powers (Britain and France) faced 
substantial economic difficulties and were no longer capable of playing their traditional 
leading roles in the Middle East. In the early 1940s, President Roosevelt and his 
administration initially expected that Britain would remain the security chief in the 
region. However, by the spring of 1944 observers reported, “Soviet policy in the Arab 
world appears to be aimed at the reduction of British influence in that area and the 
acquisition of the balance of power.” Then, on May 8, 1945, State Department personnel 
determined that Britain was unable to maintain the Soviet Union and realized the United 
States might have to take charge of “fostering the economic advancement of the Middle 
East people” and “facilitating freedom from external interference and exploitation.”15 
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14 Ismael, International Relations, 135-36. 
 
15 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 
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After World War II, the Kremlin wanted to spread its influence along Russia’s 
southern border. In 1941, Josef Stalin, who had held power in Moscow for nearly twenty 
years, ordered Soviet troops into Iran and increased diplomatic pressure on Turkey, 
which had previously refused the “Red Navy” to cross the Dardanelles (the channels 
between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean). By the fall of 1945, the United States’ 
policymakers expected the worst. “The British publicly admit that they are no longer able 
to keep the Middle East in order without … [US] help,” The State Department cautioned 
the President that “Soviet Russia is showing marked interest in the area.” If the United 
States did not respond “firmly and adequately,” another world war might result. 
Washington, responded by issuing the Truman Doctrine in 1947 that indicated that the 
United States would take over Britain’s commitment to Greece and Turkey.16 
In the mid-1950s, concern regarding possible Soviet expansion in the Middle East 
region motivated Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to seek out allies in the states 
closest to the Soviet Union.17 In February 1955, the United States’ efforts resulted in 
formation of the Baghdad Pact Organization (also known as the Middle East Treaty 
Organization [METO]). METO was formed by Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. 
The main purpose of METO was to limit possible Soviet Union expansion in the Middle 
East region.  
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17 Lenczowski, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” 164-65. 
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After ten years of Anglo-Arab confrontations, the United States’ policymakers 
presented the Eisenhower Doctrine, making Washington a high-ranking member of the 
Anglo-American association in 1957.18 The Eisenhower Doctrine was made in response 
to the 1956 Suez War, the Soviet Union’s infiltration of the Arab states, and to limit 
Nasser’s broad pan-Arabism. Following the 1958 Lebanon crisis, Baghdad Pact 
members, except Iraq, endorsed American intervention in Lebanon. In 1959, Iraq 
withdrew from METO resulting in METO to be renamed as the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO), and its headquarters to be moved from Baghdad to Ankara. The 
United States’ support to CENTO continued as a non-signatory associate until it 
completely dissolved in 1979.19 
Through the 1960’s, Britain continued to experience financial difficulties and was 
eventually forced to give up its remaining imperial stations in the Arabian Peninsula and 
the Gulf region. It was at this time that American officials began moving toward what 
would come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which appointed countries in the region, 
including Iran and Saudi Arabia, to join in the opposition against the Soviet Union. 
However, when the appointed Middle Eastern countries proved they were ultimately 
unable to effectively fill this role, Jimmy Carter created his own doctrine and “informed 
the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interests in the Middle 
East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not.”20  
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George Lenczowski, in his article, “U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Problems and 
Prospects,” (1984), states:  
Since World War II, three major issues have compelled the United States to pay 
close attention to the [Middle East] region: the Soviet [Union] threat, oil [reserves 
proven], and [the] Palestine [Question].21 
 
It is important to point out that since the beginning of the Cold War, the United 
States had developed several policies, strategies, and tactics to limit possible Soviet 
expansion in the world and in the Middle East region in particular. Containment, détente, 
and deterrence were among the most notable policies during the context of the Cold War. 
In the early 1990s, the Cold War era came to an end and the Soviet Union threat to the 
region ended, with the impact of international communism at its lowest in decades. As a 
result of the Cold War, the United States remained as the sole dominant superpower in 
the post-Cold War era. Hegemony, leadership, primacy, and military power clearly 
marked American foreign policy in international affairs in the late twentieth century and 
early twenty-first century.  
The goal of ensuring secure access to oil resources in the Middle East region, 
especially in the Arab oil-rich states and the Palestine Question, motivated the United 
States’ presence in the region since early in the twentieth century. These incentives just 
scratched the surface of what would be a much deeper involvement in the Middle East 
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The United States’ Foreign Policy Interests in the Middle East 
John W. Amos II, in his article, “The Middle East: The Problem of Quarantine,” 
(1976), summarized the United States’ interests in the Middle East, expressed at various 
times by different American officials: 
Avoidance of a superpower confrontation over the Middle East; Securing strategic 
access to the Mediterranean; Preservation of access to the area’s oil resources; 
Preservation of the stability of the area; Prevention of outside influence from 
penetrating the area, especially Soviet and, secondarily, Chinese influence; 
Defending the integrity of Israel and those Arab states that are pro-Western in 
outlook and policy.22 
  
Following the end of World War II, United States’ interests in the Middle East 
grew exponentially, and this involvement continues today. American interests in the 
region include: securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf region; supporting and 
protecting Israel’s sovereignty; maintaining the United States’ military bases, especially 
those in the Gulf states; defending client-states and friendly regimes; and resisting 
Islamic movements and terrorist groups such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and many others 
that might affect American and their allies’ interests in the region.  
Securing Strategic Access to Oil in the Gulf Region  
The primary interest of the United States in the Middle East region is to assure 
American access to oil. Oil, however, was not considered important until the end of the 
nineteenth century. The First Industrial Revolution that began in the last decades of the 
eighteenth century was fueled by water power and then by coal. The Second Industrial 
Revolution was driven by the surge of readily available and comparatively cheap oil that 
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became a growing necessity in the world’s rapidly expanding petroleum based 
economies. This spurred an insatiable thirst for fresh supplies of crude and new markets 
in which to expand. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the 
petroleum industry and the consumption of oil-based products developed rapidly across 
the world and particularly in Europe and North America. At the time, the main sources of 
oil were Russia, the United States, Mexico, and Romania.23  
Further expounding upon the rapid growth of the oil industry in the 1900s, 
Dankwart A. Rustow, in his book, Oil and Turmoil: America Faces OPEC and the 
Middle East (1982), reports that the oil industry advanced rapidly: 
Since the days of the First World War, the petroleum industry has advanced 
rapidly. The Global automobile fleet increased sixteenfold from 1924 to 1978. In 
the First World War, the battleships began to run on oil, and planes and tanks 
made their debut…. between 1880 and 1970, the world’s petroleum consumption 
doubled approximately every ten years. [In the Middle East, the] Western 
governments, too, showed an active [concession] interest. In 1913, as the Royal 
Navy was rapidly converting its boilers from coal to oil, the British Treasury 
acquired a majority interest in the petroleum concession earlier obtained by an 
Australian in Iran. In the peace settlement of 1919, the British agreed to transfer 
the German one-quarter share in the concession covering Iraq to the French; and 
in 1922, in response to State Department pressure for an “open door” to 
Americans, a further one-quarter to two United States oil companies.24 
 
In this context, it should be noted that in the early twentieth century, the 
petroleum industries flourished all over the world, but most especially in Europe and 
North America. During World War I, major world powers began to prioritize oil as a vital 
military asset; modern warfare caused a constant need for oil and its subsidiary petroleum 
based products which were a necessity for ships, airplanes, tanks, submarines, and the 
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lubrication of modern rifles. This heavy use of oil during World War I created a severe 
shortage in 1917-1918.25 
Following World War I, several Western companies gained mutual concession in 
the Middle East, especially in Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The idea behind 
these joint concessions was to negotiate solutions to incompatible political and business 
agendas and to make entrepreneurial explorations safer. At the close of the Second World 
War, the United States government became wary about cutbacks in oil production and the 
possible economic hiccups that would stem from a fuel shortage. To prevent a fuel 
shortage, the United States made economic demands for concessions with multiple 
Middle Eastern countries. This requirement started in the pre-war years with concessions 
in Bahrain (1929), Kuwait (1934), and Saudi Arabia (1947). These concessions were 
shared by multiple oil companies.26 
In 1948, following American demands, several companies were developed to 
exploit these concessions. The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was created 
by Esso (now Exxon), Texaco, Standard Oil of California (Socal), and Mobil all came 
into existence to develop the Saudi concessions. These companies soon surveyed and 
developed large production fields that allowed them to harvest massive profits from low-
cost oil that would be used to rebuild the economies of Europe and Japan that had been 
destroyed during World War II. The boom eventually brought this cheap oil to United 
States shores and stimulated the growth of the post-war American economy, which 
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reiterated the desire for more United States companies to seek concessions in Kuwait, 
Iran, and other oil producers in the region.27 
Meanwhile, as the development of the Middle Eastern concessions increased, the 
United States oil production began to decrease in ratio to its increased consumption. This 
grew to as much as 30% of the world’s total consumption of crude oil with only an 
estimated 6% of the world’s reserves.28 
Supporting the analysis above, Roy Lebkicher and other authors, in their book, 
Aramco Handbook (1960), indicate that the United States was unlikely to produce 
enough oil to meet their needs: 
… the United States, is unlikely to produce enough oil to meet its own future 
requirements, it must look to other parts of the free world for sources of supply to 
meet rising demand…. the possibility that the United States … might have to look 
abroad for a portion of its petroleum requirements became a matter of concern to 
the Government and to American oil companies.29 
 
Following World War II, the United States began looking for alternative sources 
of oil abroad to meet its own future demands. The Middle East was very attractive to both 
the United States government and American petroleum companies due to its proven long-
term oil reserves. Arab oil reserves were shown to potentially have much more than the 
originally estimated 60% of the world oil reserves. In fact, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, 
and Abu Dhabi possessed more than 50% of the known reserves amongst themselves 
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alone.30 To attest to this high quality Middle Eastern oil was known to flow freely of its 
own pressure. This circumstance allowed for much cheaper production costs; the Middle 
East per production barrel ranged between $0.10 and $0.22 cents in comparison to $0.39 
cents in Venezuela, and as much as $1.51 per barrel in the United States. This is a 
considerable difference when it comes to the bottom line.31 
James L. Gelvin, in his book, The Modern Middle East: A History (2005), 
indicates that among the most notable objectives of the United States in the Middle East 
region is to assure Western access to oil. The reasons for this are twofold: first, economic 
reasons are primary, and second, strategic policy is dictated by the fact that the United 
States must supplement its domestic output of oil from the Middle Eastern resources. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that in 1973 as much as a third of the United States’ oil 
imports came from the Middle East just prior to the Oil Embargo Crisis. Even today the 
amount of oil remains at one-fifth of American imports. From a strategic perspective, the 
post-war economic recoveries of Europe and Japan were fueled by cheap Middle Eastern 
oil. Ever since the Oil Embargo Crisis, American policy has viewed oil as a strategic 
resource, as does much of the world. In fact, more than 40 years later, even Europe gets 
more than a third of its oil from the Middle East, and Japan gets nearly 80% of its oil 
from Middle Eastern trade partners.32 
Throughout the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led an embargo against the United States in 
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response to the decision to re-supply the Israeli military. The embargo also applied to 
other countries that braced Israel including South Africa, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
Petroleum exports were barred, and manufacturing reductions were made, straining the 
United States’ economy that was extremely reliant on foreign oil. 
Supporting and Protecting Israel’s sovereignty  
The second interest of the United States in the Middle East region is to protect the 
state of Israel and to ensure its stability in the often troubled region. In fact, maintaining a 
strong Israel in the Middle East solidifies American national security interests there. This 
perspective has dominated American foreign policy since the mid-twentieth century and 
continues to shape the current policy.  
The historical land of Palestine was under the authority of the Ottoman Empire 
until the end of World War I, when Britain assumed control of Palestine as a mandate 
under the League of Nations. During World War I (1914-1918), secret agreements were 
made between the British government and the British Zionist community leaders, leading 
to the Balfour Declaration and establishing a “national home” for the Jewish people in 
Palestine. 
 The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, in his November 
2, 1917 letter to Lord Rothschild, the leader of the British Zionists, explains: 
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
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communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country.33 
 
Before Britain announced the Balfour Declaration, the British government tried to 
persuade President Woodrow Wilson to endorse the proposed statement (Balfour 
Declaration). Initially, Wilson was reluctant to do so as he thought that such a declaration 
would worsen US-Ottoman relations. Finally, under pressure by Louis D. Brandeis, an 
influential Zionist leader in America and Wilson’s close friend and confident, President 
Wilson showed sympathy with the Balfour Declaration. The British saw Wilson’s 
approval of the draft declaration as de facto support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine 
and support for British control of this area as protectorate following the war. This tacit 
support went against Wilson’s agenda of self-determination put forth in his Fourteen 
Points and undermined the Palestinian Arab’s right to self-determination, but this would 
not stop the United States from adopting the Balfour Declaration.34 In September 1922, 
Congress adopted a resolution approving the Balfour Declaration, and thus formalized the 
United States’ foreign policy toward Palestine. From then on, the United States continued 
to support Jewish migration to Palestine. 
Then in late 1947, the Truman administration supported the “Partition Plan” of 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) that proposed partitioning 
Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. On November 29, 1947, the “Partition Plan” was 
approved by the United Nations General Assembly. After the “Partition Plan” was 
passed, the Truman administration continued to promote Jewish emigration to Palestine 
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and the establishment of an egalitarian commonwealth. Congress adopted a resolution in 
December 1947 for this explicit purpose. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel announced 
its independence.   
From that point on, the historical land of Palestine has been known as Israel. 
Minutes after Israel declared its independence, the United States became the first country 
to recognize their independence. Shortly after that, the Soviet Union and other countries 
also recognized the independence of the Jewish state. Following the announcement of the 
independence of Israel, the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 began, and Egypt led Iraq, 
Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia in launching attacks on the territory in 
support of the Arab Palestinians. As a result of this war, Israel acquired land that was 
previously given to Palestinian Arabs according to the November 29, 1947 United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. Continuing their policy of supporting Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Truman 
administration explicitly facilitated this process. Truman’s policies reveal his sympathy 
for Jewish aims in Palestine. After the war, a small number of Palestinian Arabs remained 
in Israel while most of them retreated to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that remained 
under Jordanian and Egyptian control respectively until the Six-Day War of 1967. 
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs were exiled and permanently moved out to 
the United Nations’ refugee camps in surrounding Arab states.35 Many Arab officers felt 
they had been “stabbed in the back” by their governments, who had entered the war 
unprepared and without the fortitude to fight a determined foe. They also criticized their 
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governments for not developing the military infrastructure necessary to claim victory on 
the battlefield.36  
Following the Six-Day War of 1967, the United States voted and endorsed the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The succeeding American presidents 
have sponsored some initiatives, agreements, and treaties with some Arab states and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to assure the sustainability of Israel. The most 
preeminent arrangements are the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979; 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) of 
September 13, 1993; The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994; and The 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995. 
Then United States Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, in his address, “U.S. 
Interests in the Middle East,” (1980), before the Economic Club of New York indicates 
that security was an overriding factor in ensuring the stability of Israel: 
A second overriding American interest is in the security, the strength, and the 
well-being of the State of Israel. The commitment of the United Sates to Israel is 
irrevocable. It has been sustained and intensified by President Carter…. [US] 
provided almost half of the American aid Israel has received in all of her 32 
years…. Israel should have the most advanced and effective defenses we could 
supply–including modern surface-to-air missiles, the M–60 tank, and the F–15 
and F–16 aircraft…. [US] will veto any attempt to impose sanctions upon 
Israel…. will veto any change in [UN] Resolution 242. By all available means we 
will reject any effort to deny Israel its place in the United Nations … Our support 
for Israel is founded … Israel’s security is a matter of America’s national 
interest…. Israel’s security is essential to us because it is indispensable to the 
achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace … Such a peace, in turn, is 
central to all of our interests in the region and many beyond. So there is the most 
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direct relationship between Israel’s strength and our ability to pursue our most 
basic interests.37 
 
In another work written by Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, “Friends with 
Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance Is Good for America,” (2012), the authors state 
Israeli is a “true friend”: 
At the final presidential debate of the 2012 campaign season, President Barack 
Obama and Governor Mitt Romney mentioned Israel some 30 times, more than 
any other country except Iran. Both candidates called the Jewish state “a true 
friend,” pledging to stand with it through thick and thin.38 
 
As noted earlier, it is clear that the US-Israeli relationship dates back decades and 
includes provision of $115 billion of diplomatic, economic, and military support since 
1949. From the onset of the Cold War, Israel is viewed as a close ally to the United States 
in a turbulent Middle East region and critical to American national security interests. 
Since the height of the Cold War, Israel has served as a safeguard against Soviet 
communism and Arab nationalism in the Middle East. Despite many political changes, 
this logic remains true to this day, with Israel serving as a protection against political 
Islam and other extremists. This policy has also served to reduce the propagation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the region by destroying Iraq and Syria’s 
nuclear programs.39 
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Maintaining the United States’ Military Bases 
The third interest of the United States in the Middle East region is maintaining its 
military bases, especially in the Arab oil-rich states along trade routes and pressure points 
that will allow the United States’ policy to, directly and indirectly, influence the entire 
region. The United States’ military bases can be defined as military places that are used 
for training purposes, preparation, and stocking of military equipment for American 
military assistance or operations throughout the world. These military bases are not open 
to the public and usually, take different shapes according to the military purpose for 
which they were established. The United States’ military bases can be classified into four 
primary categories: Air Force; Army or Land; Navy; and Communication and/or Spy.40 
Kenneth Partridge, the editor of U.S. National Debate Topic 2010 –2011: The 
American Military Presence Overseas (2010), states the following about the United 
Sates’ military bases:  
The United States began amassing its global network of military bases in the 
aftermath of World War II. Between 1938 and 1948, the number of foreign 
installations jumped from 14 to 30,000. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. 
military used as justification for this expansion the threat of communist 
aggression.41  
 
Before World War II, the number of United States’ military bases overseas was 
limited. However, with the onset of the Cold War, the number of bases and military 
installations increased rapidly around the world. According to Alexander Cooley’s 
description of the United States’ Department of Defense’s 2006 Base Structure Report, 
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“the United States officially maintains 766 military installations overseas and another 77 
in noncontinental U.S. territories. Fifteen of these facilities were estimated to be worth 
more than $1.6 billion each, whereas an additional 19 were valued at between $862 
million and $1.6 billion.”42 
Prior to 1980, the United States maintained a minimal military presence in the 
Middle East. In the early 1970s, the United States concluded an agreement with Bahrain 
for intermittent use of its naval facilities by the United States Navy for a stipend of $4 
million a year. However, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Bahrain, no longer 
supportive of the American military presence, terminated the lease.43 Then, the 1979 
Iranian Revolution and the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan constituted a 
substantial threat to America’s vital interests in the region, especially considering the 
location of an estimated 40–70% of the world’s oil reserves. In his 1980 State of the 
Union address, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would defend 
its interests in the Gulf region from outside force by any means necessary, including 
military action. In March 1980, Carter ordered the formation of the Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force (RDJTF).44 In order to promote a long-term solution to the region, 
President Ronald Reagan unified the command structure of the RDJTF and became more 
involved in its relationship with the region. This act, combined with the creation of the 
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United States Central Command (CENTCOM) on January 1, 1983, established and 
enhanced the command structure to better accommodate its mission in the region.45 
The United States CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers the central 
proximity of the world, the Middle East. It includes countries in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Central Asia, most notably Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The primary 
mission of the United States CENTCOM is to secure conditions for the region’s stability, 
security, and prosperity by stimulating cooperation between nations, responding to crises, 
limiting and preventing aggressions, and supporting development and reconstruction (see 
Figure 2).46 Through combined military operations, education, and human service, 
CENTCOM serves to maintain access to facilities in the Middle East as well as to 
develop relationships with local leaders.47   
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Four service components and one subordinate unified command make up the 
United States CENTCOM: the United States Naval Forces, Middle East located in 
Bahrain, the United States Army Forces, Middle East based in Kuwait, the United States 
Air Forces, Middle East in Qatar, the United States Marine Forces, Middle East 
established in Bahrain, and the United States Special Operations Command, Middle East 
based in Qatar. 48 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Saddam 
Hussein regime began posing a new and substantial threat to the United States’ national 
security interests in the region. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United 
States began assembling a coalition of more than 30 countries to oust the Iraqi military 
from Kuwait in January 1991. The United States CENTCOM directed more than 532,000 
United States’ military personnel that made up the coalition armed forces (a total of more 
than 737,000), the apex of the United States’ deployment in this region. In 1991, there 
was a Gulf War ceasefire, but there were persistent Iraqi conflicts over the next ten 
years.49   
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States 
CENTCOM’s AOR was central to the global War on Terrorism and engaged in 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere in the AOR.50 
Specifically, at that time, the George W. Bush administration insisted that the Iraqi 
regime did not cooperate with the United Nations’ arms inspectors to confirm that any 
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WMD were destroyed and that it was supporting terrorism. As a result of these factors, 
America invaded Iraq in 2003. Initially, 150,000 United States’ military personnel were 
deployed to join personnel from coalition powers. This number increased by 30,000 in 
2007, but the United States’ forces in Iraq have otherwise typically remained between 
100,000 and 150,000. It was not until December of 2011 that the United States officially 
withdrew its troops, leaving only 150 personnel remaining at the American embassy in 
Iraq.51 Since this time, the remaining troops in the Middle East (roughly 35,000 American 
military personnel) are primarily based in the Gulf states.52   
Based on this research, it is clear that the early United States’ military presence in 
the Middle East was limited before World War II. However, during and after World War 
II, the United States maintained a minimal military presence in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
and Bahrain. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States 
intensified its military presence and expanded its military base footprint in the Gulf 
states. Furthermore, the United States’ military presence in the region has helped to 
guarantee safe access to oil for America and its allies, to ensure stability and security of 
the friendly regimes, to provide quick response to internal and external crises, to counter 
radical forces and Islamic extremist groups that might threaten American interests in the 
region, and, finally, to support the short and long-term strategic foreign policy agendas of 
the United States.  
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Defending Client-states and Friendly Regimes 
 The fourth interest of the United States in the Middle East region is maintaining a 
close relationship with its “client-states” and friendly regimes. The Dictionary of 
Government and Politics defines client-state as a “country which depends on another 
country for such things as defense, trade, etc.”53 
The Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy defines client-state as a 
“country that is economically, politically, and/or militarily dependent upon another 
state…. The relationship is a bilateral, and normally beneficial one, with mutual, although 
different, obligations. The client state … is often militarily powerful but economically 
weak…. client states during the Cold War were Israel and South Korea for the United 
States, and Syria, Iraq … for the Soviet Union.”54  
Eric Hooglund, in his review of U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a 
Client State in Iran (1991), discusses the patron-client relationship: 
In international affairs, relationships in which powerful states serve as protective 
patrons for weaker states, or clients, have been common for centuries. In theory, 
both parties in a patron-client relationship derive tangible and intangible security 
benefits from their association. In practice, however, clients are not equal 
partners, and they typically must sacrifices some measure of autonomous 
behavior in order to maintain the support of patrons, although a skillful client 
regime sometimes can manipulate relations to the overall disadvantage of its 
patron. Patron-client relationships inevitably affect domestic politics in client 
states, but a dearth of scholarly literature pertaining to this important aspect has 
hindered an understanding of the various ways the influence of foreign patrons 
impacts the political processes in client countries.55  
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Relations and Diplomacy (London: Continuum, 2002), 9. 
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At the beginning of the Cold War, several Middle Eastern countries were divided 
into two respective camps. In one camp, countries such as Egypt and Syria supported the 
Soviet Union and were adopting international communist ideas. In the other camp, 
countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Israel backed the United States and adopted 
capitalist ideas and style. Both parties, however, were getting economic, military, and 
diplomatic support from either Washington or Moscow. In addition, to some extent a few 
states were able to use their diplomatic skills to gain support from both parties. 
Protecting client-states has been essential to the United States’ foreign policy for many 
decades. However, since the United States has expanded its interests overseas, it has used 
a system of revolving maintenance of particular regimes and has needed to take on 
additional clients from time to time to affect its interests.56 
Following the demise of the world’s traditional powers (Ottoman, British, and 
French) in the Middle East, most newly independent countries in the region faced 
substantial economic difficulty and were heavily dependent on foreign assistance. During 
the Cold War rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the chief 
providers of foreign aid. Both superpowers recognized the importance of the region for 
their national security interests and thus sought to reinforce their relationships with the 
countries of the region and build what came to be known as client-states. Division among 
countries of the region rapidly appeared with some states giving support to the Soviet 
Union and other states supporting the United States. 
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In the aftermath of World War II, the United States recognized the Soviet Union’s 
interests in the region and thus sought to deny its possible expansion through several 
policies including containment, détente, and deterrence; building defensive organizations 
and alliances such as NATO in 1949, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
in 1954; METO in 1955, and CENTO in 1959; and aggressively pursuing many 
agreements, accords, and treaties of mutual cooperation and friendship.  
Since the early1940s, the United States has pledged to provide economic, 
military, and protective assistance to several countries in the Middle East to maintain its 
national security and strategic interests there. Specifically, the following countries 
became “client-states” of the United States dating back to the mid-1940s: Saudi Arabia 
(1945), Greece and Turkey (1947), Israel (1948), Iran (1953), Pakistan (1954), Lebanon 
(1957 and ends in 1975), Jordan (1963), Tunisia (1974), Egypt (1976), Kuwait, Bahrain, 
and Oman (in 1991-1992).57 
The patron-client relationship within the Middle Eastern countries has achieved 
success in maintaining American and Allied security interests in the region. However, 
throughout this process, an uneven relationship was fashioned between the United States 
and the Middle Eastern countries. This uneven patron-client relationship has enabled the 
United States to gain full access to proven energy supplies. Also, this relationship opened 
the door for establishing more military bases and installations that consequently have 
increased the presence of American personnel in the Gulf. Specifically, as previously 
noted, in 2014, as many as 35,000 United States’ military personnel operated in the 
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Middle East; however, precise numbers are not available given the sensitive politics of 
the region.58 
Finally, economic, military, and diplomatic support has been extended to friendly 
regimes in the Middle East. However, with the onset of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring, the 
United States’ foreign policy changed toward these regimes as the United States decided 
to support individuals in revolution instead of supporting their regimes. This decision 
stands in contrast to the United State’s previous approach in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
Bahrain, and Yemen. This decision has proven to be a double-edged sword that may have 
created more long-term confusion and chaos to the indigenous population than keeping 
the previous regimes in power might have done. 
Resisting Islamic Movements and Terrorist Groups  
The fifth interest of the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East region is 
countering the Islamic resistance movements and terrorist groups. Following the Soviet 
Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States and its allies condemned the 
Soviet action against Afghanistan. Then, the United States government developed a 
number of measures to enforce the Soviets to withdraw their forces. As previously 
referenced, President Carter, in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, said 
“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”59 
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As a direct result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States, China, 
and Arab states both openly and subversively supplied money and military assistance 
through arms and training to the Mujaheddin. The United States itself committed $4-$5 
billion during the years 1980-1992. Between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and 
European and Islamic countries, the Mujaheddin received over $10 billion in aid. The 
majority of this support came to the Afghan rebels in the form of modern lethal weaponry 
like Stinger Missiles to shoot down Soviet aircraft. Following the insurgency, these same 
weapons would find their way to the next generation of Afghan rebels, who would come 
to be known as the Taliban.60 
In the early 1990s, an Afghan faction of Mujaheddin formed the Taliban, Islamic 
forces who opposed Afghanistan’s occupation by the Soviet Union (1979–1989). 
Covertly, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Pakistani 
counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) backed this group.61 As a 
result of this war, the Soviet Union lost billions of dollars and, ultimately, this provoked 
the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 
Afterwards, the Taliban emerged as one of the strongest Islamic factions in 
Afghanistan during the 1990s. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The 
Taliban regime was isolated and not initially recognized internationally; only Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan acknowledged it. In the late 1990s, the 
United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions: first urging the Taliban regime 
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to stop treating women abusively and second, imposing sanctions on the Taliban regime 
for sheltering Al-Qaeda and its leaders. The Taliban refused to respond to the United 
Nations. In fact, in 1998, Al-Qaeda was responsible for bombing the United States 
embassies in East Africa. As a result, the United States accused the Taliban regime of 
providing a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden.62  
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States 
government declared global “War on Terrorism.” The George W. Bush administration 
accused Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime of harboring Al-Qaeda forces. Moreover, the 
Bush administration also accused many countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria of 
sponsoring and supporting terrorists. In this regard, President Bush stated that “… Syria 
and Iran continue to harbor and assist terrorists…. The United States lists both countries 
as state sponsors of terrorism because of their support for Palestinian militant groups such 
as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.”63 On October 7, 2001, the United States, supported by 
British and other NATO member forces, began its combat mission “Operation Enduring 
Freedom.” This combat mission was intended to invade Afghanistan and topple the 
Taliban regime for harboring Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader accused of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.  
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On May 24, 2011, John F. Kerry, in his opening statement to the United States 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled, “Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other 
Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” states:  
Terrorists and insurgents work together against coalition forces and to 
indiscriminately murder innocent civilians, aid workers, civil servants, and 
children. Their motivation, which should offend all faiths, is to destabilize the 
region and to establish a safe haven where they can, and plot attacks against the 
United States and our allies. People ask why we are still in Afghanistan. This is 
the reason.64 
 
On December 28, 2014, President Barack Obama and his Secretary of Defense, 
Chuck Hagel, issued concurrent statements that signified the end of combat in 
Afghanistan. Although this marks the end of the longest American military campaign in 
its history, even after 13 years, arguably there is still much work that could be done from 
a combat mission perspective in Afghanistan.65 However, the success, or lack thereof, of 
the combat missions remains debated.   
Following the September 11, 2001 events, the “War on Terrorism” became a 
major concern of American foreign policy. The United States subsequently attacked 
several Islamic groups, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, such as Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria, in order to defend its national security interests around the globe. The 
United States remains convinced that these Islamic groups are carrying out a radical 
interpretation of Islam and that they profoundly oppose the West. In addition, the United 
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States believes those terrorist groups are posing a substantial threat to America, its allied 
security interests, and the entire region’s stability and security.  
Following the Afghanistan invasion in 2001, President Bush accused Iraq of 
supporting terrorism. Bush claimed that there was a relationship between Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein, and Al-Qaeda, as well as Iraqi intelligence personnel meeting with Osama bin 
Laden in Sudan.66  
In February 2003, the George W. Bush administration developed a National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism in order to counter terrorism around the world. The 
comprehensive plan included strategies to defeat terrorists and their organizations, to 
deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists, to minimize social and economic 
conditions that terrorists exploit, and to defend United States’ citizens and wellbeing at 
home and abroad.67  
On March 19, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and collapsed the Saddam 
Hussein regime. The Bush administration accused the Iraqi regime of violating human 
rights, possessing WMD, and harboring terrorist leaders. Moreover, the United States’ 
officials argued that the Iraqi regime threatened the security and stability of the entire 
Middle East region. 
During August-September 2014, the United States formed an international 
coalition against ISIS. On September 23, 2014, the United States and other countries, 
including several Arab states (Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
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Emirates), began air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria “to take out the militant group’s 
ability to command, train and resupply its fighters.”68  
Based on this research, it seems that the United States is concerned that if 
extremist Islamic militants gain control over WMD (nuclear, radiological, chemical, or 
biological), there would be a real threat to American national security interests, especially 
those in the Middle East region, perhaps leading to a rapid destabilization of the entire 
region. 
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN IN THE 
UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY 
Synopsis of the United States and Jordan Relations 
From the dawn of antiquity, Jordan had been acquired and lost by numerous 
empires and civilizations until it finally became an independent nation following World 
War I. Even from the earliest Biblical sources in the Old Testament, the settlement of 
present day Jordan is recorded by such names as Gilead, Ammon, Moab, Edom, and the 
Hebrews led by Joshua. Consecutive settlements in the thirteenth century B.C. included 
Arab Nabataeans, Greeks, Romans, Muslim Arabs, and Crusaders until the Ottomans 
held sway over Jordan from the fourteenth century until the close of the First World 
War.1   
After World War I, for the next few years, the status of Transjordan fluctuated. In 
1918, British and Arab forces removed the Turks from Palestine and Transjordan. King 
Faisal I of Syria, briefly ruled the area, but was eventually removed by the French before 
the area began being governed by the British under the League of Nations mandate for 
Palestine and Transjordan. Then, Abdullah ibn-Hussein, King Faisal’s brother, threatened 
to attack the French in Syria. In response, the Emirate of Transjordan was created in 
1921. Two years later, Britain recognized the independence of Transjordan in May 1923.
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 Under the rule of emir (later King) Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein, the Emirate of Transjordan 
developed economically and politically. Transjordan received financial backing from 
Britain and consented to accept guidance on fiscal and foreign affairs. Transjordan also 
permitted Britain to station forces in the country. In addition, it was during this period, 
that the Arab Legion (eventually renamed Jordan Armed Forces [JAF]) was formed as 
the mainstay of the regime with British officers and Jordanian Bedouin forces under 
British command. The British mandate over the Emirate of Transjordan ended on May 
22, 1946. Three days later, the Emirate of Transjordan announced its full independent as 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan on May 25, 1946, and installing Abdullah ibn 
Al-Hussein as its King. After Transjordan and Israel signed the armistice agreement on 
April 3, 1949, the West Bank and East Jerusalem came under the governance of 
Transjordan.2 In April of that year, the country was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan.  
On July 20, 1951, King Abdullah ibn Al-Hussein was assassinated while entering 
Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for the Friday prayers. His eldest son, Crown Prince Talal, 
was proclaimed his successor on September 6, 1951. In August 1952, due to mental 
illness, King Talal abdicated the throne in favor of his eldest son, Crown Prince Hussein, 
who was recognized as the King of Jordan on August 11, 1952. A Council of Regency 
was created to hold power in trust until King Hussein’s formal accession to the throne on 
May 2, 1953 when he secured full reign of his constitutional powers upon reaching the 
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age of eighteen.3 King Hussein ruled Jordan from 1953-1999. He represented the fortieth 
generation of direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Among Jordanians, King 
Hussein was considered the “builder” and the “father” of modern Jordan. Upon his death, 
his compatriots, as well as many heads of state, heralded his accomplishments. Those 
who paid tribute at this time were part of what was described as “one of the greatest 
events in modern Middle East history.”4 Hussein’s legacy promised to guide Jordanian 
policy for many years to come. After King Hussein’s death, his eldest son, Prince 
Abdullah, was proclaimed his successor on February 7, 1999. After he had assumed the 
throne, became known as King Abdullah II and he endeavored to introduce moderate 
economic, social, and political reform. These modest reforms took on new significance 
during the “Arab Spring” of 2010-2011 when Jordanians vocally called for more 
political, economic, and governmental reforms.5  
Since its inception as a political entity in the aftermath of World War I, the 
Jordanian state has been heavily dependent on Britain’s economic and military subsidies. 
The special relationship between Jordan and Britain remained strong until the Anglo-
Jordan Treaty ended in 1957. The United States substituted Britain as the main de facto 
Western source of political and monetary aid but without the entanglements associated 
with treaties. Beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Jordan in 
1949, the United States’ policy has been aimed at ensuring Jordan’s independence and 
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stability. The United States’ foreign aid program to Jordan started in 1951 and was 
significantly expanded in 1957, when the United States affirmed its economic and 
military support for Jordan amid political uncertainty and tensions across its borders.6  
Meanwhile, the United States and Jordan have maintained close relations and 
cooperation despite some regional and international issues. The American foreign aid 
program enabled Jordan to effectively manage its serious vulnerabilities, both internally 
and externally. It also ensured Jordan’s stability in the turbulent region.7 Also, it 
significantly increased Jordan’s dependency on the United States.  
Michael D. Wormser, the editor of The Middle East (1981), explains the major 
goals of King Hussein foreign policy: 
King Hussein’s two major foreign policy goals have determined most of his other 
policies. First, he has tried to maintain strong ties with the United States … 
Second, he has had to protect himself against those forces who wish to topple his 
kingdom…. Jordan has followed a consistently pro-West foreign policy … 
[Jordan] has always voiced its support for the Arab cause against the Jewish state. 
Since the 1967 war, when Israel occupied the West Bank, a primary objective of 
Jordan’s foreign policy has been the recovery of that land…. Hussein’s first 
objective … [was] to protect his country from any regional conflicts and forces 
that could threaten his rule.8  
 
Notably, the US-Jordan relations were negatively impacted during the Carter 
administration, when Jordan refused to participate in the Camp David peace negotiations 
between Egypt and Israel in 1978-1979. King Hussein also refused to join the US-led 
international coalitions against Iraq in 1990-1991. Overall, disagreements were limited to 
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these prominent, but short-lived, departures from Jordan’s general agreement to the 
United States’ policies in the Middle East. 
The Importance of Jordan in the United States’ Foreign Policy  
Despite its size, population, climate, and limited valuable natural resources, the United 
States has maintained diplomatic relations with Jordan since 1949. Shortly thereafter, the 
United States government became actively involved in Jordan in order to maintain its 
national security interests in the Middle East. The significance of the Jordanian state to 
the United States has gradually increased since the early years of the Cold War between 
the United States and the Soviet Union due to the following factors: its strategic 
geopolitical location, its powerful ideology, its moderate and pro-Western regime, its 
security role in the region against the Soviet Union and anti-terrorism operations, and, 
lastly, its pivotal role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
Geopolitical Location 
Strategic geography is the physical and human geography as it relates to the 
control of and access to land, water, and air and even outer space that impacts the security 
and wealth of nations.9 
Historically, Jordan’s significance results from its location at the junction between 
Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Holy Land. The desert territory composing present-
day Jordan emerged after the division of the Arab world between Britain and France at 
the conclusion of World War I.10 
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Today, the importance of Jordan also stems from its location between the oil-rich 
Arab peninsula and Israel in the heart of the Middle East. Specifically, Jordan is situated 
between Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia to the south and southeast, and 
Israel to the west. This critical geopolitical location between numbers of more powerful 
countries has enabled Jordan to play a larger role in the regional and international politics 
than its diminutive size would typically command, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(see Figure 3).  
Rodney Wilson, in his book, Politics and the Economy in Jordan (1991), states 
the following about the importance of the geopolitical location of Jordan:  
Jordan is surrounded by five countries, each of which has at least one source of 
power which Jordan lacks. To the west there is Israel, which is superior to Jordan 
in military strength and is allied to one of the superpowers, the United States. To 
the north there is Syria, which has a military, demographic and psychological 
edge over Jordan and has a friendship treaty with another of the superpowers, the 
Soviet Union. To the east there is Iraq, known for its military, demographic and 
economic strength, which also has a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. To 
the south-west there is Egypt, which enjoys demographic, cultural, and military 
strength. Finally, to the south there is Saudi Arabia, which possesses financial 
strength. Moreover, Jordan is geographically the closest Arab country to Palestine 
and has the longest borderline with it, and thus it has been the most affected by 
the cause of its people.11  
 
The United States has recognized the geopolitical significance of Jordan since the 
middle of the twentieth century, given its wealth of fossil fuels, the competition for Arab 
markets by other industrialized nations, the established trade routes between Europe and 
the Middle East, and the importance of controlling its sphere of influence during the Cold 
War. Jordan’s size does not speak to its significance; its location is a crucial factor even if 
it does not have the larger consumer markets of other regional countries like Egypt, Saudi 
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Arabia, and Iraq. Its strategic geopolitical location is pivotal as an influence on the 
interests of the major and regional powers and overall regional role.12 
  
                                                          




Figure 3. Map of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its Neighbors. Source: Map adopted from d-
maps.com, accessed February 21, 2015, http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=4792&lang=en.  
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The strategic significance of Jordan is due to various regions: (i) it serves as a 
buffer between the Arab states and Israel (Jordan is the only Arab state that shares the 
longest border with Israel and the occupied Palestinian West Bank); (ii) it enhances 
regional cooperation between the Arab states; (iii) it promotes transit commerce among 
the Arab states. Iraq, for instance, recognized the importance of Jordan’s location 
specifically, the port of Aqaba. (iv) it improves transit commerce between the Arab 
states, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. These factors collectively have enabled Jordan to 
build a relatively steady economy necessary to support its foreign policy.  
Jordanian relations with the Arab states experienced tension during and after the 
Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. At the time, the position of King Hussein on the Gulf crisis was 
perceived as supportive of Saddam Hussein and his regime. This position, consequently, 
worsened Jordan’s relations with some Arab neighbor states, as well as with the Gulf 
states and the United States, a prime source of foreign aid to Jordan. Following King 
Hussein’s death in 1999, King Abdullah II began to consolidate his efforts to reinforce 
and reactivate Jordan’s relations with the Arab states. Upon his ascension to power and 
during his first year of rule, he visited all the Gulf states, Syria, and Libya in an attempt 
to advance relations that had declined during the later years of his father’s reign. Since 
that time, King Abdullah II has continued to maintain cordial relations with the Arab 
states, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Israel13 in order to ensure their 
national security interests in an ever challenging region.  
 
                                                          




The Dictionary of the Political Science defines ideology as “a systematic set of 
arguments and beliefs used to justify an existing or desired social order.”14 While The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics has defined ideology as “any comprehensive and 
mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world … 
Catholicism, Islam, Liberalism, and Marxism are examples.”15  
In this study, the researcher will refer to the ideological factor as a set of beliefs, 
concepts, ideas, perceptions, and views that prevail in a given society or nation-state that 
affect the outcome of the behavior of the policy makers in a state. The ideological factor 
has a vital role in defining the national goals, objectives, orientation, and principles of 
states. It helps the state decision-makers to form their visions and speculations based on 
this ideology. In general, a compatible ideology among states usually leads to more 
cooperation, coordination, and prosperity, unlike the incompatible ideologies that might 
result in real conflict between groups, societies, or states. In this sense, the best example 
of an ideological conflict is that between the United States and the Soviet Union since the 
onset of the Cold War. 
Marian Doris Irish and Elke Frank, in their book, U.S. Foreign Policy: Context, 
Conduct, Content (1975), explain the role of government:  
The basic assignment of any government is to determine the hierarchy of national 
values, to set the nation’s goals in accord with the established values, to allocate 
the nation’s resources in line with its goals, and to prescribe the policies which 
will move the nation toward those goals. Ideology is a useful instrument for 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 256.  
110 
 
policy makers insofar as it helps to identify the national values and to direct 
official courses of action in line with the principles to which the nation appears 
committed.16 
 
In the post-World War II era, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as 
the world’s two leading superpowers, with influence (economic, cultural, ideological, 
social, and political) that spread across the world before the final collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the early1990s. The ideological conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War motivated world nations to take sides 
and align themselves either with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (USSR) 
communist ideology and practice of socialist style economics or establish themselves as a 
democracy by aligning with the United States. In response to the ideological conflict 
between the Eastern and the Western Bloc, King Hussein chose to align with the United 
States; his motivation was both religious and political. 
From a religious perspective, King Hussein was convinced that a communist 
ideology conflicted with the principles of the Islamic religion and the traditions of Arab 
values. “As descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, neither [King] Abdullah [I] nor 
[King] Hussein [I] would have any truck with communism. They believed, as did many 
Muslims, that communism was an anti-Islamic creed.”17 In addition, King Hussein said, 
“Our most dangerous enemy is communism and Judaism.”18 This statement illustrates the 
King’s view of communism as the primary enemy of Islam and Arabs even before 
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Judaism. King Hussein’s views toward communism led him to embrace moderate 
policies in line with the West.  
From a political perspective, the King perceived international communism as a 
real threat to Jordan’s unity and to the Arab Solidarity dreams to gain independence. 
Further, he believed that international communism would not free Arab people stating 
that, “Imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab East, will be replaced by a new kind 
of imperialism [international communism]. If we are enslaved by this, we shall never be 
able to escape or overthrow it.”19 Also, the Soviet Union refused to approve Jordan’s 
entry to the United Nations in June 1946 and used its veto to stop the decision. The 
Soviet Union continued exercising its veto to challenge Jordan’s admission in 1947, 
1948, and 1949.20  
At the time, the Soviets justified their opposition to Jordan’s entry to the United 
Nations as Jordan was under the British trusteeship. As a result, Jordan passed the 
Combating Communism Act in 1948, under which the Jordanian Communist Party was 
banned. This sanction was confirmed by the Political Parties Organizing Law number 3 
(1954) and the Law of Political Parties number 15 (1955). As a result of the Soviet 
Union position, Jordan was not admitted to the United Nations until 1955.21 Thereafter, 
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the Jordanian government passed the Combating Communism Act of 1953 that banned 
communist newspapers in the country.22 
Benjamin Shwadran, in his book, Jordan a State of Tension (1959), stated that 
Jordan’s application to join the United Nations was voted down through the veto of the 
Soviet Union:  
  The application was voted down on August 28, 1946 through the veto of the 
Soviet Union, and the following year it failed again, for the same reason. On 
November 28, 1947 the Soviet Union served notice that it would vote negatively 
on the application and consequently it was not brought up.23   
 
These incidents solidified King Hussein’s conviction of the Soviet Union and 
international communism. As a de facto, the best choice was to establish a relationship 
with the free world and, specifically, the United States valued the self-determination of 
self-governing states and reinforced its independence and sovereignty. In addition, the 
King’s impression of the Soviet Union and international communism was indeed 
compatible with the ideology of American decision-makers and the Western government 
camp. Compatible ideologies paved the way to formally establishing relations between 
King Hussein and the United States that had lapsed since President Eisenhower’s 
presidency. The King was also educated in Britain, having attended the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst in Camberley, United Kingdom. In fact, many royal family members 
received their early education and significant military training in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
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In the late 1950s, King Hussein expressed his apprehension regarding the 
infiltration of communist ideology in the Arab countries. By April 1957, the impact of 
communism was apparent in Jordan. In response, the King sharply denounced 
communism activities in Jordan by sending a letter to his Prime Minister, Suleiman 
Nabulsi, emphasizing the danger of communism on Jordan and the entire region. In his 
letter to Nabulsi, King Hussein outlined his concerns regarding his position on 
communism:  
The present cold war between the two world blocs has brought to our country 
certain principles and beliefs which are in sharp contrast to our own. Strange 
views have infiltrated into our midst. Unless these unwarranted principles, beliefs 
and views are curtailed and stopped within certain limits, they will affect all the 
glory and prestige for which our nation stands…. We perceive the danger of 
Communist infiltration within our Arab home as well as the danger of those who 
pretend to be Arab nationalists while they have nothing to do with Arabism. Our 
ranks must be free from corruption and intrigues. We will never allow our country 
to be the field for a cold war which may turn to a destructive hot war if the Arabs 
permit others to infiltrate their ranks. We firmly believe in the right of this 
country to live. Its foundations must be strong and built on the glories of the past 
and the hopes of the future. No gap must be left to allow the propaganda of 
communism to ruin our country. These are our views which we convey to Your 
Excellency as a citizen and as our Prime Minister.24  
 
Three years later, in his address before the United Nations General Assembly in 
New York on October 3, 1960, the young King Hussein confirmed his position of 
communism stating: 
… I wanted to be sure that there was no mistake about where Jordan stands in the 
conflict of ideologies that is endangering the peace of the world…. In the great 
struggle between Communism and freedom, there can be no neutrality.25 
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Overall, ideology was an important factor during the early years of the Cold War. 
To a great extent, ideology helped King Hussein identify his country’s national interests 
in the Cold War, in which he took a side with the United States. Similarly, “ideology was 
the principle instrument of the Cold War which preoccupied U.S. foreign-policy makers 
for a quarter century following the Second World War.”26  
The United States recognized early on the importance of Jordan to the Cold War 
rivalry. The alignment with the King and his position of communism paved the way for 
the United States to invest more in Jordan to prevent possible expansion of the Soviet 
Union and the spread of international communism influence in the Middle East. The 
ideological congruence was an auxiliary factor exploited by both countries, the United 
States and Jordan, to achieve certain objectives and long-term strategic interests in the 
region. 
Regime 
The 1952 Constitution of Jordan remained in force in 2014, declaring that Jordan 
is a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary system of government. According to the 
current constitution, the monarchy is the primary power structure in Jordan. The King has 
been vested with broad powers over the executive branch, the legislature, and the 
judiciary. The King is the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Land, 
Naval, and Air Forces. He ratifies the laws and promulgates them, declares war, 
concludes peace, and ratifies treaties and agreements. He also appoints the Prime 
Minister, Ministers, the Senate president and members, judges, and other senior 
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government and military personnel. He exercises his executive power through the Prime 
Minister and the Council of Ministers, who are responsible to the elected Chamber of 
Deputies (Majlis Al-Nuwaab). The Chamber of Deputies, along with the Senate (Majlis 
Al-Ayan), constitute the legislative branch of the government, which collectively is 
called the National Assembly. The King convenes the National Assembly and begins, 
ends, suspends, or dissolves the Chamber of Deputies by the provision of the law; he also 
may dissolve the Senate or remove a Senator from office. The King also oversees 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Concerning legislative power, the King’s veto can 
only be superseded by a two-thirds vote of each house. The Prime Minister and the 
Minister or Ministers involved must countersign such a decree, but the King is protected 
from any liability and responsibility. The judicial branch is an “independent” branch of 
the government, with the Judges of the Civil and Sharia Courts appointed and dismissed 
by a royal decree.27 
Since 1953, “the Jordanian political system continued to revolve around [King] 
Hussein who ruled firmly, brooking no opposition.”28 The constitutional powers that had 
been vested in the King enabled him to survive in the midst of crises, to deal with local 
and foreign policies, and to plan and determine the future of the country during his reign.  
King Hussein’s frequent international visits also allowed him to learn of crucial 
developments outside his country and secure financial and technical aid to the Kingdom. 
Considering Jordan’s dependence on external financial aid, the King’s aptitude for 
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maintaining pleasant and practical relationships with other world countries continues to 
be a valuable asset.29 
In April 1957, King Hussein’s position on international communism led the 
Eisenhower administration to assert the importance of “the independence and integrity of 
Jordan as vital”30 to the United States. Since then, Washington considered the King as a 
close, loyal, and reliable ally in the Middle East.     
During the Jordanian Civil War of September 1970-1971, the United States made 
noteworthy strategies to save King Hussein’s regime. In the aftermath, Henry Kissinger 
concluded, “Our firm action helped to defuse a potentially very dangerous situation and 
to keep in power an Arab leader whose policies are moderate. This may well result in 
improving the chances for a lasting peace in the Near East.”31 After the crisis, the Nixon 
administration continued to provide the regime with economic and military aid, including 
an extra $15 million to help the Jordanian Budget. The Nixon administration’s aid during 
the crisis significantly helped the survival of the King’s regime.32 
In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States enabled King 
Hussein to play a central role in the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East. The 
participation of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation enabled the Palestinian 
delegates to have a direct negotiation with Israelis under the Jordanian umbrella which 
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led to secret negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel 
after that. The unique role of the King in the peace process stemmed from his goal to 
achieve a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Subsequent to the death of King Hussein in 1999, the Jordanian regime has 
continued to maintain cordial relations with the surrounding Arab states, the European 
Union, Israel, Japan, and the United States. The moderate pattern of the foreign policy 
followed by King Hussein and his successor King Abdullah II has enabled Jordan to be a 
lynchpin in regional and international issues that far outstrip its diminutive size. 
According to the United States’ Department of State, “[King] Abdullah [II] moved 
quickly to reaffirm Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel and its relations with the United 
States”33  
In many regional issues, crises, and wars, the United States substantially relies on 
the Jordanian regime to achieve certain objectives. Specifically, facilitating the Arab-
Israeli peace process negotiations, training Iraqi military and police officers, and 
countering terrorism, for instance combating Al-Qaeda and ISIS.  
Clea Lutz Hupp, in her book, The United States and Jordan: Middle East 
Diplomacy during the Cold War (2014), notes the dependency of the United States on 
Jordan: 
The United States not only relied on the presence of a moderate regime in Jordan, 
it had come to depend on Israeli support for the Hashemite monarchy. When 
Israeli enthusiasm for [King] Hussein waned, US officials scrambled to find ways 
to strengthen the King.34 
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Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser was a person of influence in Arab politics 
of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1952, the Free Officer’s coup overthrew King Farouk, 
clearing the path for President Jamal Abdel Nasser to rise to power as a result of his 
charisma and excellent speaking skills that inspired the Arab population. Nasser’s brand 
of “pan-Arabism” was transmitted across the Arab world by radio and particularly 
attracted the displaced Palestinians. In 1956, he successfully withstood pressure from 
Britain, France, and Israel during the Suez Crisis, further increasing his popularity. 
Nasser seemed to be the new Salah Eddin, who would join the Arab factions and retake 
Palestine.35  
In the aftermath of World War II, the confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union over influence, interests, and power ignited the Cold War. In the mid-
1950s, the Soviet Union began to gain influence in some Arab states, notably Egypt and 
Syria. This posture posed a substantial threat to the United States’ vital interests in the 
region. To mitigate this threat, the United States connected the friendly states in the 
region with military alliances. Specifically, in 1953, John Foster Dulles promoted a 
security alliance to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of 
international communism in the region. In 1955, the Baghdad Pact was formed by 
Britain. 
Following the conclusion of the pact, Egypt responded by developing an anti-
Baghdad pact coalition and signing an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia in 
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September 1955 to continue to foster Arab nationalism. By December of that year, Egypt, 
Syria, and Saudi Arabia enacted a defense pact combining the three countries’ militaries 
under Egypt’s authority and offered financial incentives to Jordan to lure them away from 
Britain and bring them into their coalition. The Egyptian coalition’s efforts were viewed 
as successful when, in January 1956, the Jordanian government refused to join the 
Baghdad pact.36  
In his book, Diplomacy (1994), Henry Kissinger, said: 
When Great Britain tried to persuade Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, pro-
Egyptian riots broke out, which obliged King Hussein to dismiss Glubb Pasha 
[Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb], the British commander of the Arab 
Legion, in March 1956.37 
 
In July 1956, the United States and Britain refused to provide financial assistance 
to Egypt to help with the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River leading 
President Nasser to negotiate for assistance from the Soviet Union. In order to leverage 
Soviet and Arab support, he nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which united Arab 
support for Egypt. This action was viewed as another victory for Egypt and Nasser’s 
influence was prevalent in Jordan by this time. For example, his influence was evident in 
the 1956 parliamentary elections when campaign slogans endorsed various political 
positions relating to the nationalization of the Suez Canal including: the repeal of the 
Anglo-Jordan Treaty, the coalition with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the association 
with Iraq, and the call for neutrality of Jordan in Arab relations.38 
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Egypt’s alliance with the Soviet Union, Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company, and Nasser’s backing of the Arab resistant movement in Algeria against 
French occupation constituted a real threat to Western powers and interests in the Arab 
states.  These events eventually led to the alignment of Britain, France, and Israel to oust 
President Nasser from power in the Suez War of 1956.39     
Shortly, after the Jordanian parliamentary elections of October 1956, Jordan 
entered an agreement with Egypt and Syria. King Hussein requested that Suleiman 
Nabulsi, the leader of the Nationalist Socialists, create a new government alliance of the 
Nationalist Socialists, Baath, the National Front, and Independents parties. The 
government was aligned with Egypt, and its outlook on the relationship between Jordan 
and Egypt was of the highest of importance regarding Arab unity and Jordanian national 
interest. This view manifested itself in the desire for the repeal of the Anglo-Jordan 
Treaty.40    
Jordan’s desire to end the Anglo-Jordan Treaty was especially true for the 
Jordanian National Socialist Party that won the parliamentary election in October 1956. 
Several subsequent events also highlighted Egypt’s effect in Jordan and in other Arab 
countries. By November 1956, troops from Syria and Saudi Arabia were stationed in 
Jordan. Iraq also sent troops to Jordan, ostensibly to secure its armistice line with Israel. 
According to the Royal Hashemite Court official online site: 
… in 1956, completely free parliamentary elections were held, and radical groups 
including communists and Ba’thists dominated the new cabinet. In another 
important development, King Hussein dismissed the British commanders of the 
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Arab Legion in 1956, and terminated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in March of 
1957. However, he thought that his government’s leftward drift would eventually 
lead to a communist infiltration of the Arab world, and consequently he resisted 
the trend. A number of riots, and an externally-inspired coup attempt which was 
personally thwarted by King Hussein, forced him to impose martial law in the 
spring of 1957.41 
 
In January 1957, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria signed the Arab 
Solidarity Agreement. This signified a shift in policy, calling for Arab cooperation and 
providing Jordan with $36 million annually.42 Later, in March 1957, the Anglo-Jordan 
Treaty was formally ended, leading to several changes, including King Hussein’s 
agreement to join the Egyptian alliance network and Jordan’s pro-Egyptian cabinet 
moving toward establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist 
China. At this time, tension increased significantly between the King and his cabinet, 
especially when King Hussein showed his interest in assistance from the United States “if 
offered without political strings.” The cabinet replied with a petition of protest. By April 
1957, the King relieved Prime Minister Nabulsi of his position. In his view, international 
communism was threatening Jordan. In support of the King, the United States provided 
$10 million in assistance and military equipment. Jordan and Saudi Arabia now shared a 
common opposition to communism that was increasingly being seen as a threat to the 
region. King Saud of Saudi Arabia provided troops to Jordan and placed them under King 
Hussein’s command. Also, Iraq placed military personnel along the border to block Syria 
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from moving into the territory and pushing out Syrian forces that had been stationed in 
Jordan since the Suez War of 1956.43 
Hatem Shareef Abu-Lebdeh, in his book, Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: 
National Perceptions and United States-Jordan Relations (1997), stated:  
It was at this juncture that U.S.-Jordan relations became defined and a new 
political alignment began between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, through convergence 
of their interests to oppose Communist influence in the region. The Sixth Fleet 
was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean, under a provision in the Eisenhower 
Doctrine to provide economic and military assistance to any Middle Eastern 
country threatened by international communism.44  
 
With the dispatch of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in exchange for 
aid, the United States effectively became Jordan’s principle source of foreign aid, albeit 
without any formal declaration. In April 1957, President Eisenhower and Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles acknowledged that “the independence and integrity of Jordan as 
vital” to the United States. The Eisenhower Doctrine enabled the United States to offer 
economic and military assistance to countries at risk of falling to communism. Thus, 
while King Hussein did not request this aid formally; he stated that “Jordan’s security 
was being threatened by communism.” As a result of his acknowledgment of Jordan’s 
situation and informal request for aid, Jordan was granted $10 million in emergency aid. 
This was the first in a series of grants and current financial aid programs that were 
extended and the first time military assistance was introduced.45 
In response to Egypt’s merger with Syria in the United Arab Republic, on 
February 14, 1958, the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan was announced. The death knell of 
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the federation was rung with the Iraqi revolution in July 1958. It was formally dismantled 
on August 2, 1958. This usurping of power by the coup leaders consequently led King 
Hussein to lay blame on the communists and the United Arab Republic for being in 
cahoots to undermine Jordanian sovereignty and force a collapse of his regime. The King 
predictably called for British and American assistance in combating this perceived threat. 
As a result, British ground forces were on site in Jordan from July 17 through November 
20, 1958. American economic assistance was increased to a significant degree as well.46 
In the 1960s, there was very little change in the political relationships or 
commitments between the United States and Jordan, and the United States continued to 
regard Jordan as an ally and client-state. When the Jordanian Civil War of September 
1970-1971 (known as Black September) broke out, Syria invaded Jordan’s northern 
borders and deployed more than two hundred tanks in support for the PLO rebels. Iraqi 
forces began rapidly withdrawing from its 12,000-man outpost near Az Zarka on 
September 17, 1970. Israel assumed preventative military deployment push back the PLO 
rebel forces. The United States also publicly reasserted its commitment to protect Jordan 
and dispatched its Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean to protect Jordanian 
sovereignty.47  
Bradley J. Pierson, in his article, “The Power of Presence: Nixon, Israel, and the 
Black September Crisis,” explains:  
The United States’ handling of the [1970-1971Black September] crisis was 
consistent with the Nixon Administration’s affinity toward heavy-handed 
diplomacy. By publicly demonstrating a seeming willingness to intervene 
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militarily, the United States effectively asserted its commitment to Jordan and 
deterred a potentially serious military altercation in the Middle East.48 
In the following decades, there were no significant changes to the US-Jordan 
security relations until Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 2, 1990. In fact, the region enjoyed 
a period of relative peace and stability that was not interrupted until the United States’ 
attacked Iraq in 2003. Jordan then again enjoyed relative peace until the erupting of the 
Syrian Civil War of 2011, when the Obama administration pledged to support Jordan’s 
security and promote regional stability.  
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, Jordan 
promised tangible support to the Bush administration’s War on Terrorism and  “was 
officially designated a combat zone for U.S. personnel on Sep. 19, 2001.”49 Jordan played 
a significant role in fighting the terrorism by providing valuable information about Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. In fact, after the 
emergence of ISIS, Jordan continued to share valuable intelligence with the United States 
about ISIS to maintain its national security interests and to ensure the stability of the 
ever-turbulent Middle Eastern region.  
To shore up stability, more than 1,500 United States’ military personnel have 
been stationed in Jordan to protect its northern borders from the ongoing Syrian Civil 
War. The military has provided security measures including general monitoring, border 
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security, and the screening of refugees.50 Economically, the United States has supported 
Jordan by preventing it from being overwhelmed by the Syrian Refugees. According to 
Congressional Research Service, since the commencement of high volume economic aid 
to Syrian refugees began, the United States set aside over $467 million in multilateral 
humanitarian assistance to enable Jordan to manage the Syrian refugee crisis.51  
On June 21, 2013, President Barack H. Obama, in his letter to Congress regarding 
the War Powers Resolution, stated the following about the deployment of American 
troops to Jordan: 
The deployment of this detachment has been directed in furtherance of U.S. 
national security and foreign policy interests, including the important national 
interests in supporting the security of Jordan and promoting regional stability, 
pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations.52  
 
During the Arab Spring of 2010-2011 the United States government recognized 
that a stable Jordan was significant to its regional interests understanding that any 
protests that might overthrow the regime in Jordan could bring an anti-Western 
government. Thus, the United States intensified its efforts to support the monarchy. 
The United States has an active interest in helping Jordan, considering the 
country’s alignment with Western politics, the promise of peace with Israel, and 
collaboration on security and counterterrorism efforts. Political uncertainty could result in 
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the removal of King Abdullah II or an altered or defunct monarchical system that might 
bring about an anti-Western form of government. Instability in Jordan is not inevitable, 
and the United States understands that policies and efforts now can prevent objectionable 
changes in the future.53 
Overall, the stability of the Middle East remains very significant to the United 
State’ national security interests, and Jordan’s security constitutes a priority in the United 
States’ foreign policy. Thus, maintaining security and stability and strengthening Jordan 
is key to the prevention of the penetration of radical Islamists guerrillas, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, 
and others from crossing the Jordanian borders and constituting a major threat to Israeli 
and Jordanian security. Thus, the United States, Israel, and the West will continue to 
support the Kingdom from any possible attacks by those guerrillas. 
Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, in his statement, “The Peace Process and 
Arms Sales to Jordan,” (1985), before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the 
following about Jordan’s significance to Israel’s security: 
… Jordan has proven,… that it is determined to ensure that terrorists do not attack 
Israel from Jordanian territory. The border that it shares with Israel–the longest 
Israel has with any of its neighbors–has been incident free for many years. Israel 
has been able to place confidence in Jordan to prevent infiltration along their 
common border. In fact, Prime Minister Peres,… said that Jordan worked actively 
to prevent terrorist acts from being launched from or through Jordan.54   
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In October 2014, the Friends of Israel Initiative newsletter stated in its issue 
“Dispatch,” that Israel is committed to protect Jordan:  
… Israel has definitely committed to act accordingly if ISIS reaches Jordan, in 
accordance with diplomatic sources recently quoted on Israel’s Channel 2…. The 
Israeli commitment to the stability of the region is once more an unquestionable 
guarantee for the West….The Friends of Israel Initiative has always claimed that 
Israel is a strategic asset for the West, the last frontier for freedom and democracy 
in the Middle East; the Israeli support to the anti-ISIS international coalition is 
just one more proof. Once again the struggle of Israel is the struggle of the 
West.55 
 
To summarize, since the onset of the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy 
in the Middle East has focused on containing the Soviet Union’s influence in the region. 
Jordan’s significance to the United States emerged from King Hussein’s opposition to the 
Soviet Union expansion and the penetration of communist ideology in Jordan and the 
Arab states. In fact, King Hussein publicly asserted, on a number of occasions, his 
opposition to international communism and its incompatibility with Islam and traditional 
Arab values. The national security interests of the United States in the Middle East are 
convergent with King Hussein’s perspective, which has led the United States to consider 
Jordan as a strategic ally in the face of international communism. In 1957, the increased 
communist threat to the Hashemite monarchy led the Eisenhower administration to plead 
publicly to support the King and regarded “the independence and integrity of Jordan as 
vital” to the United States. Emergency financial aid of $10 million was given to maintain 
the security of the monarchy, with additional funding to continue throughout the years.  
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The term the Middle East “peace process” is fairly new, coming into use in the 
mid-1970s to characterize American-led efforts to arbitrate peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors.56  
William B. Quandt, in his book, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (1993), discusses peace as a process. Specifically, he 
indicates that since 1967, the United States has come to understand that peace is more of 
a process than a state of being. America’s legalistic and practical approach to diplomacy 
and peace is representative of its political culture. By approaching peace as a set of 
procedures, the United States is better able to compromise, allowing politicians to more 
flexibility achieve long-term goals. In fact, a large part of the United States constitutional 
theory addresses how issues should be resolved rather than what should be done. In terms 
of Arab-Israeli peace, American involvement in the peace process combines both process 
and substance, providing both direction and mechanism. “That, at its best, is what the 
“peace process” has been about. At worst, it has been little more than a slogan used to 
mask the marking of time.”57  
After the Six-Day War in June of 1967, the United States’ view toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict significantly altered to the benefit of Israel. American officials came to the 
conclusion that “… the United States should support Israel’s retention of the territories 
occupied in the 1967 war until the Arab parties were prepared to offer peace, recognition 
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and security to Israel.”58 This new view would shape American foreign policy toward the 
Arab-Israeli conflict for many decades to come. 
In the months following the Six-Day War of June 1967, the United States used its 
influence in the United Nations Security Council to broker a peace settlement that would 
substantiate its view of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Subsequently, 
the United States’ intensive efforts led the Security Council to pass Resolution 242, 
adopted on November 22, 1967.59 The resolution called for the:  
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.60 
  
The resolution was accepted by Israel, Egypt, and Jordan but rejected by Syria. 
No peace, negotiations, or recognition of Israel marked this period. Consequently, the 
United States’ support of Israel has continued in an attempt to convince the Arab states to 
accept the status quo and offer peace or recognition to Israel.61 The United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 have provided a framework for subsequent 
Arab-Israeli peace settlement negotiations. 
In the late 1970s, President Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, led 
active efforts to bring about a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel. In September 
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1978, President Carter, Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister, 
Menachem Begin, signed the Camp David Accords. On March 26, 1979, Egypt officially 
signed a peace treaty with Israel.62 The historical Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, to some extent, 
has significantly undermined Arab perceptions toward Israel, isolated Egypt from the 
Arab states’ perspective, and paved the way for peace negotiations between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. 
Following the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the United States and the Soviet Union 
sponsored the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East. The conference was 
attended by Egyptian, Israeli, Lebanese, Syrian, and joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegations. This event marked the first time that conflicting Arab-Israeli parties met to 
participate in direct negotiations. Following the conference, Israeli, Syrian, Jordanian, 
and Palestinian representatives continued to meet for bilateral and multilateral talks in 
Washington, DC and Moscow. By 1993, the Washington talks were at a stalemate and 
were then superseded by secret Palestinian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. 
These secret negotiations between Israel, the PLO, and Jordan resulted in the Declaration 
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I) of September 13, 1993, 
The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994,63 and, later, The Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995. Jordanian efforts to bring about a 
just, comprehensive, and lasting peace to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was mainly 
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based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and the Arab 
Leagues Summits Resolutions. 
 Madiha Rashid Al Madfai, in her book, Jordan, the United States and the Middle 
East Peace Process, 1974-1991 (1993), explains Jordan’s strategy on the Arab-Israeli 
peace settlement stating: 
The framework for Jordan’s diplomatic strategy for peace [in the Middle East] is 
based on the following factors: Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 
1967 and 338 of 22 October 1973; the 1974 Rabat Summit Resolution; and the 
1982 Fez Peace Plan. The ultimate aim is to secure Israeli withdrawal from all the 
occupied territories including East Jerusalem and to restore the national rights of 
the Palestinian people in return for a permanent, just and comprehensive peace in 
the region.64  
 
 Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Jordanian government became 
actively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. In the early 1990’s King Hussein 
determined that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s best interests, given their military 
prowess, the development of the Palestinian national movement, and the need to regain 
Western support and secure the region. These factors together led to the signing of The 
Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in October 1994. After King Abdullah II took power in 1999, 
he continued a semi-cordial relationship with Israel in order to maintain the United 
States, Western, and international financial institutions’ foreign assistance upon which 
the Kingdom is heavily dependent.65 
 The previously referenced, George P. Shultz made a statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in regard to Jordan’s vital role in the Middle East peace 
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process. In his statement, “Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process,” (1985), Shultz 
clarifies: 
Jordan has been actively preparing the Arabs to engage in a process leading to a 
comprehensive peace…. Jordan reestablished diplomatic relations with Egypt, 
thereby reducing Egypt’s isolation, underscoring once again Jordan’s moderate 
role and reinforcing the principle that no state should be ostracized or penalized 
for making peace. This strengthened the Arab moderates. At about the same time, 
Israeli Prime Minister Peres announced his willingness to enter into negotiations 
with Jordan without preconditions…. Jordan hosted a Palestine National Council 
session in Amman–in defiance of Syrian opposition. At that session, King 
Hussein publicly challenged the PLO … to accept UN Security Council 
Resolution 242, to abandon the call for an independent Palestinian state, and to 
embark with Jordan on a path of peace negotiations.66  
 
 Finally, it is important to point out that Jordan has retained a key role in 
advancing the peace process between the Palestinians and Israeli based on the two-state 
solution. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict remains one of the highest priorities of the 
Jordanian foreign policy. Jordan’s vision toward the Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement 
has converged with the key Western powers. This is especially the case with the 
American and the British, who gave Jordan a unique role in any peace talk, negotiation, 
or accord since the Madrid Conference of 1991. In recent times, “The United States and 
Jordan share the mutual goals of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle 
East.”67 
 Moreover, to promote a peaceful settlement between Palestinians and Israelis, 
Jordan has endorsed Arab, non-Arab, regional, and international peace initiatives that 
may restore the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. Peace initiatives 
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presented by the United States include, but are not limited to: The 1991 Madrid 
Conference for Peace in the Middle East, The 2000 Camp David Summit, The 2003 Road 





THE UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE HASHEMITE 
KINGDOM OF JORDAN 
The foreign policy of the United States toward Jordan has been shaped since the 
early years of the Cold War. On January 31, 1949, the United States established its 
diplomatic relations with the newly independent Kingdom. Since that time, the United 
States has appreciated the distinctive role of the Jordanian leadership in advancing peace 
and promoting democracy, as well as modernization in the Middle East region. 
Furthermore, the United States and Jordan share mutual visions, objectives, and interests 
toward achieving just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the region. In April 1957, the 
White House stated that “the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital,”1 to the 
United States. Immediately, the Eisenhower administration provided Jordan with $10 
million of emergency financial aid, military assistance, and diplomatic support to ensure 
sustainability of Jordan and its regime. 
This chapter provides contemporary analyses of the most crucial political and 
economic issues impacting the United States and Jordan’s relations during the past four 
American presidents: the Republicans George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) and George W. 
Bush (2001-2009) and the Democrats, Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and Barack H. Obama 
(2009-2014).
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The United States’ Foreign Policy toward Jordan  
during the George H. W. Bush Presidency (1989-1993)  
On January 20, 1989, George H. W. Bush was inaugurated as the forty-first 
President of the United States. The Republican President previously served as the United 
States House of Representative Congressman from Texas, United States Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Chief of the United 
States Liaison Office to China, the director of Central Intelligence, and Vice President 
from 1981-1989 under President Reagan. Following his inauguration, President Bush 
spent a large part of his efforts on foreign affairs as Presidents generally have more 
control in this arena than in domestic affairs.2 
The years of Bush’s presidency witnessed dramatic changes in world affairs. The 
most prominent world events that took place during Bush’s term in office included 
Panama, the ending of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of 
Germany with Eastern Europe, break of the Gulf War, the formation of an unprecedented 
military coalition of 32 nations to liberate Kuwait, the reduction of the threat of nuclear 
war, a democratic Russia replaced the Soviet Union, the Baltic states became free, US-
Soviet relations changed, the New World Order was announced, the world system 
transformed from bipolar to unipolar, and the United States became the world’s sole 
economic, military, and political superpower.3  
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The Political Arena 
 Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, King Hussein 
immediately placed a phone call to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in an initial attempt 
to reach a settlement to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. Saddam assured the King that if 
the Arab states were tolerant to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he would endeavor to begin 
a gradual recall of troops and complete his pullout of the emirate within weeks. After 
speaking with Saddam, the King met with the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, to 
convene a mini-summit of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Kuwaiti, and Saudi leaders to 
resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. In the meantime, both the King and President Mubarak 
spoke by phone to American President Bush, who regarded the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
as totally unacceptable and voiced his opposition. They asked that he delay any American 
action and to allow the Arabs time to resolve the crisis within the Arab League. Further, 
they told Bush that it was just a matter of days that Saddam Hussein would withdraw his 
military troops from Kuwait.4 
On August 3, 1990, King Hussein met with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. In that 
meeting the King ensured two objectives: first, he persuaded Saddam to participate in a 
mini-summit in Jeddah on August 5. Second, he convinced Saddam to withdraw his 
military troops from Kuwait within hours if the Arab League did not put down the Iraqi 
invasion - the last point was deemed important for Saddam because any direct censure of 
Saddam by the Arab League would create a sense of embarrassment for him. This 
condemnation could change the perception of withdrawal to that of a humiliating defeat. 
                                                          




The King believed he had successfully advanced the goal of containing the crisis. 
Unfortunately, although the King’s diplomacy was to some extent successful, it was 
undermined when the Egyptian government first, and later the Arab League Foreign 
Ministers, met on August 3 in Cairo and unexpectedly condemned the Iraqi invasion. 
Marwan Al-Qassim, the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Representative to the Arab 
League meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cairo, abstained from voting due to his concern 
that this would be promoting intervention by outside parties. Jordanian officials were 
suspicious of the United States, convincing Egypt and Saudi Arabia to relinquish hope of 
a negotiating a permanent solution. Following the adoption of a resolution condemning 
the Iraqi invasion, Saddam abandoned any plans for withdrawal, whether real or 
otherwise, and refused to attend the Arab Summit in Jeddah.5 
The Egyptian President called an emergency Arab Summit, to be convened in 
Cairo on August 10th, to discuss the ongoing Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. The Jordanian King 
participated in the summit in an attempt to bring about a peaceful solution. As a result of 
this summit, the Arab League officially adopted a resolution (Resolution 195) 
condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It further called for immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, reasserted Kuwait’s 
sovereignty, and additionally responded to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states’ requests to 
shift Arab forces to defend Saudi Arabia and the regional security of the Gulf states. 
Jordan and some other Arab states abstained from the vote.6 The Jordanian neutral 
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position was interpreted as an expression of sympathy for Saddam Hussein from both the 
Arab states, especially the Gulf states, and also the United States. 
The Arab League “Resolution 195” adopted at the Extraordinary Arab Summit in 
Cairo on August 10, 1990, decided the following: 
… (3) To condemn Iraqi aggression against the brotherly state of Kuwait and not 
to recognise the Iraqi decision to annex Kuwait or any consequences arising from 
the invasion of Iraqi troops of Kuwait territory. (4) To call for the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the return to the 
state it was in before 1 August. (5) To reaffirm Kuwait sovereignty, its 
independence and regional security … (6) To respond to Saudi Arabia’s and other 
Gulf States’ request to transfer Arab forces to support their armed forces to 
defend their territories and regional security against any outside invasion.7  
 
Nigel Ashton, in his book, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (2008), states 
the following about King Hussein’s position of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: 
 … although the King genuinely sought a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, 
his expressions of sympathy for Iraq, and his belief that Iraq would have to be 
offered concessions to secure a settlement, made his position unacceptable both to 
the United States and to the majority of the Arab states.8 
 
After the Arab League adopted a resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion, Jordan 
found itself isolated from the majority of the Arab states. Subsequently, on August 16, 
1990, King Hussein met with President Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine to discuss the 
ongoing Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. The King tried to persuade Bush to keep the crisis within 
the Arab framework, find a diplomatic solution to the entire crisis, and avoid the military 
option. Ultimately, the King’s attempt to convince Bush and his administration to reach a 
peaceful settlement of the crisis was unsuccessful. Furthermore, American officials 
argued that the King was defending Saddam Hussein. In his memoirs, Bush recorded that 
                                                          
7 White Paper, 23-24. 
 
8 Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, 270-71. 
139 
 
the King “Pressed for some middle ground that could solve the problem, and I kept 
saying, there isn’t any – it’s got to be withdrawal and restoration of the Kuwaiti regime.”9 
The meeting damaged relations between the two nations and displayed how far apart the 
United States and Jordan’s policies were from each other at that time. The Bush 
administration was disappointed with the King’s position and tension between the two 
countries grew. 
In the months following the crisis, the Jordanian King continued to persuade all 
the parties involved in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis to find a diplomatic resolution to the crisis 
within the Arab framework instead of war. While King Hussein played a significant role 
in the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-1988 as a mediator between the Iraqi government and the 
United States, the King’s efforts to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis reached a dead end. 
His prior efforts were completely forgotten and crucially undermined during the Iraqi 
invasion. Jordanian efforts to stop the war were effectively rejected by both Arabs and 
Americans. 
As the internationally-led airstrike campaign against Iraq started, the Jordanian 
government expressed more sympathy for the Iraqi people. On February 6, 1991, King 
Hussein delivered a firm speech to his nation, which was brought about by the death of 
Jordanian truck drivers by an American airstrike while on the Baghdad-Amman highway. 
In his speech, the King sharply denounced the United States and its allies’ war against 
Iraq, declaring that the allied war effort was “against all Arabs and all Muslims and not 
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against Iraq alone.”10 Further, he indicated that the allied forces were seeking to exercise 
a foreign hegemony in the Middle East, stating that the Western alliance intention was to 
“destroy Iraq and reorganize the area in a manner far more dangerous to our people than 
the Sykes-Picot agreement.”11 Disappointed, the United States responded to this speech 
by suspending aid to Jordan and promising to review plans for future aid as well.12 In 
addition, Secretary of State, James A. Baker III told The Washington Post, “Although the 
United States ‘fundamentally disagrees’ with King Hussein of Jordan’s harsh criticism of 
the war against Iraq, alternatives to Hussein are not ‘particularly pretty’ and it is 
important to keep communications with the king open.”13 
Three days later, President Bush swiftly sent a personal, harsh letter to King 
Hussein articulating his dissatisfaction: 
I am not going to hide my deep disappointment with your speech of February 6. I 
had not expected … to read such a vitriolic attack on the intensions and actions of 
the multinational coalition that is liberating Kuwait … your words exculpate 
Saddam Hussein for the most serious and most brazen crime against the Arab 
nation by another Arab in modern times … If we do not agree on these matters, so 
be it. But we must understand that a public, political posture that takes Jordan so 
far from the international and Arab consensus has damaged very seriously the 
prospects for eliciting international help for Jordan. If I am circumspect in my 
own public views on your accusations, it is only because I continue to place value, 
however unrequited, in your nation’s well-being and stability.14 
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The Economic Arena 
The Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 negatively impacted the Jordanian economy, 
perhaps the most of any country outside of Iraq and Kuwait. By the time the crisis broke 
out, Jordan was hosting more than a million refugees. Approximately 300,000 of these 
returnees from the Gulf states became permanent residents in the Kingdom. The 
tremendous influx of returnees placed a significant strain on the already limited Jordanian 
sectors such as education, health care, housing, and transportation. In addition, the influx 
of returnees increased the demand on the country’s limited water supplies and 
infrastructure, causing an increase in the cost of living. These factors led to an increase in 
poverty and around 30% unemployment,15 compared to United States unemployment 
25% during the great depression 1929-1941.  
The Gulf crisis and its subsequent United Nations’ economic trade sanctions 
against Iraq created serious trade difficulty for the Jordanian state. Jordan’s political 
position on the crisis, and later its hesitation to implement the United Nations trade 
embargo sanctions on Iraq, paved the way for the United States to threaten to close the 
Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan’s only port outlet to the external world. Two weeks after the Gulf 
crisis of 1990-1991, President Bush told the Los Angeles Times that he would block 
Jordan’s only seaport if they did not join in the embargo.16 This seriously damaged 
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Jordan’s trade relations with the world community, and Jordan was most especially 
concerned as “nearly 40 percent of Jordan’s economy depended on Iraq.”17 
According to the Los Angeles Times, Bush’s statement marked the first direct 
threat to Jordan:  
The [Bush’s] statement marked the first direct threat during the current [Gulf] 
crisis of hostile American action against an Arab country other than Iraq, and it 
demonstrated the tremendous pressure being exerted on Middle Eastern nations to 
choose sides in the 12-day-old confrontation.18  
 
Undoubtedly, the first six months of the Gulf crisis was a very difficult period in 
the modern history of Jordan, damaging its relations with traditional Arab and Western 
allies as well as creating severe economic difficulties. In fact, the crisis may have cost 
Jordan as much as three billion dollars considering the impact on trade and declining 
revenues. Despite the negative impact on Jordanian relations and economy through the 
interruption of commerce, Jordan ultimately adhered to the mandated United Nations’ 
sanctions against Iraq.19  
In addition to the economic difficulties that Jordan faced as a result of the Gulf 
crisis, the United States suspended foreign aid to Jordan as a response to King Hussein’s 
speech on February 6, 1991. In this regard, James A. Baker III told CBS’s Face the 
Nation that the United States may cut its foreign aid to Jordan, stating, “[We] must 
allocate our foreign aid in a way that makes the most sense from the national interest 
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standpoint.”20 The United States Senate also expressed its deep resentment of the King 
for supporting the Iraqi regime during the Gulf crisis. On March 20, 1991, the Senate 
voted to rescind $55 million in economic and military assistance to Jordan. Moreover, 
Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma said the following regarding Jordan: “After billions of 
dollars of aid from the United States, Jordan actively opposed the United States and the 
United Nations by giving political and moral support to Saddam Hussein.”21 
In a letter to the Senate, President Bush warned of the impact of the recession on 
the Jordanian government stating “Jordanian stability remains important to the region and 
to U.S. interests -- and indeed to Israel’s interests -- and Jordan could play a significant 
role in postwar diplomacy, especially in the Arab-Israel peace process.”22 In response to 
Bush’s letter, the Senate approved resuming aid to Jordan on a conditional basis as long 
as the President agreed to certify and report to congressional committees on Jordan’s 
progress in advancing the peace process in the Middle East. Alternatively, if it could be 
shown that the aid would contribute to the peace process then the aid would be restarted. 
The President signed a waiver allowing Jordan to receive eventually all of the FY 1991 
and FY 1992 aid funds after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli agreement to a bilateral 
agenda on September 17, 1993.23 
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Impact on the Peace Process in the Middle East 
As the Gulf crisis came to an end, the Bush administration transitioned quickly 
toward sponsoring peace diplomacy to mend the Arab-Israeli conflict. On March 6, 1991, 
President Bush informed Congress that he intended to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute.24 Consequently, Bush’s speech was followed by an intensified diplomatic 
campaign by James A. Baker III, culminating in the convening of the Madrid Conference 
for Peace in the Middle East at the end of October 1991.  
King Hussein was similarly motivated to repair the strained relations with the 
United States. On February 28, 1991, the King wrote a letter in which he congratulated 
President Bush for liberating Kuwait. In his letter the King stated: 
… well done my friend and you will find me more than ever determined to 
contribute my utmost to the healing of wounds and to the opening of a new and 
bright chapter in the history of this region for the benefit of its future generations. 
We shall commit ourselves to the renewal of the best Jordanian/American and 
Arab/American relations on sound, clear and solid foundations.25  
 
On April 20, 1991, James A. Baker III paid a visit to Aqaba to discuss the Middle 
East peace process with King Hussein. According to The Washington Post, “The meeting 
was the first high-level U.S. contact with Hussein since he visited President Bush in 
Kennebunkport, Maine, shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait last August.”26 In his meeting 
with the King, Baker indicated that Washington hoped that Amman would play a key role 
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in the peace process. The Baker-Hussein meeting marked a new beginning in American-
Jordanian relations. 
According to the previously referenced Nigel Ashton book, King Hussein of 
Jordan: A Political Life (2008), the American peace process allowed King Hussein to 
show his commitment to the region: 
The American-led peace process which followed the [Gulf] war, and which was 
to culminate in the convening of the Madrid peace conference at the end of 
October 1991, was soon to give [King] Hussein the opportunity to demonstrate 
his commitment to this new beginning in the [Middle East] region.27 
 
In short, US-Jordan relations which were damaged during the first six months of 
the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, contributed to Jordan’s isolation because of its stand on the 
Gulf War. Subsequently, its relations with the Arab states that were against Saddam 
Hussein worsened and its ties with Washington were also negatively impacted. United 
Nations sanctions against Iraq significantly affected the fragile Jordanian economy. As 
the Gulf War came to a close, US-Jordan relations began to warm. Baker visited Aqaba 
in late April 1991, and his meeting with King Hussein to discuss the peace process in the 
Middle East was considered a turning point in American-Jordanian relations. The Bush 
administration, like the previous ones, asserted that the stability of the Jordanian state is 
in the best interest of the United States and its allies in the region. Furthermore, it 
recognized the importance of the King’s role, specifically, in any peace initiative in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
It is important to point out that King Hussein and President Bush had a strong 
personal friendship dating back to 1976 when Bush was the director of Central 
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Intelligence. Since 1976, the relationship between the two grew significantly. However, 
during the Gulf crisis of 1990 -1991, both leaders had a different view of the crisis and 
were both disillusioned by the course of events. After the Gulf crisis had come to a close, 
the relationship between them was recharged and consequently impacted their countries 
positively. In fact, after King Hussein’s death, President George H. W. Bush 
accompanied Presidents Clinton, Carter, and Ford on a trip to Amman to pay tribute to 
the King. 
The United States’ Foreign Policy toward Jordan  
during the Bill Clinton Presidency (1993-2001) 
The first inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton (Bill Clinton) as the forty-
second President of the United States was on January 20, 1993. In 1996, after President 
Clinton won reelection, becoming the first Democratic President since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to be elected twice. Following his inauguration, Clinton was credited with the 
most extensive economic expansion in the country’s history, creating over twenty-two 
million jobs.28  
In international affairs, Clinton focused on promoting American interests abroad 
and encouraged democracy in less developed countries. In addition, his administration 
devoted much of its efforts toward expanding international trade, launching peace and 
trade initiatives in Africa and the Middle East, promoting a framework for peace aimed at 
                                                          




ending the strife in Northern Ireland, and intervening in Bosnia29 and other former parts 
of Yugoslavia to end ‘ethnic cleansing.’  
The Political Arena 
Clinton’s foreign policy was centered on broadening the peace process in the 
Middle East. He played an important role in mediating the peace negotiations between 
Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Jordan. Clinton’s efforts resulted 
in the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
(Oslo I) of September 13, 1993, The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994, and 
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995. However, 
Clinton was unable to bring about a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. 
The Madrid Conference of 1991 represented the foundation for all peace talks in 
the Middle East. Thereafter, bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan continued in 
Washington, DC. On September 14, 1993, the bilateral talks resulted in the signing of the 
Israeli-Jordanian Common Agenda that addressed security, water, refugees and displaced 
people, borders, and territorial matters. It also paved the way for intensive negotiations 
leading to a formal peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. On July 25, 1994, the 
continuous efforts of Clinton culminated in the official signing of the Washington 
Declaration between King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Robin of 
Israel.30 
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Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, in his article, “American-Israeli Relations during 
President Bill Clinton’s Reign,” (2013), reiterates Mahmoud Ulayyan Oleimat’s 
sentiment (2000) about President Clinton role in The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 
October 26, 1994: 
Clinton’s efforts resulted in the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli agenda on 14 
September, 1993 as a continuity of the application of what resulted from a 
trilateral summit which included King Hussein, Clinton and Rabin in Washington 
on July 25, 1994 who signed “Washington Statement” which confirmed a 
comprehensive peace agreement based on resolutions 242 and 338.31  
 
Furthermore, in his news conference with King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin on 
July 26, 1994, President Clinton stated: 
… history has been made in Washington, and a brighter future has been built, a 
future that offers more peace and security, not only for the people of Israel and 
Jordan but also for the people of the United States. With great courage and 
foresight, the King and the Prime Minister have united in their conviction that it is 
time to end more than four decades of bloodshed and loss…. They have declared 
an end to the state of war between their two countries and have determined to 
secure a lasting peace. They have personally committed to making sure that a 
treaty is concluded as rapidly as possible.32  
 
Following the Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994, the tireless efforts of 
Clinton quickly turned into a permanent peace agreement. On October 26, 1994, Jordan 
and Israel signed a peace treaty in a historic ceremony held at the bordering Wadi Arabah 
(Arabah Valley) crossing between Jordan and Israel. The signing ceremony garnered a 
large attendance from Jordan, Israel, the United States, and some Arab states. The 
ceremony was also attended by President Clinton, who signed the treaty next to the Prime 
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Ministers from Jordan and Israel. By signing this historic treaty, Jordan became the 
second Arab state to have signed a peace treaty with Israel. 
In his statement, “Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Israel-Jordan Peace 
Treaty at the Border between Israel and Jordan,” (1994), Clinton indicated that there was 
proof of peace between Jordan and Israel: 
Today we see the proof of it, for peace between Jordan and Israel is no longer a 
mirage. It is real. It will take root in this soil. It will grow to great heights and 
shelter generations to come.33 
 
Clyde Haberman, in his article, “Israel and Jordan Sign a Peace Accord,” (1994), 
discussed the relief experienced that day: 
For King Hussein, the day brought full rehabilitation with the United States, after 
the isolation he had brought on himself four years ago by seeming to side with 
Iraq in the Persian Gulf war.34  
 
In addition, during the Clinton presidency, Jordan’s outlook on Iraq changed in 
1995 after it committed to a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. This achievement relieved a 
primary security stressor and allowed for a stronger relationship with the United States, a 
reliable source of financial assistance. Jordan also committed to provision of sanctions 
and refuge to individuals who defected in 1995 including Hussein Kamil (President 
Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law) and his family. King Hussein also publicly highlighted the 
Hashemite association with Iraq, accused Baghdad of undermining the Arab world by its 
invasion of Kuwait and praised Kamil. The King not only made public statements, but 
also visited the Iraqi opposition; he even went so far as to meet with some of the 
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opposition’s leaders in London in late 1995 and early 1996. The King supported the Iraqi 
National Accord (INA) effort to overthrow Saddam in 1996 and permitted them to open a 
bureau and a radio transmission location in Amman.35 The United States was also 
allowed to deploy planes in Jordan “to help patrol the no-fly zone and undertake training 
exercises with the Jordanian air force.[Finally] Jordan restricted its barter exchange with 
Iraq to $220 million in 1996.”36 
On September 25, 1996, Clinton notified Congress of his intent to designate 
Jordan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the United States. On November 12, 
1996, Congress approved the President’s request and Jordan became officially an MNNA 
of the United States. The MNNA status made Jordan more eligible for much needed, vast 
United States’ military assistance, defense articles, and equipment.37  
Immediately following the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in October 
1994, Capitol Hill backed the Clinton administration’s recommendation to forgive 
Jordan’s debt to the United States (nearly $700 million). Forgiveness of this debt and 
increase in Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA), 
underlined the United States’ commitment to Jordan. ESF increased from $7 million to 
$10 million annually and $100 million in EDA. In addition, there was also a $15 million 
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increase in Jordan’s annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance.38 In FY 1996, 
Jordan received $200 million in FMF and $1.2 million in International Military 
Education and Training (IMET).39 
The Economic Arena 
 After The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, the US-Jordan 
economic relations flourished significantly. The Clinton administration took considerable 
steps toward enhancing the economic growth of Jordan as a result of the peace treaty with 
Israel and demonstrated to the regional Arab countries the benefits of peace. Since the 
mid-1990s, both the United States and Jordan began taking vast steps toward expanding 
their economies, trades, and investments. Since then, several trade agreements have been 
signed to enhance the Jordanian economy which was deeply weakened during the Gulf 
crisis of 1990-1991. On July 2, 1997, the United States and Jordan signed a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) with an effective date of June 13, 2003. The BIT secured the 
United States’ economic interests and aid for Jordan to foster its economy by forming an 
advantageous environment for their investment by the private sector. This private sector 
revenue stream further stimulated Jordan’s economic development.40  
In November 1997, Jordan entered into a Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) 
agreement with the United States, which enabled the export of duty-free products to the 
United States and to expand and enhance its trade relations. The Jordanian QIZs played a 
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significant role in improving the economic growth of Jordan. Over the next five years, 
shifts in trades resulted in a substantial increase in exports from Jordan to the United 
States, growing from less than $5 million in 1997 to $164 million in 2001, while imports 
remained similar over the same term.41 According to the United States’ Census Bureau, 
the United States imports from Jordan increased from $18.8 million in 1993 to $73.3 
million in 2000. The United States exports to Jordan averaged $334.55 million during the 
same period.42  
Between 1998 and 2005, Jordan was ranked as the eighth largest exporter to the 
United States, moving from the thirteenth spot among the twenty Middle-East-North 
African (MENA) entities.43 On March 15, 1999, the United States and Jordan signed a 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The US-Jordan TIFA became the 
first one in the Middle East. The TIFA’s primary role was to develop a Trade and 
Investment Council consisting of representatives from each government that met for its 
inaugural meeting in June 2000. Since then, Jordan has made noticeable advancements in 
adopting legislation that secures intellectual property rights and goes a long way toward 
fulfilling the requirements of the TRIPS* Agreement of the World Trade Organization 
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(WTO). As a result, on December 10, 1998, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) announced the results of its out-of-cycle review and removed 
Jordan from the watch list during a Special 301 out-of-cycle review.44  
On December 17, 1999, the WTO General Council approved Jordan’s accession 
package; on April 11, 2000, Jordan became an official member of the WTO. A few 
months later, on October 24, 2000, the United States and Jordan signed the US-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) with an effective date of December 17, 2001. These 
rapid subsequent trade agreements between the United States and Jordan came as a direct 
result of the singing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Clearly, The Jordan-Israel Peace 
Treaty, the QIZs, the USJFTA, and the King’s crucial role in the peace process 
significantly improved the Jordanian economic growth and attracted many foreign 
investors to the Kingdom. 
The previously referenced Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, in his article, “American-
Israeli Relations during President Bill Clinton’s Reign,” (2013), credits Bill Clinton: 
… Clinton was able to accomplish the file of Jordanian-Israeli settlement which 
included agreements that comprised economic, political and security dimensions 
that guaranteed secure borders for Israel and its entrance in the Arab market via 
the Jordanian gate represented in the economic interrelations and the 
establishment of Israeli economic installations in Jordanian free zones.45  
 
In the wake of the Clinton reign, the annual United States’ foreign aid to Jordan 
increased significantly. Between FY 1998 and FY 2002, the United States’ foreign aid to 
Jordan was roughly $150 million and $75 million, respectively. In addition to annual aid 
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funds, Jordan received $300 million as part of a singular package spread over FY 1999 
and FY 2000 in order to support the Wye River Agreement (which was a US-sponsored 
Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement that the late King Hussein helped negotiate in 
1998).46  
Deborah K. Jones, in her white paper, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Jordan: 
National Security or Peace Process Politics?,” (1998), states President Clinton was 
thorough in his search for peace:   
… What is clear, however, is that the [Clinton] Administration during this period 
was seeking every possible means to bring “the fruits of peace” to Jordan and to 
reward King Hussein for having signed a treaty of peace with Israel in October 
1994.47 
The United States’ Foreign Policy toward Jordan 
during the George W. Bush Presidency (2001-2009) 
Following a difficult presidential campaign against Vice President Albert Gore, 
George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the United States. His first term in 
office survived the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States. This 
attack was the first ever deadly terrorist attack on American soil by foreign nationals. In 
response to this attack, President Bush declared a War on Terrorism that morphed into a 
broad range attack on terrorists and any entities that buoyed terrorism anywhere in the 
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world. Born out of this effort, the War in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and the War 
in Iraq in March 2003.48  
After the September 11th events, President Bush reorganized much of the federal 
government, establishing a National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council. In addition, the position of 
Director of National Intelligence and the USA Freedom Corps were also created. Some of 
the changes made were in an effort to stimulate American citizens to support 
humanitarian causes and look beyond themselves.49 Internationally, President Bush 
immediately declared a global “War on Terrorism.” On September 20, 2001, before a 
joint session of Congress, Bush stated “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it 
does not end there…. we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. 
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you 
are with the terrorists.”50 On October 7, 2001, the United States launched its War on 
Terrorism by bombing significant Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets across Afghani soil. 
Almost two years later, Bush announced the war against Iraq on March 19, 2003. It 
should be noted that the September 11th events greatly expanded the presidential power 
to an unprecedented level. Subsequently, the Bush internationally-led campaign on 
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terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq was backed by Congress to maintain the national 
security interests of the United States around the world. 
The Political Arena 
In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush 
administration immediately began assembling a multi-nation task force against the global 
terrorist threat personified by Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban on September 12, 2001. 
The United States was joined by over sixty nations supporting the campaign against the 
global War on Terrorism including significant military support deployed to the United 
States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility.51 
On September 13, 2001, President Bush contacted the United States’ allies 
including Jordan’s King Abdullah II in order to gain international consensus in support of 
his campaign against terrorism. The King expressed Jordan’s condolences to President 
Bush and the American people and pledged full support to the US-led campaign against 
the global War on Terrorism. Shortly after the attacks, the King was the first Arab leader 
who traveled to Washington, DC. In a joint press conference with the President on 
September 28, 2001, King Abdullah II pledged “full, unequivocal support” for the United 
States’ policy against terrorism. At the beginning of the press conference, Bush stated 
that “Jordan is a strong, strong friend of America. And right after September 11th, one of 
the early messages I received was from His Majesty, expressing the condolences of the 
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Jordanian people, as well as his own personal condolences.”52 Further, the President 
praised the Jordanian cooperation with the United States and assured the King that the 
United States “war is against evil, not against Islam.” King Abdullah II told the President 
that “… we will stand by you in these very difficult times…. true friends must stand with 
each other, and we’ll be by your side and we’ll be there to support you.”53  
Since the September 11, 2001 events, Jordan took several steps to support the US-
led campaign against global terrorism. In December 2001, Jordan sent a mine-clearing 
unit and military personnel to clear mines in Bagram and Qandahar, dispatched a military 
medical field hospital to Mazar-e-Sharif to provide medical care for Afghan people, and 
provided allowed all United States and coalition forces to base in and fly over Jordan.54 
Patricia Skinner, in her book, Countries of the World: Jordan (2003), observes the 
following about King Abdullah II role in supporting US-led campaign against terrorism: 
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, King 
Abdullah II pledged Jordan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition against global  
terrorism and was the first Arab leader to travel to the United States after the 
attacks.55  
 
According to the Jordanian Embassy in Washington, DC:  
 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Jordan stood with the U.S. in its 
effort to combat the common threat of terrorism and radical ideology. The two 
sides have worked together and with the international community to rid the world 
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of the scourge of terrorism and end the threat posed to the national security of 
both countries.56 
 
In 2003, Jordan publicly opposed the American invasion of Iraq, denying the 
presence of United States Personnel in the Kingdom. Quietly, Amman denounced the 
invasion, fearing that a civil war could impact Iraq, but given its financial dependence on 
the United States and its neutrality in the Gulf War of 1991, felt forced to cooperate with 
the United States’ war effort. Reportedly, several thousand American special operations 
forces operated out of western Jordan. Initially, Iraq also stopped exporting oil to Jordan, 
but Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states supplied Jordan for the next several years.57   
Politically, Jordan maintained its position against military action on Iraq; 
however, it covertly supported the US-led campaign against Saddam Hussein.58 In 
addition, Jordan continued providing valuable intelligence about Al-Qaeda and other 
insurgent groups in both Iraq and Afghanistan to the United States. In 2006, these 
intelligence efforts resulted in the locating and killing of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Al-
Qaeda leader in Iraq.59  
In response to the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Jordan 
accommodated a training program for Iraqi military and police from late 2003 through 
early 2007. This program resulted in the training of over 54,000 police. During the same 
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period, Al-Zarqawi, carried out attacks against Jordan, including the Jordanian embassy 
in Baghdad in 2003 and hotels in Amman in 2005. Jordan did everything in its power to 
stop militants trying to move into Iraq, including growing its intelligence operations 
inside Iraq. After the hotel bombings, Jordan was able to provide allies with important 
information about Al-Zarqawi’s location, leading to the 2006 airstrike that led to his 
death.60 
The Economic Arena 
Economic relations between the United States and Jordan increased significantly 
during Bush’s presidency. The US-Jordan trade agreements that were concluded in the 
wake of the Clinton administration remained active. On September 28, 2001, President 
Bush signed the USJFTA into public law. On December 17, 2001, the agreement went 
into force. By 2010, the United States and Jordan’s duties on almost all products were 
eliminated after agreeing to a period of phased tariff reductions.61  
In his press conference at the White House with King Abdullah II on September 
28, 2001, President Bush told the King:     
… as a welcoming gift, it is my honor to present you with a pen. This is no 
ordinary pen, since it’s the pen I used to sign the Free Trade Agreement with 
Jordan this morning. At long last, we have, together, accomplished one of your 
main objectives in terms of economic cooperation, which is the Free Trade 
Agreement. I’m proud of the actions of our leadership in the House and the 
Senate from both political parties that recognize the importance of trade with 
Jordan.62   
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In 2007, trade relations between the United States and Jordan increased to an 
unprecedented level of seventy-eighth in overall trade volume as compared to others with 
whom the United States trades.63According to the United States Census Bureau, Jordan’s 
imports from the United States increased from $339 million to $1,191.8 billion between 
2001 and 2009 and Jordan’s exports to the United States increased even more from 
$229.2 million to $924.1 million during the same period.64 
Following the September 11, 2001 events, the United States increased its foreign 
aid to Jordan. In FY 2002, Jordan received $151.6 million in economic aid and $77 
million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received $100 million and $25 million 
respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2002 Supplemental 
Fund. In FY 2003, Jordan received $251 million in economic aid and $200.4 million in 
military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional $700 million and $406 
million respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2003 
Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2004, Jordan received $252.3 million in 
economic aid and $208.9 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an 
additional $100 million in economic aid as part of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental 
Assistance. In FY 2005, Jordan received $251.6 million in economic aid and $209 
million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional $100 million and 
another $100 million, respectively, in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 
2005 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2006, Jordan received $249.1 million 
in economic aid and $210.9 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an 
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additional $50 million in economic aid as part of the FY 2006 Supplemental Fund. In FY 
2007, Jordan received $245 million in economic aid and $209.1 million in military 
assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional $10.3 million and $45 million 
respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2007 Supplemental 
Fund. In FY 2008, Jordan received $361.4 million in economic aid and $301.2 million in 
military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional $200 million and $50 
million, respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the FY 2008 
Supplemental Fund. In FY 2009, Jordan received $263.5 million in economic aid and 
$238.1 million in military assistance. In addition, Jordan received an additional $150 
million and $100 million, respectively in economic and military assistance as part of the 
FY 2009 Supplemental Fund. Jordan received this significant amount considering its 
support of United States’ military operations in Iraq and to help defray the financial 
impact on Jordan’s economy because of the war with Iraq. It was also hoped that the 
additional funds would strengthen its security and be applied to any logistical expenses 
resulting from supporting the United States’ military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.65 
Overall, the US-Jordan relations remained strong during the era of George W. 
Bush. The United States’ foreign aid to Jordan almost tripled from $228.4 million in 2001 
to $651.6 million in 2009. The United States’ foreign aid to Jordan during FY 2008 
totaled circa $10.23 billion, illustrating the Bush administration’s gratitude for Jordan’s 
participation in combating terrorism and rebuilding Iraq. A case may also be made that it 
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was in acknowledgment of Jordan’s vulnerabilities considering the unstable and 
unpredictable region.66 
Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, the editors of Beyond the Facade: 
Political Reform in the Arab World (2008), stated:  
After the [US] war in Iraq [of 2003] began, Washington doubled its annual grants 
to Jordan to around $450 million ($250 million in economic aid and $200 million 
in military assistance), in addition to more than a $1 billion supplement to offset 
the effects of the [Iraqi] war on Jordan’s economy and bolster its security.67 
 
The United States’ Foreign Policy toward Jordan  
during the Barack H. Obama Presidency (2009-2014) 
On January 20, 2009, Barack H. Obama was inaugurated as the forty-fourth 
President of the United States. He was the first ever African-American president and had 
the biggest winning percentage (79%) of any president in the past twenty years. He also 
enjoyed the support of having a strong Democratic majority in Congress. In November 
2012, Obama won reelection for a second term after a tough competition with his 
Republican challenger, Mitt Romney.68 
During his election campaign for the presidency, Obama vowed to repair the 
United States’ relations with the Islamic world and its image abroad, mend ties with 
Russia, limit possession of nuclear weapons throughout the world, became more selective 
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and strategic in choosing battles, and address climate change concerns.69 After he had 
assumed power, Obama’s policy was centered on fighting global terrorism through 
respective campaigns against the Afghani Taliban and various parts of the Al-Qaeda 
organization. At the same time, Obama’s administration searched for ways to 
successfully extricate itself from large scale conflict and occupation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In addition to these goals, President Obama struggled to limit nuclear 
proliferation by Iran, mediate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and contain the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
The Political Arena 
Under the Obama administration, the United States has continued its global War 
on Terrorism. In his remarks in an address to the nation on “The Way Forward in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan” on December 1, 2009, Obama announced that he would send 
an additional 30,000 United States’ military troops to Afghanistan by the first part of 
2010. The President concluded that these troops were necessary to target the insurgent 
terrorists, to secure larger populated areas, to improve Afghan security force training, and 
to embed effective combat troops with them so more indigenous troops could pull their 
own weight. This would prepare for a successful transfer of responsibility to the Afghans 
at some point in the future. As a result of the Obama administration’s efforts in 
Afghanistan, the United States has achieved notable progress on some significant 
objectives and increased the pressure on Al-Qaeda worldwide. These successes included 
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neutralizing high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, as well as preventing the 
Taliban from stopping a presidential election. This was instrumental in producing a new 
government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and constitution.70 In his 2012 re-
election campaign, Obama pledged to end the war in Afghanistan during 2014 and, 
indeed, on December 28, 2014, a formal ceremony marked the end of the United States’ 
combat mission in Afghanistan.71  
In February 2009, President Obama set a timetable for United States’ military 
troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. In his remarks, Obama indicated that about 35,000 to 
50,000 troops would stay in Iraq until the close of 2011. Their focus would be on 
providing advice and training Iraqi security forces. Moreover, they would be called upon 
to protect foreign diplomats and civilians with business in Iraq. The fight against Al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups would continue, but with Iraqi forces taking a greater 
role.72  
US-Jordan military and intelligence relations remained strong during the Obama 
presidency. Cooperation over fighting Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other insurgent groups has 
continued to be a top priority for both countries. In 2009, extensive collaboration between 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Jordan Intelligence Directorate (JID) 
culminated in recruiting a Jordanian physician, Humam Khalil Mohammed Abu-Mulal 
Al-Balawi, as a double agent. Subsequently, Al-Balawi was “taken to Afghanistan to 
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infiltrate Al-Qaeda by posing as a foreign jihadi.”73 Shortly thereafter, Al-Balawi was 
used by both countries’ intelligence services to provide information about high-value 
targets such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the second-ranking Al-Qaeda official to Osama bin 
Laden. Then, on December 30, 2009, Al-Balawi was invited to a meeting at the CIA’s 
Forward Operating Base Chapman in the southeastern province of Khost, Afghanistan to 
help the CIA to capture or kill Al-Zawahiri. Instead, Al-Balawi detonated himself inside 
the meeting, killing seven CIA operatives and the Jordanian Captain Sharif Ali bin Zaid, 
a relative of Jordan’s King Abdullah II.74 
According to the USA Today article, “Jordan Used Jail to Coerce Bomber of CIA 
Base,” published on January 5, 2010: 
The Jordanian Intelligence Directorate wanted al-Balawi, who was respected 
among al-Qaeda and other militants for his Web writings, to help them and their 
CIA allies capture or kill Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden’s right-hand 
man.75 
 
Nasser Judeh, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, during his press conference with 
Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, explained the following about Jordan’s role 
in Afghanistan: 
… our presence in Afghanistan today is … to combat terrorism and the root 
causes of terrorism … to help out in the humanitarian effort that is needed 
there…. our presence in Afghanistan will be enhanced and increased in the 
coming phase. This is something that is ongoing. Jordan was one of the first 
countries there. We are not only part of a network of countries that are trying to 
assist Afghanistan and Afghanis, but also trying to combat terror and terrorism…. 
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we’re also there to defend Jordan’s national interests and … to defend Jordanians 
and safeguard them against this growing threat.76 
 
Since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Jordan has helped the 
United States restore stability and security to Iraq by providing valuable intelligence 
regarding Al-Qaeda and its leaders and other insurgent groups, training Iraqi police in 
Jordan, hosting several hundred thousand Iraqi refugees, and working closely with donors 
agencies and international organizations to address the Iraqi refugees humanitarian needs, 
dispatching a military medical field hospital, and, in August 2008, sending an 
ambassador to Iraq to enhance the bilateral relations.77  
Following the 2011 Syrian Civil War broke out, the United States and its allies 
worked closely with the Syrian moderate rebels to fight the Islamic State. The Obama 
administration lacked a clear strategy for the war in Syria and finally concluded that 
Syrian moderate rebels were uniquely poised to fight the Islamic State.78 In September 
2014, Congress approved an aid package of $500 million for training up to 5,000 Syrian 
moderate rebels. In May 2015, Jordan began training prescreened moderate Syrian rebels 
on its soil. “Currently, just 400 rebels are being trained in Jordan out of 3,750 potential 
volunteers.”79   
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On September 4-5, 2014, King Abdullah II of Jordan attended the NATO Summit 
in Newport, Wales, the United Kingdom to discuss the latest developments in Iraq and 
Syria and the threat ISIS poses to regional security and stability.80  
Following the onset of US-led international coalition airstrikes against ISIS, 
Jordan joined the coalition and the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) conducted 
airstrikes against ISIS targets near Al-Raqqah, Syria. However, after Jordanian pilot, 
Captain Muath Al-Kasassbeh, was captured by ISIS militants near Al-Raqqah on 
December 24, 2014, Jordan suspended its airstrikes. On February 3, 2015, ISIS 
distributed a video displaying Al-Kasassbeh burning alive inside a metal cage. The 
capture and then killing of the pilot attracted the attention of all Jordanian people, 
especially the King, who vowed to wipe out ISIS. On February 5, 2015, shortly after the 
immolation of Al-Kasassbeh, the RJAF waged a rigid airstrike campaign against many 
key targets of ISIS in Syria. Pentagon records indicate that Jordan dropped as many as 72 
bombs in just this leg of its campaign.81  
On February 3, 2015, President Obama condemned ISIS for burning the Jordanian 
pilot to death. Obama commented that “it’s just one more indication of the viciousness 
and barbarity of this organization.”82 According to the USA Today website, Obama 
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believed that the death of the pilot would only lead the US-led coalition to redouble its 
efforts to defeat the Islamic State.83 
During King Abdullah II’s visit to Washington, DC, which coincided with the 
killing of the Jordanian pilot, the King met with key Congress committee members, 
lawmakers, and the President to request an increase in arms sales to fight the Islamic 
State. Senator John McCain, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
pledged support “to help Jordan obtain the sophisticated weaponry it needs to ramp up its 
fight against ISIS.”84   
The Economic Arena 
US-Jordan economic relations have remained strong throughout Obama’s 
presidency. The non-binding five-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was 
signed on September 22, 2008, has remained in force during the Obama presidency. The 
MOU pledged that the United States would provide $660 million annually from FY 2009 
through FY 2014. In reality, during that period, Congress furnished Jordan with $290.6 
million beyond what they agreed to ameliorate for the overall unrest, regional security, 
and vast influx of neighboring refugees.85   
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The United States’ Department of State Archive indicates that the MOU 
reinforces the relationship:  
Th[e] MOU is a step forward in our already strong bilateral relationship and 
reinforces our commitment to work together on a range of important issues – 
including advancing security and stability in the region, and encouraging 
economic development and political reform. Moreover, the MOU sets forth our 
intent to establish a bilateral economic framework and pledges to continue our 
active dialogue on security, economic policy, and political reform and 
performance, in accordance with the priorities established in Jordan’s National 
Agenda.86  
 
Under the USJFTA enacted in 2001, the United States and Jordan completed 
systematic tariff reductions. By 2010 Jordan was no longer imposing any duties on most 
United States’ products. Additionally, Jordan supported the United States-Jordan Joint 
Principles on International Investment and Joint Principles for Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) Services.87 
Following the ending of tariffs on most goods from the United States, the US-
Jordan bilateral trade relations flourished. According to the United States Census Bureau, 
the imports from Jordan increased from $924.1 million to $1,400.5 billion between 2009 
and 2014, and exports to Jordan increased even more, from $1,141.8 billion to $2,050.4 
billion during the same period.88 In addition, the United States’ Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in Jordan (stock) increased from $189 million in 2012 to $217 million in 201389 
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and by 2014; Jordan was ranked as the sixty-sixth largest export market for United 
States’ goods.90 
Further improvements resulted when the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) signed a five-year $275.1 million agreement with Jordan to improve the 
availability of water, delivery, and water sanitation services to one million Jordanian 
citizens and businesses in Amman and Zarqa in 2010.91 
On March 22, 2013, President Obama and King Abdullah II held a press 
conference in Amman that was focused on the Syrian crisis. During the conference, to aid 
Syrian refugees and Jordanian communities impacted by the crisis, President Obama 
pledged an additional $200 million in aid money.92   
In FY 2014, United States’ foreign aid to Jordan exceeded $1 billion, including 
$360 million in economic aid and $303.588 million in military assistance. Jordan also 
received $340 million as part of the FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) 
funds. Then, the total amount of the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan through FY 2015 
was nearly $15.833 billion.93 In an effort to increase Jordan’s fighting capability against 
ISIS, on February 3, 20015, the Obama administration signed a new three-year MOU in 
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which the United States increased its overall foreign aid to Jordan from $660 million to 
$1 billion annually from FY 2015 through FY 2017 period.94 
Finally, following the immolation and murder of the Jordanian pilot, Congress 
moved quickly to pressure senior Obama administration officials to provide Jordan with 
military materials such as parts, smart weapons, devices for night vision, and other 
weapons to keep air strike pressure on ISIS.95  
Donna Cassata, in her article, “Lawmakers Support more Military Aid to Jordan 
Fight IS,” published on February 4, 2015, stated:  
[Following a February 3, 2015 meeting with King Abdullah II] All 26 members of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee wrote in a letter to Secretary of State John 
Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that Jordan’s situation and the 
unanimity of the coalition battling the extremists “demands that we move with 
speed to ensure they receive the military materiel they require.”96 
 
Furthermore, United States Senator John McCain, quoted by Kevin Baron, in his 
article, “Jordan’s Revenge and the Arab World’s ISIS Awakening,” (2015), published in 
The Fiscal Times indicated:  
America has no greater ally in the fight against terrorism than Jordan. And, as we 
made clear to King Abdullah [II] … this committee’s immediate concern is to 
ensure Jordan has all of the equipment and resources necessary to continue taking 
the fight directly to [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL.”97 
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According to the United States Defense Secretary Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 
in response to Congress, in March 2015, the Obama administration approved the sale of 
two coastal patrol boats and associated weaponry to Jordan: 
This proposed sale [to Jordan] will contribute to the foreign policy and national 
security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a partner which 
has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and 
economic progress in the Middle East.98  
 
Despite the numerous obstacles, the United States has continued to make every 
effort possible to hold its commitments to Jordan under the current Obama 
administration.  
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THE UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN AID TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF 
JORDAN 
Following World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the 
Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia as prime regions to compete for influence in the 
Third World.1 In the very early years of the Cold War, foreign aid became a principal 
instrument of the United States’ foreign policy, especially in the Third World. In 1947, 
Truman’s Doctrine provided economic aid and military advice to Greece and Turkey to 
prevent Soviet expansion and the spread of international communism into the Middle 
East region. In April 1957, Jordan was threatened by communism, necessitating receipt 
of aid from the United States and invigorating the relationship between the two nations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the United States’ foreign aid 
(economic and military) to Jordan from 1990-2014. This chapter seeks to explain the role 
of the United States’ foreign aid in advancing the mutual relations between the United 
States and Jordan. Moreover, this chapter discusses US-Jordan military cooperation, 
especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This chapter also examines 
the role of the Jordanian Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) and the US-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement (USJFTA) in enhancing trade relations with the United States and on 
the Jordanian economy.  
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The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines the 
United States’ interests, goals, and objectives in extending aid to Jordan as follows:  
Surrounded by Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Jordan is geographically and 
politically important. Jordan has long supported a comprehensive Middle East 
peace settlement. Jordan continues to seek a formula which will permit Jordanians 
and Palestinians to seize the opportunity for peace. The primary objective of 
Aid’s program in Jordan is to assist the continued development of a moderate, 
Western-oriented state that is socially and politically stable. For [six]ty years, US 
economic assistance has been an important component of the US presence in 
Jordan, contributing to the formation of both the physical and human 
infrastructure which helped foster the rapid socio-economic growth of recent 
years.2 
 
The United States’ Foreign Economic Aid to Jordan 
United States’ foreign aid to Jordan dates back decades to the Cold War. The 
United States government has provided economic aid to Jordan since 1951 and this aid 
intensified in the late 1950s with the growing fear of the spread of communism in the 
Middle East and Jordan, in particular. According to the Congressional Research Service, 
over time the amount of aid that Jordan has received varies depending on various threats 
at a particular time, political perspectives, and worldwide cuts on funding.3  Today, 
Jordan is in the top ten of aid recipients in the world, and in the Middle East Jordan is 
third only behind Israel and Egypt, receiving $15.833 billion through FY 2015.4 
The United States’ economic aid to Jordan is given in two primary ways. The first 
is Cash Transfer, which accounts for 40-60% of Jordan’s allocated aid and is used by the 
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Jordanian government to pay its foreign debt. The second source is the USAID program 
in Jordan. This program focuses on a plethora of sectors including democracy assistance, 
water preservation, and education. In the democratic sector, the United States’ economic 
aid has provided support for government building programs for the parliamentary offices, 
the Jordanian Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The 
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, respectively, 
have received grants to train Jordanian political parties and some members of parliament. 
In the economic sector, most of the United States’ economic aid is earmarked for 
efficiently managing Jordan’s scarce water resources, given Jordan’s high needs in this 
area resulting from its extremely limited access to fresh water. USAID is also providing 
subsidies to numerous waste treatment and water distribution projects in the cities of 
Amman, Aqaba, Irbid, Mafraq.5 
The United States’ economic aid to Jordan consists primarily of four types: 
Economic Support Fund (ESF); Food Assistance (“FA”); Development; and the Peace 
Corps. In FY 1990, Jordan received $3.7 million in ESF and $137 million in loans to 
import food from the United States under FA.6 Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan sharply declined due to Jordan’s refusal to 
join the US-led international coalition against Iraq. The King’s position was viewed as 
pro-Saddam Hussein and his regime subsequently damaged Jordanian relations with the 
Gulf states and the United States, (the major foreign aid provider to the Kingdom since 
the early1950s). 
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After the US-led international coalition against Iraq began, King Hussein 
delivered a firm speech on February 6, 1991, in which he accused the United States of 
attempting to assert hegemony over the Middle East. In response to the king’s speech, the 
George H. W. Bush administration froze the release of all economic and military 
assistance to Jordan. In fact, in March 1991, Congress approved a bill officially blocking 
all aid to Jordan, including $50 million for 1990 and $57.2 million for 1991.7 
Warwick Knowles, in his book, Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy 
(1995), states that the aid would not be resumed, unless: 
… the President certified and reported to appropriate congressional committees 
that the Government of Jordan has taken steps to advance the peace process in the 
Middle East, or that furnishing assistance to Jordan would be beneficial to the 
peace process in the Middle East. 8 
 
In FY 1991 Jordan received $35 million in ESF. In FY 1992 Jordan received $30 
million in ESF and $20 million in FA. In FY 1993, Jordan received $5 million in ESF 
and $30 million in FA. In FY 1994, Jordan received $9 million in ESF, $15 million in 
FA, and $4 million in Development. In FY 1995, Jordan received $7.2 million in ESF, 
$15 million in FA, and $6.7 million in Development. In FY 1996, Jordan received $7.2 
million in ESF, $21 million in FA, and $7.9 million in Development (see Table 3). 
In the early 1990s, the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan was very low because 
of its stands on the Gulf War. In addition, foreign aid from the Gulf states was cut off and 
it experienced an influx of Iraqi refugees. These factors collectively impacted Jordan’s 
economy and dramatically increased unemployment. Official unemployment records 
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showed increases ranging between 15-20% and the gap between the poor and the wealthy 
was rapidly increasing. Following the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty on 
October 26, 1994, Jordan received additional money from the United Sates. Further, 
some financial burden on Jordan was reduced by the United States, who canceled its debt 
amounting to $705 million.9 The relationship between the United States and Jordan 
economically, militarily, and politically improved during this period. By FY 1997, 
Jordan’s economic aid increased to $112.2 million in ESF, $2.6 million in FA, $4.5 
million in Development, and $1.1 million in the Peace Corps.   
The United States’ economic aid to Jordan notably increased again following a 
November 1997 visit by King Hussein to Washington, DC in an attempt to alleviate the 
declining economic situation. Prior to that, USAID noted that Jordan was on the verge of 
turning into a “limited presence country.” However, during the visit, the King was able to 
make a case for increased aid by leveraging a number of the countries positive deeds and 
good-will. The King offered to allow the allies’ access to Hussein Kamil, President 
Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law. King Hussein was also given recognition for playing a 
role in achieving the Hebron agreement between the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) and Israel in January 1997. Prior to the King’s visit, on June 17, 1997, President 
Clinton reiterated the importance of providing financial support to countries that 
supported the peace process. Funding was increased at that time from a budget of $7 
million in FY 1996 to $200 million in FY 1999 when the United States’ aid budget to 
other countries was being reduced. Thus, from 1997 forward, Jordan received a 
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significant boost of increased funding that supplemented the previously agreed 
upon1997-2001 program. In fact, more than 25% of total United States’ aid to Jordan 
over the fifty years was received between 1997 and 2000.10 
In FY 1998, Jordan received $150 million in ESF and $1.2 million in Peace 
Corps. Jordan received $150 million in ESF, $1.4 million in Peace Corps, and an extra 
$50 million in ESF in FY 1999, as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund of 1998. In FY 
2000, Jordan received $150 million in ESF, $1.7 million in Peace Corps, and an extra $50 
million as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund of 1998. In sum, the United States 
dramatically increased economic support to Jordan throughout the mid-1990’s, 
supporting Jordan in strengthening its economy, maintaining domestic stability, and 
pursuing normalization of its relations with Israel.11  
 In the years following 2000, Jordan experienced further increases in economic 
aid. In FY 2001, Jordan received $150 million in ESF and $1.7 million in Peace Corps 
funding. In FY 2002, Jordan received $150 million in ESF and $1.6 million in Peace 
Corps funding as well as $100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2002 Supplemental 
Funding. In FY 2003, Jordan received $250 million in ESF and $1 million in Peace Corps 
funding, plus an extra $700 million in ESF as part of the FY 2003 Emergency 
Supplemental Funding to help reduce the economic impact of the Iraqi War of 2003. 
Since the September 11th events, the United States’ economic aid to Jordan has increased 
markedly, from $151.7 million in FY 2001 to $700 million in FY 2014. In FY 2004, 
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Jordan also received $250 million in ESF, $2.3 million in Peace Corps funding, and an 
extra $100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Funding. By 
FY 2005, Jordan was receiving $250 million in ESF, $1.6 million in Peace Corps 
funding, and an extra $100 million in ESF as part of the FY 2005 Emergency 
Supplemental Assistance. In FY 2006, the amount of aid Jordan received was $247.5 
million in ESF, $1.6 million in Peace Corps funding, and $50 million in ESF as part of 
the FY 2006 Emergency Supplemental Funding. Also, between FY 1999 and FY 2006, 
Jordan received $238.52 million in FA from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) for the purchase of wheat.12 
In FY 2006, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) categorized Jordan in 
the lower middle-income bracket, which led the MCC’s Board of Directors to approve an 
additional $25 million of Threshold Program assistance.13 
This assistance was distributed by USAID and used primarily to increase political 
reforms and qualify Jordan for larger funding programs offered by MCC. According to 
MCC, the Threshold Program to Jordan was intended to spur participation in elections 
and develop programs to improve relations between municipalities, the population, and 
private business.14 
In FY 2007, Jordan received $245 million in ESF as well as an extra $10.3 
million in ESF as part of the FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. By FY 2008, 
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Jordan received $361.4 million in ESF and $200 million in ESF as part of the FY 2008 
Emergency Supplemental Assistance.  
On September 22, 2008, the United States agreed to provide Jordan with a total of 
$660 million in annual foreign aid for a five-year period (FY 2010-FY 2014). Although a 
non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), this committed the United States to 
providing $360 million per year in ESF and $300 million per year in Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) for the next five years. The Jordanian government felt the agreement 
“reaffirms the strategic partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” Indeed, 
at this time, when the budget for foreign aid was impacted by United States operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the agreement was an example of strong US-Jordan relations.15  
In FY 2009, Jordan received $263.5 million in ESF and an extra $150 million in 
ESF as part of the FY 2009 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. For FY 2010, Jordan 
received $363 million in ESF and an additional $100 million in ESF as part of the FY 
2010 Emergency Supplemental Assistance. In addition, the MCC committed another 
$275.1 million to increase water supply and delivery, as well as the treatment and 
collection of waste in the cities of Amman and Zarqa.16 
In FY 2011, Jordan’s aid was increased to $362 million in ESF and $19 million in 
FA to purchase 50,000 metric tons of wheat. In FY 2012, Jordan received $460 million in 
ESF and 50,000 metric tons of wheat ($17 million value).17 Aid continued to increase in 
FY 2013 to $564.404 million in ESF. In FY 2014, Jordan received $700 million in ESF. 
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In fact, the average United States’ economic aid to Jordan between 2011 and 2014 
reached approximately $521.601 million.  
According to the United States’ Department of State, both the United States and 
Jordan are committed to fostering the security and stability of the region by improving 
Jordan’s economy and fostering economic, political, and social reform in Jordan. The 
United States is able to understand and accept Jordan’s increasing and imperative needs 
born out of regional unrest and their fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) and other extremist ideologies and terrorism. In addition, they bear the economic 
brunt of the influx of displaced people from Iraq and Syria, disturbance of foreign energy 
supplies, and other unparalleled strains endemic to the region.18 
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1990 3.7 0a 0 0 3.7 
1991 35.0 0 0 0 35.0 
1992 30.0 20.0 0 0 50.0 
1993 5.0 30.0 0 0 35.0 
1994 9.0 15.0 4.0 0 28.0 
1995 7.2 15.0 6.7 0 28.9 
1996 7.2 21.0 7.9 0 36.1 
1997 112.2 2.6 4.5 1.1 120.4 
1998 150.0 0 0 1.2 151.2 
1999 150.0+(Wye)b 50.0 0 0 1.4 201.4 
2000 150.0+(Wye)b 50.0 0 0 1.7 201.7 
2001 150.0 0 0 1.7 151.7 
2002 150.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0 0 0 1.6 251.6 
2003 250.0+(Suppl.)c 700.0 0 0 1.0 951.0 
2004 250.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0 0 0 2.3 352.3 
2005 250.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0 0 0 1.6 351.6 
2006 247.5+(Suppl.)c 50.0 0 0 1.6 299.1 
2007 245.0+(Suppl.)c 10.3 0 0 0 255.3 
2008 361.4+(Suppl.)c 200.0 0 0 0 561.4 
2009 263.5+(Suppl.)c 150.0 0 0 0 413.5 
2010 363.0+(Suppl.)c 100.0 0 0 0 463.0 
2011 362.0 0 0 0 362.0 
2012 460.0 0 0 0 460.0 
2013 564.404 0 0 0 564.404 
2014 700.0 0 0 0 700.0 
Source: Data adopted from the following sources: (i) Knowles, Jordan since 1989, 127; (ii) Sharp, Jordan: 
Background and U.S. Relations, March 17, 2015, 19.  
a. In FY 1990, Jordan received $137 million in soft loans from United States to import food 
commodities.  
b. Wye: The Wye River Agreement Fund Assistance of 1998; United States sponsored Palestinian-
Israeli  peace agreement that the late King Hussein helped negotiate in 1998 to provide Jordan additional 
United States economic and military assistance in FY 1999 and FY 2000.  
c. Suppl.: Supplemental Emergency Assistance (Supplemental fund). 
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The United States’ Foreign Military Assistance to Jordan 
Since the early years of the Cold War, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration 
pledged to protect the independence and integrity of Jordan from the Soviet Union and 
national communist threat in the Middle East. Military assistance has been given to 
Jordan since April 1957, replacing the British subsidies when they were withdrawn. After 
the Jordanian Civil War broke out in September 1970, the Richard M. Nixon 
administration publicly pledged support to save the Jordanian regime. On September 17, 
1970, while standing with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, President Nixon pledged 
that the United States would intervene if any power threatened Jordan.19 Consequently, 
the United States’ Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean to protect 
Jordan, due to its importance to the entire region’s security and stability. Since then, 
Jordan began to rely heavily on the United States for military assistance and security and 
thus, the United States has been happy to play the role of primary guarantor of Jordan’s 
security.20 
The United States’ foreign military assistance to Jordan has fluctuated depending 
on domestic, regional, and international events. In the early 1990s, the United States’ 
military assistance to Jordan began to dramatically decline due to two reasons: (i) the 
Soviet Union threat to the Middle East decreased and completely collapsed in late 
December 1991; (ii) Jordan’s unwillingness to join the US-led international coalitions 
against Saddam Hussein and his regime in 1990-1991 was negatively viewed. 
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According to the Los Angeles Times on June 20, 1991, the United States House of 
Representatives voted to halt military assistance to Jordan: 
The [US] House [of Representatives] voted [on June 20, 1991] to cut off 
American military aid to Jordan in reprisal for its support of Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War. The lawmakers gave President 
Bush the authority to waive the cutoff if certain conditions are met, principally 
bilateral negotiation with Israel.21  
In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, and in response to King 
Hussein’s crucial role in the Madrid Conference of 1991, the United States’ foreign 
military assistance was restored by the mid-1990s. By November 1996, US-Jordan 
military relations warmed to a point that Jordan was declared a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally 
(MNNA)’ of the United States in the Middle East. This title has significantly enabled 
Jordan to obtain priority status when it comes to military assistance. This classification 
made Jordan eligible for surplus United States defense items and systems, training, and 
equipment loans necessary for research.22 In addition, in FY 1996, Jordan received $200 
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $1.2 million in International Military 
Education and Training (IMET), the primary types of military assistance provided to 
Jordan. 
The United States’ military assistance has increased dramatically since Jordan 
became an MNNA. In FY 1997, Jordan received $30 million in FMF and $1.7 million in 
IMET, increasing to $75 million in FMF and $1.6 million in IMET in FY 1998. In FY 
1999, Jordan received $70 million in FMF and $1.6 million in IMET, as well as $50 
million in FMF as part of the Wye River Agreement Fund. In FY 2000, Jordan received 
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$75 million in FMF, $1.6 million in IMET, and $150 million in FMF as part of the Wye 
River Agreement Fund (see Table 4).  
During the early 2000s, Jordan’s aid increased exponentially. In FY 2001, Jordan 
received $75 million in FMF and $1.7 million in IMET. In FY 2002, Jordan received $75 
million in FMF and $2 million in IMET, as well as $25 million in FMF as part of 
Emergency Supplemental Funding. In FY 2003, Jordan received $198 million in FMF, 
$2.4 million in IMET, and an extra $406 million in FMF as part of Emergency 
Supplemental Funding to help reduce the effects of the Iraqi War of 2003 on Jordan’s 
economy and to enhance its security and stability. 
 In March 2003, Jordan joined what was identified as the “Coalition of the 
Willing.”23 As a result, it was the second largest funding recipient, receiving $295 million 
of additional United States’ support to Non-US Coalition Troops from March 2003 
through March 2007 for border operations. Since 2003, Jordan has received about $1.34 
billion in security assistance from the United States.24  
                                                          
23 In March 2003, 48 nations were deemed a “Coalition of the Willing” and provided with 
political, military, and financial aid for supporting US efforts in Iraq. Of these countries, 38 besides the US 
provided troops. Quoted in Joseph A. Christoff, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and 
International Donor Commitments, GAO Report GAO-07-827T (Washington, DC: US Government 
Accountability Office, May 9, 2007), 1.  
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International Military Education & 
Training (IMET) 
Total 
1990 67.8 2.1 69.9 
1991 20.0 1.3 21.3 
1992 20.0 0.6 20.6 
1993 9.0 0.5 9.5 
1994 9.0 0.8 9.8 
1995 7.3 1.0 8.3 
1996 200.0 1.2 201.2 
1997 30.0 1.7 31.7 
1998 75.0 1.6 76.6 
1999 70.0+50.0 (wye)a 1.6 121.6 
2000 75.0 + 150.0 (wye)a  1.6 226.6 
2001 75.0 1.7 76.7 
2002 75.0 + (Suppl.)b 25.0 2.0 102.0 
2003 198 + (Suppl.)b 406.0 2.4 606.4 
2004 206.0 2.9 208.9 
2005 206 + (Suppl.)b 100.0 3.0 309.0 
2006 207.9 3.0 210.9 
2007 206 + (Suppl.)b 45.0 3.1 254.1 
2008 298.3 + (Suppl.)b 50.0 2.9 351.2 
2009 235 + (Suppl.)b 100 3.1 388.1 
2010 300 + (Suppl.)b 50.0 3.8 353.8 
2011 299.4 3.7 303.7 
2012 300.0 3.7 303.7 
2013 284.829 3.608 288.437 
2014 300.0 3.588 303.588 
Source: Data adopted from the following sources: (i) Knowles, Jordan since 1989, 127; (ii) Sharp, Jordan: 
Background and U.S. Relations, March 17, 2015, 19.  
a. Wye: The Wye River Agreement Fund Assistance of 1998. 
b. Suppl.: Supplemental Emergency Assistance (Supplemental Fund).   
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Amaney A. Jamal, in her book, Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American 
Democracy or No Democracy at All? (2012), stated the following: 
After the events of 9-11, Jordan has also grown more dependent on the United 
States for security. As [King] Abdullah [II] turned to the United States to energize 
the Jordanian economy further, Amman also became more useful to the United 
States, providing intelligence on al-Qaeda after 9-11. Further, Jordan served as a 
key site from which the U.S. military could launch its devastating attack on Iraq 
in 2003.25  
 
Additionally, Jordan has received not only large military assistance grants toward 
conventional weapons and funding for antiterrorism efforts from the Nonproliferation, 
Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs account (NADR).26 Since FY 2002, 
Jordan has received an average of about $2 million a year in NADR appropriations from 
Congress. NADR funding is earmarked to aid training of civilian security and law 
enforcement personnel from “friendly governments” in police maneuvers to more 
effectively deal with terrorism.27 
As a result of supplemental appropriations acts (a total of $1.78 billion since FY 
2003), annual United States’ military assistance to Jordan has increased significantly 
from a total of $69.9 million in FY 1990 to $303.588 million in FY 2014. In addition to 
the noted funds specified for Jordan, the country has also received funds from emergency 
supplemental bills passed to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperation states 
for logistical expenses for supporting United States’ military operations. Increased aid is 
a direct reflection of the Bush administration’s gratitude for Jordan’s role in fighting 
                                                          
25 Jamal, Of Empires and Citizens, 51. 
 
26 Jeremy M. Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, 
DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 9, 2010), 23. 
 
27 Sharp, WikiLeaks Document Release: Jordan, October 17, 2008, 20. 
188 
 
terrorism and renovation of Iraq. It also may be an indirect nod to Jordan’s exposure in a 
volatile region so near the instability in Iraq and conflict between the Israelis and 
Palestinians.28 
Overall, it is important to point out that the annual United States large-scale 
military assistance grants to Jordan considerably helped upgrade its military weapon 
systems and increase its military’s qualification and readiness. On the other side, Jordan 
contributes significantly to the United Nations, hailing as the top supplier of police 
personnel. They additionally provide 57,000 military troops to eighteen peacekeeping 
missions around the world.29    
The US-Jordan Military Cooperation 
US-Jordan military cooperation has included several aspects such as Military 
Sales, Military Exercises, Military Training, and Intelligence Exchange. To a great 
extent, the various forms of United States’ military support has significantly contributed 
to developing and modernizing the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) that has, in turn, 
strengthened the United States’ commitment to Jordan’s security and stability in the 
region. It has also simultaneously created substantial dependency on the United States.   
Military Sales 
The United States’ military sales to Jordan go back decades. However, in the 
years following the signing of The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of 1994, the United States 
                                                          
28 Sharp, WikiLeaks Document Release: Jordan, October 17, 2008, n. pag. 
 
29 Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, April 9, 2010, 23-26.  
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helped Jordan develop and modernize its military forces “which have been the traditional 
mainstay of the regime.”30  
In 1996, Congress approved $100 million for ground force equipment (including 
50 M60A3 tanks) to augment Jordan’s ability to secure their border and uphold the peace 
treaty with Israel.31 On July 29, 1996, the United States signed a $220 million agreement 
authorizing the lease of sixteen fighter jets to Jordan. The F-16 Peace Falcon Program 
provided funds for structural upgrades, engine modifications, support equipment, spare 
parts procurement, and maintenance training of aircraft and pilots.32 Most of this 
equipment was delivered in December 1996 (see Table 5). 
According to the website F-16.net: 
The country which might be most directly affected by the whole deal, Israel, was 
an enthusiastic supporter of the transfer of 16 F-16s to Jordan and has been one of 
the principal advocates in urging the US Government to go forward with the 
deal.33 
 
Before the 2003 Iraqi War, the United States delivered three Patriot anti-missile 
batteries to Jordan to help protect it against possible attacks. Recently, Jordan has utilized 
annual United States’ military assistance grants and other military supplemental 
appropriations funds to buy Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 
radar systems, upgrades for its fleet of 70 to 80 F-16 fighters, and to provide financing for 
the purchase of the United States’ Blackhawk helicopters. Also, the large-scale military 
                                                          




32 “Jordan: Royal Jordanian Air Force – RJAF,” F-16.net, accessed June 27, 2015, http://www.f-
16.net/f-16_users_article11.html.  
 
33 Ibid.  
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assistance grants were primarily directed toward upgrading the Royal Jordanian Air 
Force (RJAF) and other military units to enable improved border monitoring and 
counterterrorism readiness capabilities.34 
Table 5. The United States’ Foreign Military Sales to Jordan 2006-2010 (US$ million) 
Fiscal Year Weapon System Prime Contractor Value of Sale 






2006 Black Hawk Helicopters Sikorsky Co. and 
General Electric 
60.0 
2006 Armored Personnel 
Carriers 
BAE Company 156.0 
2008 Border Security System DRS Technologies Corp 390.0 
2009 AMRAAM Missiles Raytheon 131.0 
2009 Artillery Rocket Systems Multiple Companies 220.0 
2010 Repair of F-16 Engines  Pratt & Whitney 75.0 
2010 JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided 
Missiles 
Javelin Joint Venture 388.0 
Source: Data adopted from Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, April 1, 2013, 14. 
Military Exercises 
In 1974, a joint US-Jordan military commission was formed to coordinate military 
concerns between the two countries. In the period following the 1991 Gulf War, the 
military forces of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and the JAF 
continued to conduct many annual and biennial combined training exercises in Jordan. 
The United States and Jordan had a vibrant and, mainly open, combined exercise 
program. Annual exercises and regular visits by the United States’ naval vessels to Aqaba 
demonstrated this relationship since 1993.35 
                                                          
34 Jeremy M. Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33546 (Washington, 
DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2013), 13. 
 
35 Arkin, “Keeping Secrets in Jordan.” 
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Since the early 1990s, several combined military exercises have taken place in 
Jordan such as the Early Victor (since 1994), Eager Tiger (since 1996), Infinite 
Moonlight (since 1996), Infinite Acclaim (since 1997), Eager Light (since 1998), and 
Eager Lion (since 2011). The primary objective of conducting these mutual US-Jordan 
military exercises is to increase interaction and function between the United States and 
the JAF, exhibit the strong partnership, encourage cooperation in participating forces, 
prepare for crises, and heighten military readiness.36  
Spencer C. Tucker and Prescilla Mary, the editors of The Encyclopedia of Middle 
East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts 
(2010), state the following: 
A joint U.S.-Jordanian military commission has coordinated a number of 
important military concerns since 1974, and Jordanian cooperation with the West 
usually includes at least one major U.S.-Jordanian military exercise per year as 
well as Jordanian participation in multilateral exercises organized by the United 
States.37  
Military Training 
Military training is a critical component of US-Jordan military cooperation. To 
enhance the military partnership between the two countries, the United States trains 
approximately three hundred Jordanian military personnel each year. Further, Jordan has 
been among the top three recipients of IMET funding from the United States in recent 
years. Nearly 257 Jordanian officers participated in this program in FY 2013. Beyond the 
                                                          
36 “Jordanian Armed Forces Announce Exercise Eager Lion 2014,” US Central Command, 
accessed June 30, 2015, http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/jordanian-armed-forces-announce-
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37 Spencer C. Tucker and Prescilla Mary, eds., The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United 




expected military education, IMET also provides funding for English language labs in 
Jordan.38 
In 2002, the Bush administration endorsed King Abdullah II’s initial plan to build 
an international advanced military training center in Jordan. In 2005, the United States 
provided $99 million as part of the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Assistance to help 
support the construction of King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center 
(KASOTC). Later, on May 19, 2009, KASOTC officially opened in Yajooz, near 
Amman, Jordan, to serve as a regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training and 
included a state-of-the art training center for the United States’ forces and its partners. 
KASOTC, partially financed by the United States government, was intended to 
demonstrate the United States’ commitment to Jordan and to support it as an “anchor 
state,” contributing to regional security. Further, it would shore up Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) objectives, interaction, and functionality, and build 
counterterrorism competencies for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The DSCA 
enhanced “consequence management and civil defense capabilities” of the OCO 
partners.39  
In late 2003, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was 
established in Al-Muwaqqar, northeast of Amman, Jordan, to house the American-backed 
Iraqi police training program. In November of that year, the first class of 456 Iraqi cadets 
began training. Since then, the Center has trained more than 50,000 Iraqi police officers 
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in eight-week courses.40 During its operation, the Center accommodated police officers, 
border guards, and corrections officers from nineteen countries at various times: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States all participated in the JIPTC mission at various 
times.41 Further, Jordan rebuilt its Special Operations Command, known in Jordan as 
‘Brigade 71 Anti-Terrorism’ in 2001, and the Anti-Terrorism Center as well, in order to 
oppose terrorism in 2004.  
Intelligence Exchange 
According to several articles related to the subject, US-Jordan intelligence 
relations date back decades. Following the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, Iraqi population and 
commerce expanded, spurring the need for “cooperative intelligence.” All sectors of the 
population were recruited to provide anti-Saddam intelligence. In response, the United 
States increased aid, technical support, and signals intelligence maintenance via 
(SIGINT) monitoring stations for Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID).42 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Jordan 
pledged concrete support to help the United States in its global War on Terrorism and 
served as a combat zone for United States’ personnel. Jordan also allowed the United 
                                                          
40 Howard J. Krongard and Joseph E. Schmitz, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, 
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States’ intelligence staff to operate covertly to eject Saddam Hussein. This level of 
military relations between the two countries traces back to March 1995. At that time, 
there were approximately 1,200 United States’ personnel, and 34 American F-15s and F-
16s based in Muwaffaq Salti Airbase and Prince Hassan Airbase for several months in 
order to protect the Iraqi no-fly zone.43  
As the 2003 Iraqi War approached, other Australian and British special and 
intelligence forces also manned the facilities that “eventually became part of the secret 
network of U.S. facilities in the Gulf region.” Jordan also allowed aircraft carriers to fly 
over, enabling the United States forces and their partners to carryout airstrikes on Iraq.44  
Five Patriot missile units were set up around Jordan’s capital, and the Florida and 
Rhode Island National Guards were deployed to protect the United States’ bases, expand 
infrastructure, and support special operations on the Iraqi border. In addition, the United 
States flew Army intelligence reconnaissance planes alongside the Iraqi border. Britain 
and Australia also helped by providing aircraft and personnel in support of the Western 
Iraqi operations in Western Iraq. In fact, by the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
there were over 5,000 United States and coalition forces in Jordan, designated as “Joint 
Task Force-West” and overseen by Major General Jonathan S. Gration.45   
On January 4, 2010, The Washington Post staff writer, Joby Warrick, in his 
article, “In Jordan, U.S. Finds Quiet Ally in Arab World,” (2010), reports that: 
Current and former U.S. intelligence officials said the special relationship with 
Jordan dates back at least three decades and has recently progressed to the point 
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that the CIA liaison officer in Amman enjoys full, unescorted access to the GID’s 
fortress-like headquarters. The close ties helped disrupt several known terrorist 
plots, including the thwarted 2000 “millennium” conspiracy to attack tourists at 
hotels and other sites. Jordanians also provided U.S. officials with 
communications intercepts in summer 2001 that warned of terrorist plans to carry 
out a major attack on the United States.46 
The United States, Jordan, and Terrorism 
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Jordan was 
among the first Muslim nations to condemn the terroristic acts against the United States. 
Jordan issued a statement that “… accused Osama bin Laden, the United States’ chief 
suspect in the Sept. 11 attacks, of trying to destabilize Jordan as well.”47 They offered 
their assistance to the United States and publicly pledged concrete support to the Bush 
administration. Two weeks later, King Abdullah II was the first Arab leader welcomed at 
the White House. In his visit, the King reasserted his pledge to President Bush’s ‘War on 
Terrorism’ policy. This furthered the relationship and, subsequently, Jordan developed 
and shared crucial intelligence resources with the United States.48 
Robert J. Bookmiller indicated in his article, “Abdullah’s Jordan: America’s 
Anxious Ally,” that public support and intelligence sharing were seen publicly after 9/11. 
Amman and Washington agreed that the war on terrorism and military strikes against the 
Al-Qaeda organization were justifiable self-defense for the United States, but Jordan was 
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concerned that “these military operations not be a ‘war on the Islamic world’ nor be used 
as a pretext to target Arab countries such as Iraq.”49   
Jordan has provided support in several different ways to the United States’ 
campaign against terrorism. On October 9, 2001, Jordan banned any banking operations 
“linked to terrorism activities,” by amending existing terrorism laws. This same 
amendment also outlawed “infiltration and attacks on industry, shipping, 
telecommunications, and computer systems.” In addition, authorities detained and 
prosecuted those affiliated with Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization as well 
as Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who was linked with multiple acts of terrorism in Jordan. 
According to the Congressional Report Service, Jordan continued to back the global war 
on terrorism into 2004.50 Militarily, as noted previously, Jordan established several 
advanced military training centers to cope with terrorism phenomena and augment 
counter-terrorism abilities of the military personnel. These military training centers 
established between 2003 and 2009 include the JIPTC, the Anti-Terrorism Center, and 
the KASOTC.  
Jordan’s Role in Afghanistan, 2001 
According to the United States Department of Defense’s Fact Sheet of 2002, 
Jordan’s military contributions to the War on Terrorism included a mine-clearing unit and 
necessary personnel in Qandahar. They are credited with eliminating mines covering over 
70,000 square meters in Bagram and Qandahar. Jordan also contributed land and air use 
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by United States and coalition forces. Additionally, they provided vital military field 
hospital support, serving 68,811 patients by June 6, 2002 in Mazar-e-Sharif alone.  
Specifically, they served 1,055 troops, 26,763 civilian women, 22,930 civilian men, and 
18,063 children. 798 surgeries were also concluded.51 
According to the NATO Wales Summit 2014 Declaration on Afghanistan: 
Jordan demonstrated its support for NATO military operations through its 
deployment of troops in Kosovo, support for NATO efforts in Libya and its 
steadfast contribution to the NATO International Security Assistance Forces 
[ISAF] in Afghanistan. One of the top five nations in troop contribution to ISAF, 
the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) has also provided a unique asset to NATO’s 
mission through the use of the female soldiers and specialized training for women 
in Afghanistan’s national security forces.52 
 
Jordan’s Role in Iraq, 2003 
As part of its support to the US-led global War on Terrorism, in the post-Saddam 
Hussein regime, Jordan pledged to train more than 30,000 Iraqi military and police in 
Jordan to help Iraqi citizens defend and rebuild their country. In Defense News’ interview 
with King Abdullah II published on February 9, 2004, the King explained, “Iraqi army 
personnel are being trained by the Jordanian Army while Iraqi police training is a joint 
venture with private sector companies.”53  
In addition, in the post-2003 Iraqi War, Jordan provided valuable intelligence 
information about Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Iraq. In 2006, Jordanian 
intensive intelligence efforts in Iraq helped locate the most essential leaders of Al-Qaeda 
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in Iraq including Abu Mousab Al-Zarqawi, the leader who claimed responsibility of 
many terrorist actions in Jordan and Iraq. Subsequently, on June 8, 2006, Al-Zarqawi was 
killed in a United States’ airstrike on a house in Baquba, thirty miles northeast of 
Baghdad.54 
According to Time magazine article, “How They Got Zarqawi: The Manhunt that 
Snared Him,” Tony Karon, notes that the Jordanians received intelligence about 
Zarqawi’s meeting place:  
A well-placed intelligence source in Jordan told TIME that the CIA was tipped 
off after Jordanian intelligence learned of a meeting that Zarqawi planned to hold 
in the town of Baquba, north of Baghdad. His safe house was targeted in an air 
attack, and, says the same source, the Jordanian-born leader of the group al-Qaeda 
in Iraq was killed in the bombing.55 
Jordan’s Role in Syria, 2014 
As part of its commitment to the US-led campaign against terrorism, Jordan 
joined the international coalition airstrikes campaign against the Islamic State in Syria. 
Former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Marwan Muasher stated publicly on CNN that he did 
not think Jordan would go so far as to commit ground troops in the fight against ISIS. 
“The U.S. will have to take the lead in providing military strikes,” he said. Furthermore, 
he adds, “One of Jordan’s key roles would be providing intelligence to the West as 
Jordan’s intelligence on ISIS is “second to none.”56  
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After the Jordanian pilot, Muath Al-Kasassbeh, was captured by the ISIS militant 
members in Al-Raqqah at the end of December 2014, Jordan halted airstrikes against 
ISIS in an attempt to negotiate the return of the pilot. However, hopes of negotiations 
ended with ISIS on February 3, 2015, when ISIS released a horrific video revealing the 
execution by burning of the Jordanian pilot. After the video had been released to the 
media, King Abdullah II pledged to wage an aggressive campaign of airstrikes against 
ISIS in retaliation the pilot. According to Time magazine, Jordan “Bombed 56 ISIS 
targets in Syria in a three-day campaign to avenge the death of the 26-year-old Jordanian 
air force pilot.”57  
As mentioned previously, in September 2014 Congress authorized the United 
States’ military to arm and train moderate Syrian rebels. This authorization provided 
$500 million for the training of about 5,000 fighters over the next year. Subsequently, in 
May 2015, moderate Syrian rebels began to train in Jordan, augmenting existing troops 
and form a force capable of fighting Islamic State extremists.  
Mohammed Al-Momani, a Jordanian government spokesman, indicated to The 
Associated Press that the Syrians training program had only recently begun. Al-Momani 
also added, “Jordan confirms that the war against terrorism is our war, and it’s the war of 
the Muslims and Arabs, first and foremost, to protect our interests and the security of our 
countries, peoples and the future of our children, and to defend our tolerant religion.”58 
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The US-Jordan Trade Agreements 
The Jordanian economy was not deemed significant to the United States until 
Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. In the following years, the Clinton 
administration and Congress established initiatives that have since developed to 
economically reward the Jordanian government for its peace treaty with Israel. 
In 1993, Jordan attempted to join the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
(GATT), but was advised to wait to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) that was 
slated to replace it.59 In January 1994, Jordan began negotiations to join the GATT. In 
January 1995, after the WTO was founded, Jordan’s accession application was 
transferred to the WTO working party. In October 1996, the working party met for the 
first time and held five formal meetings, approving Jordan’s accession package on 
December 17, 1999. Thereafter, Jordan became the one hundred thirty-sixth member of 
the WTO on April 11, 2000.60 
In 1996, Congress instituted the QIZs initiative to support the peace process in the 
Middle East. On November 21, 1996, Presidential Proclamation 6955 created the QIZs in 
Jordan, with the Al-Hassan Industrial Estates in Irbid designated to be the first QIZ in 
Jordan. The QIZs initiative empowered the President (Clinton at the time) to eliminate 
duties on items manufactured in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and QIZs in Jordan and 
Egypt. This enabled Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, so long as 
these products include contributed products from Israel. Prior to 2004, all QIZs had been 
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founded in Jordan. Currently, there are numerous QIZs in all over Jordan’s 
governorates.61 
According to the United States Office of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA), products 
manufactured in QIZs must comply with strict rules of origin:   
1) 35% Jordanian content, of which 11.7% must come from a Jordan QIZ; 8% 
from Israel (7% for high tech goods); the remainder of the minimum may be 
fulfilled by content from a Jordan QIZ, Israel, USA or West Bank / Gaza. 2) 
20% Jordanian content + 15% U.S. content. Furthermore, the U.S.-Jordan 
FTA rules of Origin require that Jordanian exports to the United States must 
have 35 percent Jordanian content in order to receive FTA duty benefits. The 
duty free benefits provided by QIZs remain particularly important for 
Jordanian products for which duty free treatment has not yet been phased-in 
under the United States-Jordan FTA.62  
 
Last, it is important to emphasize that the idea behind establishing such QIZs in 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Egypt was to encourage economic 
development and thereby normalize relationships between Israel and its Arab neighbors 
and promote peace. Further, the QIZs were also established to promote Jordan’s 
economic growth and to promote US-Jordan trade relations. QIZs were designed to 
subsidize regional support for the Middle East peace process by providing economic 
benefits to Egypt and Jordan, the only two Arab states to sign peace treaties with Israel. 
They also were designed to deliver a clear economic boost for Egypt, Jordan, the West 
Bank, and the Gaza Strip by providing economic stimuli and reducing unemployment.63  
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On October 24, 2000, President Bill Clinton and King Abdullah II were in power 
at the signing of the USJFTA, a compact that intended to encourage trade of goods and 
services in the United States and Jordan by eliminating duties and commercial barriers. It    
also helped both nations by freeing markets and encouraging new business for working 
people and farmers in both countries.64 
Marwa Al Nasa’a and others, in their study, “The Jordan-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement: Eight Years Later,” (2008), explain USJFTA’s advantages:  
… [The USJFTA] provide[s] the country with a comparative advantage in a large 
export market and boost foreign direct investment from the United States…. [The 
USJFTA] signify the strong U.S. commitment to Jordan. It demonstrated U.S. 
support for the recently ascended King Abdullah II at a personal level, the 
Jordanian economic reform program at a national level, and Jordan’s role in 
promoting political stability and economic openness at a regional level…. [The 
USJFTA] was a culmination of the previous years of U.S.-Jordan joint economic 
initiatives.65 
  
Following the initial signing of the USJFTA on May 9, 2001, the Jordanian 
Parliament ratified it. During King Abdullah II’s visit to Washington, DC after the 
September 11, 2001 events, President Bush signed the USJFTA on September 28, 2001, 
as a reward for Jordan’s role in supporting the United States’ policy against fighting 
terrorism. Almost three months later, the USJFTA came into force on December 17, 
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2001.66 By signing the USJFTA, Jordan became the first Arab and fourth country (after 
Canada, Mexico, and Israel) to sign a free trade contract with the United States.    
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR): 
[The] QIZ products still account for more than half of Jordanian exports to the 
United States, but the QIZ share is declining relative to total products shipped 
under the [USJ] FTA. This shift toward exporting products manufactured outside 
of the QIZs demonstrates the important role the [USJ] FTA plays in helping 
Jordan diversify its economy.67 
 
The US-Jordan trade relations have flourished since the mid-1990s. According to 
the USTR, the key elements of the US-Jordan economic partnerships are (i) the formation 
of QIZs which allow goods made in Jordan to be imported to the United States duty-free; 
and (ii) the USJFTA, which was enacted on January 1, 2010.68  
In 2003, according to Jordan’s Ministry of Finance, QIZ exports totaled $582 
million.69 After the USJFTA had been signed, Jordan experienced a rapid increase in its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which almost doubled from nearly $8.5 billion in 2001 
to $16 billion in 2007.70 Further, bilateral trade between the two countries also led to a 
notable increase and the United States became Jordan’s largest trading market. In 2000, 
the United States exported $306 million to Jordan, while in the same year, Jordan exports 
                                                          
66 “United States-Jordan,” SICE, accessed August 15, 2015, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_JOR/USA_JOR_e.asp. 
 
67 “Jordan Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed 
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68 Ibid.  
 
69 As quoted by Prados, Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, April 26, 2006, 12-13. 
 
70 Al Nasa’a et al., “Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 4-9.  
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to the United States were $73 million.71 In 2001, Jordan’s exports to the United States 
grew to approximately $229 million, while in 2007 Jordan exports to the United States 
reached almost $1.3 billion. It is undeniable that the USJFTA has had a more 
considerable impact on Jordanian’s economic growth than on the United States’ 
economy. Since the USJFTA was enacted in 2000, United States experts put the United 
States’ economic impact of the agreement into context, “as U.S.-Mexico trade was larger 
in an average day than U.S.-Jordan trade was in an entire year. [Further] annual US 
exports to Jordan were less than $300 million, or about the value of two Boeing jumbo 
jets.”72  
By 2007, the United States was Jordan’s largest market, making up nearly one-
third of its yearly exports.73 United States exports to Jordan amounted to $1.2 billion in 
2009, an increase of 27% over 2008.74 
After the USJFTA signing, Jordan moved to 66th in rank compared to other 
United States trading partners in 2014. In fact, the United States Trade Commission 
reports that in 2014 Jordan shipped more than a billion dollars in products and services to 
the United States, mostly apparel and clothing accessories. In the same year, the United 
States exported two billion dollars to Jordan, primarily aircraft parts, machinery and 
appliances, vehicles, and grain. The USJFTA and QIZs-have both contributed to the 
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expansion of US-Jordan trade ties and could produce more opportunities for the United 
States to benefit from its investment in Jordan.75 
It is important to point out that US-Jordan trade relations have been enhanced 
dramatically as a result of the peace treaty with Israel. Further, it might be argued that the 
American-Jordanian economic relations are a direct reflection of the political relations 
between Washington and Amman, developing positively when there is an agreement over 
political issues and declining when there is disagreement, especially when it comes to 
security and stability matters. In addition, Jordan’s economic reform program that King 
Abdullah II adopted has impacted the Jordanian economy and has attracted many foreign 
investors to the Kingdom.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the USJFTA was not lightly made: 
… [The USJFTA] comes as a result of the impressive steps Jordan has taken 
under King Abdullah’s [II] leadership to modernize its economy and to open its 
markets to foreign investors. It also is a tribute to the courageous role Jordan has 
played over the past several years to promote stability and peace in the region…. 
It is also the first U.S. free trade agreement to include both labor and environment 
obligations in the body of the text.76  
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CONCLUSION AND THEORIES 
The United States’ political presence in the Middle East did not commence until 
the beginning of the Second World War. At the close of World War II, the United States 
and the Soviet Union emerged as the only two superpowers. After World War II, the 
traditional world powers in the Middle East (Britain and France) faced substantial 
economic crises and were no longer capable of exercising their historical leadership role 
in the region. In response to the increasing ambitions of the Soviet Union for the oil-rich 
Middle East region, the United States found itself compelled to assume Britain’s long-
standing involvement which ratcheted up tension significantly, leading to what came to 
be known as the Cold War. 
In response to the Cold War rivalry, Arab countries separated into two camps, one 
camp supporting the Soviet Union such as Egypt (until 1976 when they switched to 
support the United States) and Syria and the other camp including Iraq (until 1959 when 
they switched to the Soviet Union), Jordan, and Saudi Arabia that supported the United 
States. 
In 1952, the Egyptian Revolution brought President Jamal Abdel-Nasser, an Arab 
nationalist military officer, to power. Nasser’s policies were centered on nationalism, 
self-determination, and eliminating the Western influence and interests in the Arab 
countries. Nasser’s policies attracted many Arab nationalists at the time. 
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 In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to gain influence in Egypt and Syria. 
To limit any possible Soviet Union expansion in the Middle East region, the Baghdad 
Pact was established with the support of both the United States and Britain in 1955. In 
response, in an attempt to build Arab cohesiveness, Egypt created an “anti-Baghdad pact 
coalition” among Arab countries. Due to Egypt’s position, the Jordanian government 
refused to join the Baghdad Pact.1  
By this time, the influence of Egypt and Syria began to increase in Jordan. In July 
1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. In response to Nasser’s actions, the 
Suez War of 1956 broke out. Arab countries, including Jordan, supported Nasser at the 
time. Following the Suez War, Egypt took control of the Suez Canal, and the popularity 
of Nasser increased significantly within the Arab countries. This is especially the case in 
Jordan as the Jordanian parliamentary elections of October 1956 resulted in a pro-Nasser 
government. A few days after the elections, in response to King Hussein’s request, 
Suleiman Nabulsi, the leader of the Nationalist Socialists formed a government that 
represented all of the Jordanian political parties. The Nabulsi government valued Jordan’s 
alliance with Egypt, believing that it would enhance Arab Unity and promote Jordan’s 
national interests. Further, it called for the ending of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty.2  
By late 1956 and early 1957, the influence of Egypt, Syria, and the communists 
were clear in Jordan. Shortly thereafter, the bond between King Hussein and Prime 
Minister Nabulsi became stressed as the cabinet became more involved in formulating 
significant policies such as moving toward establishing diplomatic relations with the 
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Soviet Union and Communist China. This led to the King’s decision to write Nabulsi 
formally about his unease over potential communist penetration. The King’s letter 
emphasized his commitment to preserving Jordan’s solidarity and preventing outside 
interference.  
By April 1957, considerable tension ignited between the cabinet and monarchy. 
This eventually led King Hussein to dismiss the Nabulsi government and announce 
concerns of the infiltration by international communism. The United States viewed these 
anti-communist and anti-Soviet Union efforts as being in alignment with its interests in 
the region. The White House announced that “the independence and integrity of Jordan 
[w]as vital” to the United States. Immediately, the United States provided $10 million 
emergency assistance to Jordan and dispatched its Sixth Fleet to the eastern 
Mediterranean to defend the King’s regime.3  
Although the US-Jordan diplomatic relations were officially established in 1949, 
Jordan’s significance to the United States was not understood until 1957 when the 
interests of the two countries converged. It can be argued that the United States’ foreign 
policy toward Jordan was developed under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Successive 
American administrations confirmed throughout the following decades that Jordanian 
security and stability were deemed significant to the national security interests of the 
United States. This attitude toward Jordan still remains true.  
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In response to the primary and secondary questions that characterize this study, 
there are several conclusions that can be drawn. 
The United States’ foreign policy toward Jordan stemmed mainly from the 
following five factors: its strategic geographical location in the heart of the Middle East 
region, its powerful ideology, its moderate, pro-Western regime, its regional security role, 
and its vital role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The study revealed that these factors 
reflect the continuously significant role of Jordan to the United States’ administrations 
beginning with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and ending with the current President, 
Barack H. Obama.  
The study shows that Jordan’s strategic importance to the United States mainly 
derives from its geopolitical location in the center of the Middle East. Since the late 
1950s, the United States has recognized how significant Jordan’s location is to achieve its 
foreign policy interests in the region. Additionally, it has also realized that Jordan’s 
location constitutes a buffer between the Arab countries on one side and Israel on the 
other. Geographically, Jordan is the closest Arab state to Israel and has the longest border 
with it. Finally, Jordan’s geopolitical location maintains a strategic significance to the 
United States and other countries in the region as well. 
The study also shows that ideology was a primary factor in the US-Jordan 
relationship. During the very early years of the Cold War, both President Eisenhower and 
King Hussein shared a similar negative view of the Soviet Union and international 
communism. Their opposition to the Soviet Union and international communism led to 
more cooperation and coordination economically, militarily, and politically. Further, it 
seemed logical that the King aligned his country with the free world; he received his 
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early education in Britain. Later, as an adult, he attended the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst in Camberley, United Kingdom. 
In the late 1950s, King Hussein recognized the impact of international 
communism on the Arab countries in general, and Jordan, in particular. His 
apprehensions led him to oppose the communist principles. The King felt that “as 
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad … would have … [no] truck with communism,” 
as he, like many Muslims in the Arab world, thought that Islam and communism were 
inherently incompatible.4 Also, King Hussein considered communism as a major foe of 
Islam and Arabs even before Judaism. Furthermore, the King believed that communism 
would not free Arab people stating that “… imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab 
East, will be replaced by a new kind of imperialism [international communism].”5 
This King’s disposition toward communism and its principles and values 
motivated him to move quickly toward building strong relations with the United States. 
The unified vision of King Hussein and the United States’ policy-makers over the Soviet 
Union and communism, especially in the early years of the Cold War, has significantly 
strengthened US-Jordan ties and the United States has regarded the King as a close friend 
and ally in the Middle East. This contentment with King Hussein and his position on 
communism paved the way for the United States to invest more in Jordan to prevent the 
Middle East region from experiencing the spread of communist influence. Thus, ideology 
congruence was an auxiliary factor exploited by both the United States and Jordan to 
achieve certain objectives and a long-term strategic partnership. 
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This study also reveals that security is of major importance in the mutual 
relationship between the United States and Jordan. This was first recognized when King 
Hussein publicly announced that international communism was a threat to Jordan. 
Subsequently, the King’s efforts to challenge the communist influence in Jordan were 
greatly seen as compatible with United States interests. The United States began to 
consider Jordan as a strategic ally in the face of international communism. Therefore, 
Jordan’s stance against the Soviet Union helped prevent the expansion of the Soviet 
Union and the spread of international communism in the Middle East region.  
The study shows that the security and stability of Jordan were very significant to 
keeping a balance between the Arab states and Israel. Lastly, it should be noted that since 
the late 1950s, the United States has provided all necessary means to maintain and sustain 
the permanency of Jordan. The United States has provided substantial diplomatic, 
economic, and military assistance necessary to the survival of the Jordanian state. The 
study found the United States correlated Jordan’s security with Israeli security. The 
United States’ policy-makers came to the conclusion that any threat to Jordan’s safety 
would significantly constitute a substantial threat to Israel. 
The study confirms that the Jordanian regime is a parliamentary system of 
government with a hereditary monarchy, in the dynasty of King Abdullah ibn Al-
Hussein. In this system, the monarchy is the primary political institution, and the 
parliament is secondary. The King has been vested with broad powers over the executive 
branch, legislature, and judiciary. The King is the Head of State and the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces. The King is exempt from any liability and 
responsibility; therefore, there can be no amendment to the Constitution that might affect 
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his rights as king without his approval. These vast constitutional powers significantly 
enable the King to play a vital role in both domestic and foreign policies. Since 1953, 
“the Jordanian political system continued to revolve around [King] Hussein, who ruled 
firmly, brooking no opposition.”6 This philosophy continues to be true today. 
The study illustrates that the Jordanian regime holds a moderate, pro-Western 
orientation and embraces moderate policies in accordance with the Western party line, 
especially the United States and the United Kingdom. “The fate of its pro-Western 
regime holds more [significant] consequences for American interests than any Arab state 
not named Egypt and Saudi Arabia — something better ruminated now than at the 
eleventh hour.”7 Moreover, as a result of his willingness to engage with other leaders, 
King Hussein was able to keep up with developments outside his country, ensuring 
uninterrupted financial and technical assistance for his Kingdom. He was able to be 
cordial with foreign states, something that continues to be a critical advantage for Jordan, 
considering its dependence on external support.8 
Furthermore, the study finds that the significance of the Jordanian regime to the 
United States emerged from the crucial role of King Hussein in regional and international 
politics. His moderate policies significantly increased his creditability within the Arab 
and Western world alike. In addition, among Arab countries, Jordan is considered the 
country that has the most democratic principles including democratic elections, human 
                                                          
6 Nyrop, Jordan, a Country Study, 166. 
 
7 Sean L. Yom, “Foreign Policy: Don’t Forget about Jordan,” NPR, last modified February 3, 
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rights, political parties, syndicates and civil society foundations, and women’s political 
participation. The study also shows that King Abdullah II, since he assumed power in 
1999, has kept cordial relations with Arab countries, the United States, Britain, Japan, 
Israel, and other foreign governments. After the events of September 11, 2001, the King 
was the first Arab leader welcomed in the White House. He was also the first Arab leader 
to visit President Obama in April 2009. 
The study shows that Jordan is a vital participant in the Middle East peace 
negotiations. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Jordan became actively involved 
in the Arab-Israeli peace process negotiations. In late 1991, King Hussein played a 
crucial role in the Madrid Conference for the Peace in the Middle East to resolve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, all the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict came 
together in direct negotiations. As a result of the Madrid Conference, three peace accords 
were clinched with Israel: the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (Oslo I) of September 13, 1993, The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 
26, 1994, and The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) of September 28, 1995.   
The study further reveals that after the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements 
concluded in September 1993, King Hussein determined that peace with Israel was in 
Jordan’s best interests given Israel’s military prowess, the initiation and progress of the 
Palestinian national movement that endangered Jordanian and Israeli security, and the 
need to regain Western support of Jordan following its decision to back Iraq in the Gulf 
War of 1991.9 Finally, in October 1998, at the Wye River Summit in the United States, 
King Hussein played a role in easing tensions between the Israeli Prime Minister 
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Benjamin Netanyahu and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader, Yasser 
Arafat to join the talks.   
As a result of his sound character, the participation of King Hussein in the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process negotiation significantly raised Jordan’s position, 
prestige, respect, and creditability. After King Abdullah II assumed the throne in 
February 1999, he also kept a semi-cordial relationship with Israel to maintain positive 
relationships with the United States, the West and international financial institutions to 
ensure continued foreign assistance upon which Jordan depends on heavily.10 Jordan’s 
primary goal was, and is, to ensure Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, 
including the Old City of Jerusalem (East Jerusalem). It also hoped to secure a permanent 
and spreading peace in the region while restoring the national rights of the Palestinian 
people. To this day, the Jordanian state continues to support resolving the “Palestinian-
Israeli” dispute based on the two-state solution and the United Nations Resolutions 242 
and 338.  
The study reveals that following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States, Jordan was among the first Muslim countries to pledge support to help the 
United States in its global War on Terrorism. Jordan has taken multiple approaches to 
support the United States’ campaign against terrorism.  
At the domestic level, Jordan banned any banking activities “linked to terrorism 
activities,” and banned any assaults on shipping, industry, communications, and computer 
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systems. Those related Osama bin Laden, his Al-Qaeda organization, or to bin Laden’s 
associate, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi were arrested and prosecuted.11 
At the military level, Jordan established several advanced military training 
centers, partially funded by the United States government. This helped boost anti-
terrorism capability within its military forces to cope with the ongoing regional terrorism 
threats. The Jordanian training centers also provide training to neighboring Arab and non-
Arab countries to rebuild their military forces’ capacity to counter-terrorism. Also, to 
help the US-led global campaign against terrorism, Jordan was instrumental in training 
Afghan and Yemeni forces. In the post-2003 Iraqi War, Jordan trained over 54,000 Iraqi 
security and police officers in an attempt to help US-led construction efforts to rebuild 
Iraq in the post-Saddam Hussein regime.  
At the regional level, Jordan has provided valuable intelligence information on 
Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region. Furthermore, Jordan supported and 
participated in the US-led international coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in September 2014. Finally, in May 2015, Jordan played an active 
role in training prescreened moderate Syrian rebels to defend its national security interest 
and to maintain the stability of the entire region.  
The study found that the United States’ annual foreign aid (economic and 
military) to Jordan has fluctuated depending on the regional and international political 
events. Specifically, foreign aid increases during the time of crises and declines when 
there is no threat to Jordan. For instance, in response to the King’s stance on the Gulf 
crisis of 1990-1991, the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan declined and was suspended 
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until 1993. In the period followed the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, the United 
States’ foreign aid, both economic and military to Jordan, increased from a total of $73.6 
million in 1990 to $237.3 million in 1996.  
Following the September 11, 2001 events, the American war in Afghanistan in 
2001, and the Iraq War in 2003, the United States significantly increased its foreign aid to 
Jordan as a reward for its vital role in the war against terrorism. Specifically, the United 
States’ foreign aid to Jordan increased from $228.4 million in FY 2001 to 1,557.4 billion 
in FY 2003. Clearly, this high figure was given to Jordan to soften the impact of the Iraq 
War on Jordan’s economy and to maintain its border security. The United States’ foreign 
aid to Jordan through FY 2008 totaled approximately $10.23 billion.12 Between FY 2009 
and FY 2014, annual United States’ foreign aid to Jordan was $660 million ($360 million 
in economic aid and $300 million in military assistance). In reality, the average United 
States’ foreign aid to Jordan reached almost $1 billion. In February 2015, the United 
States and Jordan signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which 
the United States pledged to provide Jordan $1 billion annually in foreign aid from FY 
2015 to FY 2017. Through FY 2015, the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan reached 
approximately $15.83 billion.13 
The study reveals that US-Jordan economic relations were enhanced significantly 
after Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Jordan’s economy was not deemed 
significant to the United States’ at that time. As a direct result of the peace treaty with 
Israel, the United States took considerable initiatives to boost the Jordanian economy. 
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These initiatives included the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in 1997, the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1997, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
(TIFA) in 1999, and the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA) in 2001. These 
agreements had positive impacts on the US-Jordan trade relations. By 2007, as a direct 
result of these agreements, the United States was Jordan’s chief market making up nearly 
one-third of all exports in the country.14 In 2014, Jordan rated sixty-sixth out of all of 
United States trading partners in terms of volume of trade. After the USJFTA had gone 
into effect, Jordan experienced a rapid increase in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
which almost doubled from nearly $8.5 billion in 2001 to $16 billion in 2007.15 
Marwa Al Nasa’a and others, in their study, “The Jordan-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement: Eight Years Later,” stated: 
… [The USJFTA] provide[s] the country with a comparative advantage in a large 
export market and boost foreign direct investment from the United States…. 
[USJFTA] signify the strong U.S. commitment to Jordan.16  
 
It is important to point out foreign aid has been utilized as a vital tool to exercise 
political pressure by the United States on Jordan. Foreign aid and mutual trade 
agreements have markedly helped Jordan by enhancing its economy and limiting its 
ability to make independent political decisions. 
The study explores how the members of the United States Congress have 
significantly influenced US-Jordan relations. First, the most notable occurrence in this 
regard was Congress’ suspension of the United States’ foreign aid to Jordan until 1993 
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following King Hussein’s unwillingness to join the US-led international coalition against 
Iraq in 1990-1991. Second, Congressional approval of the USJFTA in 2001, despite the 
fact that experts concurred that the agreement would have a negligible effect on the 
United States, further influenced US-Jordan relations. Third, in 2015, the United States 
Senate Foreign Committee, led by Senator John McCain exercised its influence over the 
Obama administration to authorize the sale of more sophisticated weapons to Jordan to 
defend itself from the threat of ISIS. 
The study found that the primary interests of the United States’ foreign policy in 
the Middle East include: securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf region; supporting 
and protecting Israel’s sovereignty; maintaining the United States’ military bases, 
particularly in the Gulf states, defending client-states and friendly regimes in the region 
to maintain its stability and subordination; and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and many others that might pose a major threat to 
American interests in the region. 
Examining the hypotheses of the study shows: 
Hypothesis One: Jordan’s stability is crucial to the United States to maintain its 
national security interests in the Middle East.  
Largely, Jordan’s stability and security remained significant to the United States. 
Since the very early years of the Cold War until today the United States government 
pledged its support to the Jordanian state. In addition, the successive American 
administrations from Eisenhower to Obama regarded “the independence and integrity of 
Jordan as vital” to the United States. 
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Hypothesis Two: Jordan’s instability might lead to the spread of radical Islamic 
movements, which might pose a substantial threat to the United States’ national security 
interests in the Middle East. 
To some degree, the study revealed that the United States had some 
apprehensions that Jordan’s instability would destabilize the entire region. Thus, Jordan’s 
stability correlates with regional security. The study also reveals that any threat to the 
Jordanian regime might result in a new government consisting of anti-US Islamic parties, 
national movements, or radical forces that would pose a substantial threat, de facto, to the 
United States national security interests in the region. 
Moreover, the Jordanian state believes that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict can 
be achieved throughout peaceful negotiations, based on the United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, various Islamic parties (including 
the Islamic parties in Jordan) believe that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict can be 
achieved through resistance and military means, which contradicts Western foreign 
policy. It is unlikely that the Western governments would accept any Islamic leadership 
given that their underlying philosophies are so opposed. The former Hamas government 
in the Palestinian occupied territories and the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt 
are just two examples. 
Hypothesis Three: Foreign aid and economic agreements have been utilized as 
principal instruments of the United States’ foreign policy to exercise influence over 
Jordan to achieve certain political objectives.  
Foreign aid, QIZs, USJFTA, and other economic agreements have markedly 
helped the Jordanian government to overcome its serious economic barriers and rebooted 
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the country’s economy. On the other hand, successive American administrations have 
exploited foreign aid and economic agreements as principal tools to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives. This posture, however, led to linking the Jordanian economy, and even 
the currency, with the United States’ economy and subsequently created a situation of 
subordination of the Jordanian state to the United States.  
This study presents some final speculations:  
- If Jordan becomes a totally democratic state in the future, it could conceivably 
count on increased aid from the United States, both economic and military, which could 
perhaps be an even closer collaboration in the Middle East. 
-  If the Muslim Brotherhood Party comes to power, there could be a significant 
cooling in relations with the United States in the current political climate. The United 
States support of such a government would be considered supporting a potential 
‘Islamist’ regime. In this regard, the example of the short-lived Hamas government of 
2006 and the Muslim Brotherhood government led by former President Mohammad 
Morsi in 2012 are illustrative of the approach of the West to Islam in general.  
- If the Jordanian government abrogated the peace treaty it has with Israel, there 
would be a swift shift in relations between the United States and Jordan. Although Jordan 
is a significant ally in the Middle East region, the Israelis are by far more interwoven into 
short and long-term United States goals. 
- Continuous regional instability could be either improved or declined, depending 
upon Jordan’s relations with the United States as well as considering their position on any 
given issue causing the instability. If Jordan is part of a solution, it could receive 
increased foreign aid up to, and possibly including, military support. However, the result 
221 
 
could be the exact opposite if Jordan was part of the cause of the instability and it would 
be economically and militarily punished by the United States. The Gulf crisis of 1990-
1991 is a clear example.  
Based on my research, it appears both countries will continue to have a strong 






Address to the Nation by His Majesty King Hussein 
Amman, February 6, 19911* 
 
Brother citizens, Brother Arabs, Brother Muslims, you who uphold your faith and refuse 
to see your nation humiliated; you who are truly sincere within yourselves and in your 
hearts and minds, and in your objectives, ideas and attitudes; you who are concerned for 
the present as well as the future generations of our nation, I greet every one of you with 
all affection.  
I choose to address you at this very difficult moment, motivated by Arab honour and 
religious duty. Iraq, fellow Arabs and Muslims, now pays the price in pure and noble 
blood of belonging to its nation. Iraq had always hastened, without hesitation, to make 
sacrifices in all the battles which the Arabs land in Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. 
Arab blood was always dear to Iraq and shouldn’t the blood of Iraqi men, women and 
children be dear to us? 
The world has known cruel wars, but never one like this that is waged against Iraq and 
the likes of which may never happen again. The armies of the biggest and most powerful 
nations have gathered and unleashed their modern and dangerous weapons on the land, in 
the sea, and in the sky. These weapons had originally been arrayed by the present 
international military alliance against an opposing alliance led by another super power. 
They are all now arrayed against the Baghdad of Haroun Al Rashid, the Basra of Islamic 
studies and poetry, the Kufa of Ali, May God’s peace be upon him, the Holy Najaf, 
Karbala, Al Diwaniyeh, Mosul, Kerkouk, and every Iraqi city and village. Fire rains 
down upon Iraq from airplanes, from battleships, from submarines and rockets, 
destroying mosques, churches, schools, museums, hospitals, powdered milk factories, 
residential areas, Bedouin tents, electricity generating stations, and water networks. This 
bombing started from the first hours and took the form of a war that aims to destroy all 
the achievements of Iraq and return it to primitive life, by using the latest technology of 
the destruction. The first victims of this war were justice, righteousness and peace. Its 
first casualties were aspirations of all humanity since the end of the Second Word War, 
hoping that that war would be the last human tragedy, and that man would no longer be 
killer or victim. All the hopes of our nation and the world community were thwarted the 
day the land of Iraq was turned into the arena of the Third World War.  
[*] Original text in Arabic.    
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Brother Citizens, Brother Arabs, Brother Muslims, 
The irony of this war is that it is waged under the cloak of international legitimacy, and in 
in the name of the United Nations, which was created to preserve peace, security and 
justice, and to resolve disputes through dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy. If this is an 
example of the future role of the United Nations in the New World Order, what an 
ominous future lies before all nations! What international legitimacy will there be to 
protect the less powerful against the more powerful who seek to subjugate them, 
humiliate them, kill them, and usurp all their rights that were granted by God and 
protected by the Charter of the United Nations? We now realise fully the real reason why 
we, the Arabs, were deprived of our right to solve our problems. 
By contrast the Arab-Israeli conflict remained far from any honest and real attempt to 
resolve it justly. The Arab Palestinian people and the Arab nation still await the 
implementation of a single United Nations resolution, which rejects Israeli occupation 
and calls for an end to it. Twenty four years have passed since the occupation of the West 
Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, and nine years have passed since the occupation of 
South Lebanon, but none of our hopes were fulfilled. Nevertheless, we did not despair of 
the United Nations. The major powers persisted in assuring us that a peaceful solution 
was possible. Because the real purpose behind this destructive war, as proven by its 
scope, and as attested to by the declaration of the parties, is to destroy Iraq, and rearrange 
the area in a manner far more dangerous to our nation’s present and future that the Sykes-
picot agreement. This arrangement would put the nation, its aspirations and its resources 
under direct foreign hegemony and would shred all ties between its parts, thus further 
weakening and fragmenting it. 
The talk about a new world order, whose early feature is the destruction of Iraq, and the 
persistence of this talk as the war continues, lead us to wonder about the identity of this 
order and instill in us doubts regarding its nature.  
The New World Order to which we aspire holds equal in their right to freedom, progress 
and prosperity. It deals with their causes with the same standards and under the same 
principles, regardless of any consideration or influence. The required new order would 
not mete out injustice to any one nation. It would not discriminate between nations but 
draw them together within the framework of mutual respect and fruitful cooperation for 
the benefit of our planet and all people on it. It must be an order that believes in public 
freedom and protects private freedoms, respects human rights and strengthens the 
principles of democracy. It should not deny the Arab people their right to all this. 
The nature of the military alliance against Iraq betrays its near and long-term objectives. 
For when Israel supports this alliance; when two countries, one Arab the other Islamic, 
both of which have normal political relations with Israel, whose leaders compete for 
prominence in this alliance and reiterate their desire and enthusiasm for the destruction of 
Iraq. When Arab and Islamic lands are offered as bases for the allied armies from which 
to launch attacks to destroy Arab Muslim Iraq, when Arab money is financing this war 
with unprecedented generosity unknown to us and our Palestinian brothers, while we 
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shoulder our national responsibilities; when this takes place, I say that any Arab or 
Muslim can realise the magnitude of this crime committed against his religion and his 
nation.  
Brothers Citizens,  
From the very beginning we have shouldered our responsibilities to the Arab nation and 
Islam, as well as towards international peace and security. We have made every effort to 
fulfill these responsibilities. We are not hurt because our rewards have been successive 
punishments to our country and people. It has become clear to the World that these 
punishments are the price which we must pay because we tried to avert the disaster which 
was planned and premeditated in the dark. As a new form of punishment there are now 
attempts to deprive us of our basic needs, even oil, as a new form of punishment, and one 
of the most severe, for no other reason than our principled stand. We would not forsake 
this right because it is equal in importance to our human right to breathe air that is not yet 
rationed. Nevertheless, Jordan’s leadership and people will remain firm in their position 
and belief that the opportunity for peace still exists. Resources to peace remains less 
costly and would reflect more truly the commitment to principles and values that the 
continuation of this devastating war.  
The voices of millions can be heard in every country, including those of the alliance. 
They all call for peace and an end to the killing of children, the destruction of homes, and 
the withholding of medicine from the sick. I know just as you do that against these voices 
stand political and military leaders, alas with Arabs in their forefront, calling for the 
continuation of this war. Which voices will win in the end? The voices of reason, peace 
and justice, or the voices of war, hatred and insanity?. 
We and other brothers have made a loud call to stop military action and open the way for 
diplomatic political action to resolve the problem, but the call fell on deaf ears. Many a 
time before the war had started we warned against its effects, the deep wounds which it 
would open, and its repercussions which would grow and include human, economic and 
ecological tragedies. We warned that war is a measure of last resort, launched only after 
all efforts to avert it have been exhausted. Our calls and warnings were in vain.  
Justice will be victorious, God willing, Brothers, and our nation will prevail because, 
through its victory humanity will prevail against its enemies. Life will prevail over death. 
Love among nations will prevail over hatred. It will become clear to all those who 
gambled that our nation would be divided, like its leaders, that it is a dead nation, they 
will be proven wrong. Our nation will remain, God willing, a strong, proud and vibrant 
nation. “These your people are one people and I am your God, so worship Me alone” 
(Surat Al Anbiya’ No. 92).  Let us have fear of God and remember that. If this situation 
continues it will only benefit those who covet our hands and resources, with Israel at their 
forefront. There are already signs that the spoils are being divided. We hear and read 
every day of plans to control our resources, limit our freedom of decision, strangle our 
aspirations and usurp our rights. There is talk of proposed military alliances and foreign 
troops that will stay on Arab soil; of conditions that will handicap our progress; of a 
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solution for the Palestinian problem which has been prepared or which will be prepared 
by others according to what they see, and according to the will of the powerful that is 
imposed on the weak. We cannot imagine that this solution would fulfill the legitimate 
national rights of the Palestinian people on their national soil. 
Let us join our efforts to stop this catastrophe and save the people of Iraq from the fate 
that is planned for them. Let us save our nation from the plans that are designed for it. Let 
us bring that war to an end.  
The starting point in all this is immediate and serious work to make the alliance accept a 
cease-fire, in preparation for a responsible dialogue between the antagonists: an Iraqi 
American dialogue and an Arab-Arab dialogue that resort to reason and balance interests 
against international legitimacy, the legitimacy of security, peace, justice and equality. 
So where is the United Nations now? The alternative to a cease-fire is the destruction of 
Arabs and Muslims, their humiliation, their exploitation, the trampling on their honour, 
pride and legitimate hopes, and hatred and strife between nations. We in Jordan will stay 
the Arabs of all Arabs, the noblest of the noble, the men of all men. We shall always stay 
united, army and people, alert to defend our country. If the fight is forced upon us we 
shall be up to it and gain one of God’s two favours (victory or martyrdom). Our hearts are 
full of faith, and we thank God for everything.  
From Amman of the Arabs I send to our people in Palestine our great pride in them, in 
their steadfastness, in their resilience against their suffering where a whole nation is 
under house arrest, without work, without a source of earning, without medicine. But it is 
a nation that believes in God and stands fast by the Aqsa mosque and the Church of the 
Holy sepulcher. 
We send a special salute to His Holiness Pope John Paul II for his prayers and continuous 
calls for peace in the Middle East, and to all people and international figures everywhere 
who decry war and call for peace. A salute of pride to all our Arab and Muslim brothers 
in the five continents who came out from the first moments of war to make a stand for 
life and peace against death, destruction and aggression.  
I pray a special debt of thanks to all those who search for truth and who work to spread it 
because they respect and care for truth. To all newsmen, academics, and politicians who 
live along us and do their duty in honesty and professionalism.  
“Most of their conferrings together are devoid of good, except such as enjoin charity, or 
the promotion of public welfare or of public peace; and on him who strives after these, 
seeking the gratificiation of God, shall we soon bestow a great reward.” (Surat Al-Nisa’ 
No. 114).  






International Contributions to the War against Terrorism, June 7, 2002 
(revised June 14, 2002)1 
 
Coalition partners from across globe are fighting against evil of terrorism. 
The terrorism of September 11th was not just an attack on the United States; it was an 
attack on the world.  Citizens from more than 80 countries died that day – innocent men, 
women and children from across the globe.  Within hours of the tragedy, coalitions 
involving many nations assembled to fight terrorism – literally hundreds of countries 
have contributed in a variety of ways – some militarily, others diplomatically, 
economically and financially.  Some nations have helped openly; others prefer not to 
disclose their contributions. 
 
The United States began building the coalition on September 12, 2001, and there are 
currently 69 nations supporting the global war on terrorism. To date, 20 nations have 
deployed more than 16,000 troops to the U.S. Central Command’s region of 
responsibility. This coalition of the willing is working hard every day to defeat 
terrorism, wherever it may exist. 
 
In Afghanistan alone, our coalition partners are contributing more than 8,000 troops to 
Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul 
– making up over half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan.  The war against 
terrorism is a broad-based effort that will take time. Every nation has different 
circumstances and will participate in different ways.  This mission and future missions 
will require a series of coalitions ready to take on the challenges and assume the risks 
associated with such an operation. 
 
Below is a partial list of military contributions to the war on terrorism from some of the 
countries that have lent their support.  This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to 
give the reader a sense of the important role played by the coalition of coalitions in the 
global war on terrorism. This list will be updated monthly.
                                                          





An “Aardvark” mine clearing unit and personnel are currently deployed to 
Qandahar, and has cleared mines from more than 70,000 square meters in both 
Bagram and Qandahar. Jordan has provided basing and overflight permission for 
all U.S. and coalition forces. As of June 6, 2002, the Jordanian hospital in Mazar-
e-Sharif helped 68,811 patients:  
 
 




Women – 26,763 
Men – 22,930 
Children – 18,063  
 




Has provided overflight rights and allowed transshipment of supplies to U.S. forces in 




Has continuously offered support to OEF operations, including access, overflight, 
basing and supporting MIO. 




Kuwait has provided basing and overflight permission for all U.S. and coalition forces. 
Country representatives arrived at CENTCOM on Feb.14, 2002.  There are currently 




Has provided basing and overflight rights for U.S. and coalition personnel. 
Under the United Nations World Food Program, Kyrgyzstan -- along with Russia and 






The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)1 
 
Security Council resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967, and resolution 338, 
adopted on 22 October 1973, are considered basic instruments in all subsequent 
discussions of a Middle East peace settlement. 
 
1. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967: 
 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the 
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of 
the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment 
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area 
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats 
or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;  
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of 
every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of 
demilitarized zones;
                                                          




3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement  in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of 
the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
 
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.  
 
2. Resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973: 
 
The Security Council, 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 
12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now 
occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease- fire, negotiations shall 
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a 
just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none.1 
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